Opinion
Case No. 3:98CV7188.
January 31, 2005
ORDER
This is a suit by the operator of a towing company. After extended litigation, the parties reached a settlement, and the case was dismissed in accordance with that settlement. Nothing in the dismissal entry stated or indicated that this court retained continuing jurisdiction over the case after its dismissal. Likewise, the dismissal entry did not incorporate the settlement agreement into the order of dismissal.
Pending is plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. In essence, the plaintiff's motion contends that the City has engaged in a pattern of retaliatory removals of the plaintiff from the City's list of towing companies authorized to tow vehicles at the request of the Toledo Police Department.
In response to the motion to enforce, the defendant contends that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and grant the motion. The defendant is correct, and the motion to enforce settlement shall be denied.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the applicable principles in Hehl v. City of Avon Lake, 90 Fed.Appx. 797, *800-01, 2004 WL 133875, **3-4 (6th Cir. 2004) (Unpublished disposition):
In Re/Max International. Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001), . . ., this Court had an opportunity to discuss a district court's retention of jurisdiction following a dismissal based on a settlement agreement. We explained:
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), the Supreme Court considered a district court's attempt to enforce a settlement agreement between parties in a diversity action. The parties had settled and filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 41(a)(1)(ii), which the district court judge then signed. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia explained that as courts of limited jurisdiction, federal district courts do not possess the inherent power to vindicate their own authority where parties enter into a voluntary agreement resolving their federal lawsuit. Id. at 376-77, 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391. Instead, "[e]nforcement of the settlement agreement, whether through award of damages or decree of specific performance, is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction." Id. at 378, 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391. However, a district court does have the authority to dismiss pending claims while retaining jurisdiction over the future enforcement of a settlement agreement. Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 207 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2000). The Kokkonen Court noted that such ancillary jurisdiction would have existed if the parties had provided for the court's enforcement of a dismissal-producing settlement agreement through either one of two methods:
[T]he only order here was that the suit be dismissed, a disposition that is in no way flouted or imperiled by the alleged breach of the settlement agreement. The situation would be quite different if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal-either by separate provision (such as a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a breach of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (emphasis added).Re/Max, 271 F.3d at 641-42 (footnote omitted).
Thus, a district court retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement if it either (1) has language in the dismissal order indicating its retention of jurisdiction, or (2) incorporates the terms of the settlement agreement into the dismissal order.
As to the second exception, it is clear that the dismissal order, which only referenced the fact of settlement, did not incorporate the terms of the settlement. See Caudill v. N. Am. Media Corp., 200 F.3d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that "a dismissal order's mere reference to the fact of settlement does not incorporate the settlement agreement into the dismissal order.").
This court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the parties' settlement agreement. The dismissal entry contained no language that did so; nor did it incorporate the language of the agreement.
In light of Hehl and the cases and principles that it recites, this court has no jurisdiction to enforce the parties' settlement agreement.
It is, therefore,
ORDERED THAT the plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement be, and the same hereby is denied.
So ordered.