Opinion
D071645 D072035
09-27-2017
In re K.K. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.K., Defendant and Appellant.
Joanne D. Willis Newton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Daniela Davidian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. EJ3567A-B) CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed. Joanne D. Willis Newton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Daniela Davidian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
S.K. (mother) appeals the orders summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions. We conclude the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion when it found mother failed to make a prima facie showing (1) her circumstances were changed, and (2) it was in her children's best interest to place them in her care and/or order additional reunification services, given that she had been a drug addict for about 11 years; that she had a previous dependency and had relapsed; that she had neither engaged in any court-ordered services nor visited her children during the reunification period; and that she filed her petitions on the "eve" of the section 366.26 hearing after maintaining sobriety for a relatively short period of time. Affirmed.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
This court on April 24, 2017, granted mother's unopposed request to consolidate case numbers D071645 and D072035. Case number D071645 involves mother's appeal from the juvenile court's January 24, 2017 order summarily denying her "first" section 388 petition. Case number D072035 is an appeal from the court's March 15, 2017 order summarily denying mother's "second" section 388 petition, which the court found was "very similar" to the first petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
A. Background
In early July 2015, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed section 300, subdivision (b)(1) petitions on behalf of K.K., born April 2008, and on behalf of A.K., born June 2012 (K.K. and A.K. are sometimes collectively referred to as minors). The petitions alleged there was a substantial risk minors would suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure of mother and father C.K. (father) (sometimes collectively referred to as parents) to provide regular care due to their mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
The petitions further alleged that between May and June 2015, "the parents used narcotics and/or dangerous drugs, to wit, methamphetamine, to excess, as evidenced by, but not limited to, the mother's admission that she has an 11[-]year history of using methamphetamine and recently relapsed and tested positive for amphetamine. The mother is homeless and has been residing in a truck and abusing drugs and her behavior has been erratic and violent and her drug abuse has rendered her unable to provide regular care for [minors] and [minors'] father is incarcerated and has failed to protect and supervise [minors who are] in need of the protection of the Juvenile Court."
Further, as to A.K. only, the petition alleged that on or about June 17, 2015, A.K. was exposed to a "violent confrontation" between mother, who appeared under the influence, and the paternal great-grandmother, C.A. After mother became upset, mother punched C.A. in the face while C.A. was holding A.K. The petition also alleged mother's "erratic behavior" and ongoing drug abuse placed A.K. at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
In connection with the petitions, Agency filed an application for protective custody warrant on behalf of minors. In the application, Agency noted that in late May 2015, it received a child abuse hotline call regarding general neglect for K.K. and A.K., as mother was suspected of using methamphetamine and living in her truck with A.K., who was then three years old. Agency reported that mother was arrested on May 24, 2015, as a result of two open warrants for illegal lodging and being under the influence; that C.A. was called and was able to take A.K. into her care upon mother's arrest; and that A.K. was dirty and the following day, was ill with a high fever. At the time, K.K. was living in the home of the maternal grandmother. On June 10, mother tested positive for amphetamine.
Agency received a second referral on June 19, 2015, after the San Diego Sheriff's Department was dispatched to C.A.'s home on June 17, when mother struck C.A. (as noted ante). The referral stated that on June 17, mother arrived unannounced to visit with A.K. on his birthday; that C.A. believed mother was under the influence as mother's eyes were "crazy blown out"; that when C.A. informed mother she could not visit with A.K. because of her condition, mother attempted to take A.K. from C.A.'s arms; and that when unsuccessful, mother punched C.A. in the face causing C.A. to sustain a bloody lip. Mother next walked outside and pointed a finger at C.A. "like [mother] was shooting . . . a gun." C.A. filed a restraining order against mother on June 26.
When contacted by an Agency social worker, mother admitted striking C.A., and, when asked about her failed drug test, she also admitted to using methamphetamine about two weeks earlier, but denied she needed treatment. Mother had a prior dependency case when A.K. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Although mother successfully reunited with A.K. after she completed six months of services, she admitted relapsing. The court granted the warrant application on July 2.
The July 6, 2015 Agency detention report relied on the same information used to support the protective custody warrant. Agency's July 6 report recommended mother be offered reunification services; parents have liberal supervised visitation; and mother be referred to a substance abuse specialist for assessment. Agency further recommended father not receive reunification services because father began serving an eight-year prison term for first degree burglary and assault charges in June 2013.
At the July 6 detention hearing, the court made prima facie findings on both petitions; it ordered minors detained in licensed foster care, but provided Agency with the discretion to evaluate all appropriate relatives to determine whether minors could be placed with an appropriate relative caregiver; and ordered liberal and supervised visits for the parents, with father's visits to be by telephone only.
In its August 11, 2015 jurisdiction/disposition report, Agency recommended mother be provided with reunification services; father not receive such services; K.K. be placed with a nonrelative extended family member (NREFM); A.K. be placed back with the paternal great-grandmother; that mother's visits with minors be liberal and supervised; and that mother be assessed by a substance abuse specialist.
During this reporting period, Agency noted that mother missed a prearranged visit with minors on July 30; that when mother was interviewed on July 23 by an Agency social worker, mother appeared "uninterested," as she had her head rested in her hands for most of the interview; that during this same interview, mother was evasive and expressed her belief that paternal great-grandmother C.A., whom mother referred to as a "Wino" and as "sadistic," was responsible for mother's then current plight; and that, although mother and A.K. had been living in mother's truck for two or three months while K.K. lived with her maternal grandmother, mother nonetheless reported that she and A.K. had been "doing well, going to church every Sunday" until C.A. called "CPS" on mother.
The Agency's August 11 report also described a phone interview with mother on July 15. During that interview, mother admitted that she had a problem keeping steady employment; that she had been referred to a substance abuse program by a substance abuse specialist, but had been unable to make the appointment because her car allegedly had broken down; that she was homeless and was unfamiliar with taking a bus, despite being given bus passes by the specialist; and that she did not believe it was necessary to meet in person with an Agency social worker to discuss her need for services because mother would "rather tell the Judge in person."
The Agency social worker confirmed mother was a "no-show" for her scheduled intake at the substance abuse program. During the July 23 Agency interview, mother admitted using methamphetamine "off and on" since she was 15 years old. Mother also insisted minors be placed with the maternal grandmother. When an Agency social worker informed mother that Agency could not approve the maternal grandmother, mother raised her voice and stated, "How can you tell me where my kids can live. She is my mother and if I want my kids to live with my mother, they will."
On August 3, an Agency social worker assisted with the change of placement of A.K. from licensed foster care back to C.A. According to the August 11 report, when A.K. saw his paternal great-grandmother, he smiled, jumped up and down, and showed no hesitation going to or leaving with C.A. The August 11 report also noted that minors were then both healthy and happy; that K.K. was developmentally on track and was bright and articulate; and that A.K. was to receive a developmental screening because at times his speech was difficult to understand and he displayed defiant behaviors.
On August 31, 2015, the juvenile court made true findings on the minors' petitions. On September 11, 2015, it declared minors dependent children of the court, after finding by clear and convincing evidence minors should be removed from the custody of mother pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c). It ordered K.K. placed in the home of a NREFM and A.K. placed in the home of an approved relative. It also ordered Agency to provide mother services consistent with her case plan and mother to comply with those services. The court set the six-month review hearing for March 9, 2016.
In its March 9, 2016 status review report, Agency recommended that mother's reunification services be terminated, that minors remain placed in out-of-home care, and that the court set a section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan for minors. During this reporting period, Agency noted that mother remained homeless and unemployed; that communication with mother was challenging because mother did not have a phone; that despite its myriad attempts, Agency did not make contact with mother until January 8, 2016; and that during the reporting period, mother had not made any progress in services or visited minors.
Specifically, the March 9 report noted mother had not enrolled in a substance abuse treatment program per her case plan. Mother had failed to participate in education/parenting services and counseling/mental health services. This report further noted minors were doing well in their respective placements and C.A. was willing to become the permanent caregiver for K.K.
On March 4, Agency filed a section 388 petition seeking a change in the order from granting mother services to terminating those services. Agency's petition alleged this change was necessary because mother neither made any progress in services nor visited minors during the six-month review period. The court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on March 24 to coincide with the contested six-month review hearing.
Agency filed an addendum on March 24 in connection with that hearing. Agency's recommendations from its March 9 report remained the same. Agency noted C.A. had moved into a larger home and could now care for both K.K. and A.K. It also confirmed the maternal grandmother could not be approved for placement.
At the March 24 hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial likelihood that reunification between mother and minors would not occur because of the "inaction of the mother, including, but not limited to, [her] failure to visit [and her] failure to participate and make progress in court-ordered treatment programs." The court further found there had been a change in circumstances and granted Agency's section 388 petition, finding it was in minors' best interests to do so. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for July 2016.
Agency's July 21, 2016 section 366.26 report noted mother's whereabouts remained unknown. Agency also noted C.A. wanted to assume legal guardianship of K.K., then eight years old. K.K. wanted to remain placed in C.A.'s home with her brother, and if C.A. was unable to assume such guardianship, there were 15 families in San Diego approved to adopt a child matching K.K.'s characteristics.
The July 21 report noted C.A. at that time preferred legal guardianship over adoption because she hoped father one day could reunite with minors. C.A., however, made clear that regardless of father's situation, she was committed to providing minors with a "safe, stable and permanent home."
As to A.K., Agency noted he had some behavioral issues, but that with services was making steady progress while living with C.A. for the past 11 months. C.A. expressed the desire to continue caring for A.K. also under a legal guardianship. If C.A. was unwilling or unable to assume guardianship, Agency noted there were 40 families in San Diego approved to adopt a child matching A.K.'s characteristics. Finally, Agency noted there were 10 families in San Diego approved to adopt a sibling set matching K.K.'s and A.K.'s characteristics.
The July 21 report stated that C.A. "has known the minors since they were born. She reported that the minor, [A.K.,] was placed in her care when he was 3 days old, following the removal from the mother due to general neglect and exposure to parental substance abuse that resulted in him testing positive for methamphetamine at the time of his birth. Furthermore, the paternal great-grandmother reported both [K.K.] and [A.K.] have resided in her care for extended periods of time while the parents were making poor lifestyle choices that were not conductive to effectively care for the children. As a result, over time, the minors grew very close to the paternal great-grandmother because they looked to her as the adult in their lives who was responsible for ensuring that all of their needs were met. It is clear that the paternal great-grandmother loves the minors and wants the best for them."
A Voices for Children court-appointed special advocate (CASA) report prepared in connection with the section 366.26 hearing, supported Agency's assessment that minors were thriving in their placement with C.A. (See generally §§ 100 et seq. & 101, subd. (c) [defining CASA].) Specifically, the CASA stated that she had visited minors in the home of C.A. three times during the applicable reporting period; that it was evident C.A. and minors "have a close relationship and . . . there is a lot of love in the home"; that C.A. "provides structure in the home"; and that C.A.'s home "is an excellent placement for the children. . . ." Thus, the CASA recommended termination of parental rights and C.A. be granted guardianship of K.K. and A.K. The juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing for August 4.
In its August 4 addendum report, Agency reported mother had left a voicemail message with an Agency social worker on August 2 stating she "has been in detox . . . for 5 days and plans to enter inpatient treatment . . . once there is an opening." Mother requested the August 4 hearing be continued and indicated she wanted the court to know she "wants her children back." The court in response continued the section 366.26 hearing to August 18, which it subsequently continued to January 30, 2017.
In its December 7, 2016 addendum report, Agency noted that C.A. preferred adoption of minors to legal guardianship. Because Agency sought the most permanent plan for minors, it determined adoption was most favorable for providing permanency for K.K. and A.K.
Agency's December 7 report summarized eight visits between minors and mother during the reporting period. Mother's visits with minors were overall appropriate, as mother was affectionate and tended to their needs during the visits. However, at the conclusion of the visits, neither K.K. nor A.K. "displayed . . . visible signs of distress" when leaving mother. Before the visit on October 22, C.A. reported K.K. was "hesitant to attend the visit" and "had begun wetting the bed since visits with [mother] were reinstated." C.A. further reported that K.K. again did not want to visit with mother on October 29. Before the November 5 visit, C.A. called Agency and reported K.K. was opposed to visiting mother. In its December 7 report, Agency continued to recommend termination of parental rights and adoption as the permanent plan for minors.
The December 7 report stated father also visited with minors while he was incarcerated.
B. January 3, 2017, Section 388 Petition
Particularly germane to this appeal, on January 3, 2017, mother filed a section 388 petition seeking a change to the court order terminating her reunification services and requesting the court either return minors to her care or reinstate such services and allow "unmonitored visits with the children with discretion to liberalize." Mother noted this change was warranted because she had "completed treatment at Kiva including regular 12-step meeting attendance and random drug screening which have been negative; has completed a residential detox program through McAlister; has engaged in multiple parenting programs; is also participating in Vista Hill [Perinatal Case Management] services; and is visiting with children consistently." Mother included exhibits to support her petition and contended the court should make this change because she and minors were "bonded," she was sober, and it was in minors' best interest to reside with her so she can provide them with a "safe, loving, [and] stable home."
Agency submitted two separate January 24, 2017 reports in connection with the section 366.26 hearing and mother's section 388 petition. Briefly, with regard to the section 366.26 hearing, Agency continued to recommend the permanent plan of adoption for minors, stating in its January 24 report in part as follows: "The children have been thriving in their current placement and the caregiver has expressed interest in adopting them together. During this reporting period, [mother] has maintained regular contact with the children but the relationship does not rise to the level of a parent-child relationship and there would not be detriment if parental rights were terminated. Adoption would be in the best interest for the children, providing them a secure and permanent home."
In its January 24 report in response to mother's section 388 petition, Agency noted that mother had provided evidence that she had completed a 12-Step program at Kiva and that she continued to comply with services requirements; that mother then claimed six-months of sobriety; but that, while mother has shown she is in the process of changing her circumstances, she has not shown a "specific change in circumstances that would warrant the return of the children into her care."
In recommending the court deny mother's January 3 section 388 petition, Agency noted it was not in minors' best interest to live with mother for the next nine months or so while mother resided and participated in an aftercare program. Instead, Agency concluded it was in minors' best interest to establish permanency and stability in their lives, stating in part as follows: "[Mother] completed 4 months at Kiva, which is minimal when compared to the amount of time the children have been dependents of the Court. [Mother] has developed some insight but this is just the first step in the process of her recovery and not enough time has lapsed to determine that she can maintain sobriety while providing the children with regular and appropriate care. Also since dependency, the children have experienced multiple placements and only now are they finally establishing a sense of stability with their current caregiver. Returning the children to [mother] puts the children's newfound stability at risk, especially since it is expected that the family will need to move after the short 9-month program. Furthermore, it is not guaranteed that [mother] will have stable housing upon graduation despite the services that [her program] offer[s]. After 4 months of program compliance, it is evident that [mother] is making efforts to change but there are not significant changes that would suggest stability for the children should they return to her care." Thus, while Agency commended mother's efforts, it concluded minors' well-being and need for stability, permanency and safety, when contrasted to the relatively short period of time mother had remained sober in light of her long history of drug abuse, warranted denial of mother's January 3 petition.
The record shows that after hearing oral argument and considering mother's January 3 section 388 petition, including additional documents mother filed in connection with her petition, and Agency's reports, the court denied the section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. In so doing, it found mother had not made a prima facie showing of changed, as opposed to changing, circumstances. The court also found mother did not make a prima facie showing it was in minors' best interest to grant the relief she sought in her petition.
Specifically, the court found that mother had been a drug addict for about 11 years; that she had a prior dependency proceeding when A.K. was born; that in the current dependency proceeding, minors were detained because mother was using drugs, was homeless, and was living out of a truck; that while mother was "under the influence," she had a violent confrontation with C.A., who was then caring for A.K.; that mother's plan called for therapy, parenting, and substance abuse services; and that at the six-month review hearing, "mother was still homeless, and this was despite independent Agency efforts. Mother did not enroll in substance abuse treatment. She never enrolled in therapy despite being given referrals."
The court also found mother did not visit minors from December 15, 2015 to September 17, 2016, despite repeated attempts by Agency and the visitation center to set up such visits; and that, to grant mother relief and return minors to her care, "would be an absolute gamble" because mother had been unable to remain sober in the past, the dependency proceeding was past the 18-month date, minors had been in multiple placements, and mother was "still at supervised visits." Thus, while the court, like Agency, commended mother on her efforts in recovery, it found those efforts were "too little too late."
C. March 15, 2017, Section 388 Petition
As noted, mother filed a second section 388 petition on March 15, which was heard in connection with the contested section 366.26 hearing. The record shows this second petition was very similar to mother's January 3 section 388 petition. In addition to documents previously lodged with the court, mother's March 15 petition included letters from her substance abuse counselor and perinatal case manager; various attendance records and worksheets showing her participation and engagement in counseling and related services; a three-page, handwritten list kept by mother showing her efforts to make telephone contact with minors during the reporting period; and a March 15, 2017 letter from the North County Juvenile Dependency Drug Court stating that mother had enrolled in the program on January 27, 2017, and that she was in "Phase 1" of, and had attained 42 sober days in, the program.
Mother has separately appealed the court's ruling terminating parental rights (case No. D072151). --------
The record shows that after hearing oral argument, the court again denied mother's section 388 petition without granting an evidentiary hearing. In so doing, the court found the March 15 petition was, as noted, "very similar" to mother's January 3 petition and the only "real addition" to the March 15 petition was that mother continued to remain sober. Although the court found mother's progress commendable, it nonetheless denied the March 15 petition for the same reasons the court gave when it initially denied mother's January 3 petition.
DISCUSSION
A. Guiding Principles
"A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent's request. . . . [¶] However, if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.)
A section 388 petition must show a change of circumstances, not merely changing circumstances, and such changed circumstances must also be substantial. (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.) Indeed, because the proposed order also must be in the best interests of the children, "[a] petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent . . . might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests. [Citation.] ' "[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate." ' " (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
"The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition." (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) The court should consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case in determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) An appellate court will not disturb the trial court's decision to deny an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition absent an affirmative showing by the appellant that the trial court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205.) The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate the order was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423.)
B. Analysis
Mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found in connection with both section 388 petitions that she failed to make a prima facie showing of changed, as opposed to changing, circumstances and that the proposed change—to place minors back in her custody or to reinstate reunification services—would promote the best interests of minors. (See In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.)
As the record shows, the juvenile court in the instant case considered the sufficiency of the petitions in light of the entire factual and procedural history before it (see In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 189), including the fact both petitions were filed on the "eve of the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing [when] the children's interest in stability was the court's foremost concern and outweighed any interest in reunification." (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 594; see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308-310 [same].)
Here, the record shows mother filed her section 388 petitions in early January 2017 and in mid-March 2017, more than five and seven months, respectively, after the court initially had set the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. What's more, mother waited until early August 2016, about seven months after Agency's last contact with her and more than four months after her reunification services had been terminated, to inform Agency she had entered "detox."
Moreover, the record shows mother did not visit with minors from mid-December 2015 until mid-September 2016, or for about nine months. During this period, mother failed to engage in any court-ordered services. While we, like Agency and the juvenile court, commend mother for her efforts to retain sobriety, even construing the petitions liberally (see In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460), we conclude the court properly exercised its discretion when it found mother failed to make a prima facie showing that her circumstances had changed, and were not merely changing.
Indeed, the records show that in connection with the dependency proceedings, mother had struggled with drug addiction for 11-years; that mother already had been the subject of a previous dependency in 2012 when A.K. tested positive for drugs at birth; and that mother was only in the very beginning of treatment for drug abuse, as she had just begun living in a nine-month aftercare program when she filed her initial section 388 petition. (See, e.g., In re Cliffton B., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 423 [seven months' sobriety does not constitute changed circumstance where parent has history of periods of sobriety and relapses]; compare, In re Hashem H. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1791, 1799 [noting prima facie showing of changed circumstances made to warrant a section 388 hearing when appellant proffered evidence showing she had engaged in continuous individual therapy for more than 18 months that "was so successful . . . her therapist recommended [the minor] be returned to her custody," the appellant had regular and consistent visitation with the minor for more than a year, who also joined the appellant in counseling, and the appellant had stable employment and the "current ability to provide a home for [the minor] on a full-time basis"].)
Furthermore, we separately conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother also failed to make a prima facie showing that placing minors in her care or providing her with additional services would promote the best interests of minors. (See In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) Mother contends that it would be in minors' best interest to return them to her care or to resume reunification services because they were bonded and she was sober. Although it is clear from the record that mother loves her children, this fact alone is insufficient to demonstrate that it would be in their best interest to return them to her or to have their permanent placement delayed. (See In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464 [noting the burden on this element is difficult to meet when a parent's reunification services have been terminated and when the permanent plan for the child is adoption].)
Placement with mother also would have required minors to reside for several months in an aftercare residential treatment program, as mother, at the time she filed her January 2017 petition, had just started what was projected to be a nine-month program that focused on five "problem areas: drugs and history, medical, legal system, psycho/social, and education." And even when mother filed her second petition about two months later, she was still slated to be in the program about seven more months.
In either case, minors then faced an uncertain future with a parent who admittedly struggled to keep steady employment; who, as noted, was a drug addict for 11 years; who had relapsed once before after receiving reunification services; and who not only then lacked secure housing, but who also had failed to provide minors secure housing since at least (if not before) May 2015, when Agency found A.K. was staying with mother in her truck and with his paternal great-grandmother and K.K. was living with her maternal grandmother.
In contrast, at the time of the section 388 petitions, minors were then in a stable placement with C.A. and were thriving in that placement. The record shows that A.K. had been placed with C.A. in August 2015; that K.K. had been placed with her in June 2016, when K.K. was reunited with A.K.; and that even before these placements, minors had resided in C.A.'s care for extended periods of time because of the poor lifestyle choices made by parents. "As a result, over time, the minors grew very close to the paternal great-grandmother because they looked to her as the adult in their lives who was responsible for ensuring that all of their needs were met." Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother also failed to make a prima facie showing that placing minors in her care or providing her with additional services would promote minors' best interests.
DISPOSITION
The orders summarily denying mother's section 388 petitions are affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: AARON, J. DATO, J.