Opinion
Index No. 525924/2021 Seqs. 002
10-10-2023
German Petrov, Plaintiff, v. Monadnock Construction, Inc., The Domain Companies LLC, 445 Gerard Owner LLC, and 417 Gerard Avenue Holdings LLC, Defendants.
Unpublished Opinion
DECISION/ORDER
DEVIN P. COHEN, Justice
Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of this Motion
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed ....1
Order to Show Cause and Affidavits Annexed.___
Answering Affidavits ....................................2
Replying Affidavits .......................................3
Exhibits.........................................................___
Other............................................................___
Upon the foregoing papers, defendant's motion for summary judgment (Seq. 002) is determined as follows:
Procedural History and Factual Background
This action arises from injuries that the plaintiff claims to have sustained when he fell on an exterior set of stairs at a worksite on August 30, 2021 (Bill of Particulars at ¶¶ 4, 6-7). Plaintiff was employed by non-party M. Early Plumbing and Heating Corp at the time of the occurrence (Petrov C-3 Form). Plaintiff testified during his Workers' Compensation hearing that he tripped on debris at the site and fell (Hearing Transcript at 8).
Plaintiff filed Workers' Compensation claim on September 7, 2021. On March 29, 2022, Workers' Compensation Administrative Judge Meira Mednik disallowed the plaintiffs claim, finding that the plaintiff s testimony "was not deemed credible" as to the mechanism of injury (Decision of Mednik, J., at 1). Plaintiff then appealed the decision to the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) on April 25, 2022. The WCB affirmed Judge Mednik's decision on August 29, 2022. The plaintiff did not appeal the WCB determination and the time to do so has expired.
Analysis
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact (Giuffrida v Citibank, 100 N.Y.2d 72, 81 [2003]). Once a prima facie showing has been established, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to rebut the movant's showing such that a trial of the action is required (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324 [1986]).
In the instant action, defendants argue that the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from pursuing his claims in this action by the WCB determination (Lennon v. 56th &Park [NY] Owner, LLC, 199 A.D.3d 64 [2d Dep't 2021]). New York courts have historically recognized the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies (see DeSimone v S. African Mar. Corp., S.A., 82 A.D.2d 820 [2d Dept 1981]). However, on December 30, 2022, the New York Legislature promulgated NY Workers Compensation Law (WCL) § 118-a, the "Justice for Injured Workers Act" (JIWA). WCL § 118-a precludes the use of determinations by the WCB for the purpose of collateral estoppel, except as to the issue of an employer-employee relationship.
The issue before the court, therefore, is whether WCL § 118-a was intended by the Legislature to be solely prospective in scope or to have retroactive applicability. Statutes are presumed to be prospective in scope unless the Legislature clearly intended retroactivity to apply (Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Disk, 91 N.Y.2d 577, 581 [1998]). Where the Legislature's intent to promulgate a statute that was remedial in nature is clear and retroactive application would not result in unfairness or impair substantive rights, retroactive application may be appropriate (Posillico v Southold Town Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 219 A.D.3d 885 [2d Dept 2023]).
Plaintiff contends that the "Justification" section of JIWA states that the statute is meant to correct court determinations that have estopped plaintiffs from bringing claims based on administrative determinations. Factors to consider when determining retroactivity are "whether the statute was designed to rewrite an unintended judicial interpretation; and whether the enactment itself reaffirms a legislative judgment about what the law in question should be" (Marrero v Crystal Nails, 114 A.D.3d 101, 112 [2d Dept 2013]).
In that section, the Legislature explains that, in 2013, the Court of Appeals held that allowing WCB determinations to collaterally estop third-party actions denied plaintiffs their right to a fair trial (citing Augui v Seven Thirty One Ltd. Partnership (22 N.Y.3d 246, 255-57 [2013]). The Legislature deemed WCL § 118-a necessary because New York courts after Augui continued to improperly grant defendants efforts to collaterally estop plaintiffs based on WCB determinations. In light of the Legislature's clear intent to preclude a practice it states has been improper since 2013, it is clear that the Legislature intended JIWA to be remedial in nature-an indicia of retroactivity. Additionally, it seems clear that the application of JIWA to prevent collateral estoppel does not increase the defendants' ultimate liability-rather, it allows plaintiff an opportunity to exercise his right to a fair trial.
Accordingly, JIWA applies and the defendant's motion for summary judgment, predicated on collateral estoppel, is denied without prejudice to a new motion after discovery has concluded.
Conclusion
Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Seq. 002) is denied. This constitutes the decision of the court.