Opinion
Civil No. 3:19-CV-1228
07-19-2019
JOSEPH PETRICK, Plaintiff v. JUDGE VITO GERUOLO, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Caputo)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review. The plaintiff, Joseph Petrick, recites that he was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County on state criminal charges, and is currently actively pursuing an appeal of this conviction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 3, 33.) In this pro se complaint, Petrick names the presiding judge in his state criminal trial, the district attorney and assistant district attorney who prosecuted this case, and various investigating police officers as defendants. (Id.) He then alleges that the defendants maliciously prosecuted him, engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and denied him due process. As relief for these alleged civil rights violations, Petrick urges us to set aside and overturn his state criminal conviction based upon due process violations, the denial of Petrick's right to a fair trial, and prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.)
Petrick has not submitted the filing fee required by law and thus is apparently seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We will conditionally GRANT Petrick leave to proceed in this fashion, direct the clerk to file the lodged complaint for screening purposes only, but for the reasons set forth below we recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not "assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.'"
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed.
B. We Should Abstain From Interfering with Petrick's On-going State Case.
In its current form, this complaint fails as a matter of law for at least five reasons. At the outset, liberally construed the complaint invites us to issue an injunction in this pending state criminal case, setting aside Petrick's conviction. To the extent that this complaint invites this court to enjoin aspects of a pending state case, this pro se pleading runs afoul of a settled tenet of federal law, the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Younger abstention doctrine is inspired by basic considerations of comity that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As defined by the courts: "Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding." Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) ("[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.")). This doctrine, which is informed by principles of comity, is also guided by these same principles in its application. As the Third Circuit has observed:
"A federal district court has discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding." Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)). As noted earlier, the Younger doctrine allows a district court to abstain, but that discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir.2008).Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d at 131.
Once these three legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, applying these standards, federal courts frequently abstain from hearing requests for injunctive relief which necessarily interfere with on-going state criminal cases. Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, the plaintiff's pro se complaint reveals that all of the legal prerequisites for Younger abstention are present here with respect to those claims that seek to enjoin on-going state cases. First, it is evident that there are state proceedings in this case. Second, it is also apparent that those proceedings afford Petrick a full and fair opportunity to litigate some of the issues raised in this lawsuit in the state case. See Sullivan v. Linebaugh, 362 F. App'x 248, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010). Finally, it is clear that the state proceedings implicate important state interests, since these matters involve state criminal law enforcement, an issue of paramount importance to the state. See, e.g., Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
Since the legal requirements for Younger abstention are fully met here, the decision to abstain from addressing these requests for injunctive relief rests in the sound discretion of this Court. Lui, 369 F.3d at 325. Given the important state interest in enforcement of its criminal laws, and recognizing that the state courts are prepared to fully address the merits of these matters, we believe that the proper exercise of this discretion weighs in favor of abstention and dismissal of these requests for injunctive relief at the present time. Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
C. Petrick May Not Bring a Civil Rights Action for Malicious Prosecution Until the State Case Has Been Resolved in a Fashion Which is Favorable to the Plaintiff.
In addition, this complaint fails because it rests on a fatally-flawed legal premise. At bottom, the plaintiff seeks to bring a civil rights action premised on claims of malicious prosecution without showing that his state criminal case has been resolved in a fashion which was favorable to the plaintiff.
This he cannot do. Quite the contrary, it is well-settled that an essential element of a civil rights malicious prosecution claim is that the underlying criminal case must have been terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here, the civil rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim in a setting where he has not achieved a favorable outcome in the underlying state case, the plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law. The Third Circuit has aptly observed in this regard:
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (quoting Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the common law of torts, "defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point for inquiry under § 1983 as well." Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978)). The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate's § 1983 suit, which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police officer destroyed evidence, used an unlawful voice identification procedure, and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the inmate could state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme Court asked what common-law cause of action was the closest to the inmate's claim and concluded that "malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy ... because unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process." Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Looking to the elements of malicious prosecution, the Court held that the inmate's claim could not proceed because one requirement of malicious prosecution is that the prior criminal proceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff's favor, and the inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his criminal conviction. Id.Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155-156 (3d Cir. 2000).
Thus, "our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment, but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime for which they were prosecuted." Washington v. Hanshaw, 13-1116, 2014 WL 67887 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2014) (citing Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir.2000)). Therefore, "a plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case." Steele v. City of Erie, 113 F. App'x 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, it is evident from the complaint that Petrick's prior state criminal prosecution did not terminate favorably for him. Indeed, Petrick admits that he currently stands convicted in this state case. In the absence of such a favorable termination of the state criminal case, this federal civil rights malicious prosecution lawsuit cannot proceed. In short, this complaint is based upon the fundamentally flawed legal premise that the plaintiff can sue the state for malicious prosecution even though he has not prevailed in the underlying state case. Since this premise is simply incorrect, the plaintiff's complaint fails as a matter of law.
D. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Also Bars Consideration of This Case.
Moreover, at this juncture, where Petrick has filed a civil action that invites this court to reject findings made by the state courts in the course of Petrick's state criminal prosecution, the plaintiff also necessarily urges us to sit as a state appellate court and review, re-examine and reject these state court rulings. This we cannot do. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has spoken to this issue and has announced a rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which compels federal district courts to decline invitations to conduct what amounts to appellate review of state trial court decisions. As described by the Third Circuit:
That doctrine takes its name from the two Supreme Court cases that gave rise to the doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states that "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court....". See also Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003). "Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of review on the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not intend to empower District Courts to review state court decisions." Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419.Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
Because federal district courts are not empowered by law to sit as reviewing courts, reexamining state court decisions, "[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction in some circumstances to review a state court adjudication." Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, LLP,, 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Cases construing this jurisdictional limit on the power of federal courts have quite appropriately:
[E]mphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that it "is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."[Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.], 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S. Ct. at 1521-22; see also
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, ----, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006)
Id.
However, even within these narrowly drawn confines, it has been consistently recognized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal judges from considering lawsuits "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments," particularly where those lawsuits necessarily require us to re-examine the outcome of this state criminal case. As the Third Circuit has observed in dismissing a similar lawsuit, which sought to make a federal case out of state court rulings made in litigation relating to a prior state criminal case:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal courts of jurisdiction "if the relief requested effectively would reverse a state court decision or void its ruling." Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). The doctrine occupies "narrow ground." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). It applies only where "the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment." Id. at 291, 125 S. Ct. 1517. . . . Ordering the relief he seeks, however, would require the District Court to effectively determine that the state courts' jurisdictional determinations were improper. Therefore, [Plaintiff] Sullivan's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the extent Sullivan was not "appealing" to the District Court, but instead was attempting to relitigate issues previously determined by the Pennsylvania courts, review is barred by res judicata. See Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing conditions in Pennsylvania under which collateral estoppel will bar a subsequent claim).Sullivan v. Linebaugh, 362 F. App'x 248, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010).
This principle applies here. Thus, in this case, as in Sullivan, the Rooker-Feldman and res judicata doctrines combine to compel dismissal of this complaint, to the extent that Petrick improperly invites us to act as a Pennsylvania appellate court for matters and claims relating to the plaintiff's state criminal prosecution.
E. The Judge Named in this Lawsuit is Entitled to Immunity.
Further, in its current form, Petrick's pro se complaint fails to state a claim against the state judge named as a defendant in this action. Liberally construed, this pro se complaint seeks to hold this state judge personally liable for alleged civil rights violations arising out of the performance of judicial acts in Petrick's criminal case. To the extent that the plaintiff seeks in this complaint to hold any judge personally liable for civil rights violations, based upon an alleged failure to act favorably in ruling upon Petrick's prior criminal case, it is well-settled that such officials are individually cloaked with immunity from liability. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial system must be entitled to some measure of protection from personal liability for acts taken in their official capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection from liability for judicial officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and those who perform adjudicative functions, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20 (grand jurors); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d. Cir. 1986) (parole board adjudicators); are entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions they take in our adversarial system of justice.
These longstanding common law immunities apply here and prevent Petrick from maintaining this civil action against the state judge named in this complaint, since the judge is entitled to judicial immunity for his actions in this state case and is absolutely immune from personal liability for any judicial acts, including presiding over a criminal case or sentencing a defendant. See, e.g., Arsad v. Means, 365 F. App'x 327 (3d Cir. 2010); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). As we have explained when rejecting a similar effort to impose personal civil rights liability on a judge, this immunity is both broad and absolute:
"It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally 'immune from a suit for money damages.' " Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam), and citing Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868)). "The doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit for damages." Id. (citations
omitted). Therefore, "[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his [or her] judicial acts even if his [or her] exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors," Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), and "[j]udicial immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice" Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694, 703 (W.D. Pa. 2007). Such immunity can be overcome only where a judge's acts are nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in nature, are "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.Catanzaro v. Collins, CIV. A. 09-922, 2010 WL 1754765 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2010), aff'd, 447 F. App'x 397 (3d Cir. 2011); Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F. App'x 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)) ("A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit. . . . A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction'").
These longstanding common law immunities for judicial officials directly apply here and prevent the plaintiff from maintaining this civil action against the individual judge named as a defendant in his complaint. In short, since this judge is immune from liability for judicial acts in Petrick's prior criminal case, the plaintiff simply may not maintain an action against this defendant, and these claims must all be dismissed.
F. The Prosecutors Named in This Complaint Are Also Entitled to Immunity From Liability.
Moreover, this complaint also fails with respect to the various state prosecutors named in this pleading. While the nature of his claims against these prosecutors is sometimes difficult to discern, it appears that the plaintiff is suing the prosecutors, in part, for the very act of prosecuting him. This he may not do. It is well-settled that a criminal defendant may not sue prosecutors for their act of filing charges against him since such conduct is cloaked in immunity from civil liability. The immunity conferred upon prosecutors for the quasi-judicial act of filing and bringing criminal charges is broad and sweeping:
[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that state prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-judicial role. This immunity extends to acts that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," such as "initiating a prosecution and ... presenting the State's case." Court has noted numerous public policy considerations underlying its extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors: [S]uits against prosecutors for initiating and conducting prosecutions "could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate"; lawsuits would divert prosecutors' attention and energy away from their important duty of enforcing the criminal law; prosecutors would have more difficulty than other officials in meeting the standards for qualified immunity; and potential liability "would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." ... [T]here are other checks on prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law and professional discipline.Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Here, we find that Petrick's complaint largely seeks to hold prosecutors personally liable for their act of prosecuting him. Since these officials are immune from personal, individual liability for their actions in bringing this criminal case, the claims against these defendants arising out of their decision to charge and convict him for engaging in state crimes should also be dismissed.
G. The Complaint Should Be Dismissed With Prejudice.
We recognize that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, the plaintiff's complaint is, on its face, fundamentally flawed in multiple and profound ways that cannot be remedied through more artful pleading. Since these pro se pleadings do not contain sufficient factual recitals to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, these allegations should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, since the factual and legal grounds proffered in support of the complaint make it clear that the plaintiff has no right to relief, granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston, 363 F.3d at 235. Therefore, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is conditionally GRANTED leave to proceed in forma pauperis but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 19th day of July 2019.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge