Opinion
2013-11-15
In the Matter of Timothy N. PETERS, Petitioner, v. Honorable Douglas A. RANDALL, Monroe County Court Judge, Respondent.
Easton Thompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP, Rochester (Brian Shiffrin of Counsel), for Petitioner. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of Counsel), for Respondent.
Easton Thompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP, Rochester (Brian Shiffrin of Counsel), for Petitioner. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, SCONIERS AND WHALEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination, after a hearing, revoking his pistol permit. Contrary to the contention of petitioner, we conclude that the determination is neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion. It is well established that “[r]espondent is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to revoke a pistol permit and may do so for any good cause,” including “a finding that the petitioner lack[s] the essential temperament or character which should be present in one entrusted with a dangerous instrument ..., or that he or she does not possess the maturity, prudence, carefulness, good character, temperament, demeanor and judgment necessary to have a pistol permit” ( Matter of Schiavone v. Punch, 34 A.D.3d 1366, 1366, 823 N.Y.S.2d 736 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Penal Law § 400.00[1], [11]; Matter of Strom v. Erie County Pistol Permit Dept., 6 A.D.3d 1110, 1111–1112, 776 N.Y.S.2d 685). Here, petitioner's pistol permit was revoked after a domestic incident involving his wife at the time. Police reports from the incident date indicate that petitioner twice grabbed his wife by the arms and pushed her against the wall, warning her that “there was going to be trouble” if she called the police. The reports also indicate a prior history of domestic violence. Notably, petitioner did not dispute the above factual basis for the revocation of his pistol permit, but argued only that it was an “isolated incident” ( see Matter of Demyan v. Monroe, 108 A.D.2d 1004, 1005, 485 N.Y.S.2d 152). In light of the above facts, we conclude that there is a rational basis for the determination, and that respondent did not abuse his broad discretion or act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in revoking petitioner's pistol permit ( see Matter of Moreno v. Cacace, 61 A.D.3d 977, 978–979, 878 N.Y.S.2d 175; see also Matter of Cuda v. Dwyer, 107 A.D.3d 1409, 1410, 967 N.Y.S.2d 302; Matter of Dlugosz v. Scarano, 255 A.D.2d 747, 748, 681 N.Y.S.2d 120, appeal dismissed93 N.Y.2d 847, 688 N.Y.S.2d 493, 710 N.E.2d 1092, lv. denied93 N.Y.2d 809, 694 N.Y.S.2d 631, 716 N.E.2d 696, cert. denied528 U.S. 1079, 120 S.Ct. 798, 145 L.Ed.2d 673).
Finally, petitioner's further contention that the revocation of his pistol permit violates the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution is without merit ( see Cuda, 107 A.D.3d at 1410, 967 N.Y.S.2d 302; Matter of Kelly v. Klein, 96 A.D.3d 846, 847–848, 946 N.Y.S.2d 218).
It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.