Opinion
E068651
12-14-2017
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.R. Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.B. Elena S. Min, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.R. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.Nos. J262900, J262901, J262902, J262903, J262904, J266760) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Christopher B. Marshall, Judge. Affirmed. Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.R. Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.B. Elena S. Min, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.R. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants and appellants, K.R. (mother), J.R. (father-1), and R.B. (father-2), appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for their children. Mother and father-1 argue insufficient evidence supports the finding that the children are adoptable. Father-2 joins mother's argument. We disagree with the parents and affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
This appeal concerns six children. Plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), removed five of the children from mother's custody in November 2015. At the time, N.B. was eight years old, H.R. was five years old, J.R. II was four years old, A.R. was one year old, and T.R. was five months old. Later, in August 2016, mother gave birth to the sixth child, M.R. Father-2 is the alleged father of N.B. Father-1 is the presumed father of the remaining children. A. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition
The family came to CFS's attention when H.R. and J.R. II were found wandering in the middle of the street outside N.B.'s school. Mother eventually arrived at the school to pick them up. Several weeks after this incident, a sheriff's deputy conducted a welfare check and found mother and the children "on the streets." The deputy arrested mother for child endangerment and being under the influence of methamphetamine. No one knew the whereabouts of either father at the time. N.B. reported that father-1 hit mother frequently and also hit the children. CFS placed H.R. in a foster home, N.B. and J.R. II in a second foster home, and T.R. and A.R. in a third foster home. Mother was released from jail the following day. Father-1 had an active criminal case charging possession of methamphetamines and possession of paraphernalia. A criminal background check for father-2 revealed he had multiple convictions for drug offenses.
CFS filed petitions alleging: all three parents had substance abuse problems, and mother and father-1 had exposed the children to domestic violence, placing the children at risk of harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)); all three parents were either unable to provide care for the children or had failed to provide for them, in that mother was arrested, and father-1's and father-2's whereabouts were unknown (§ 300, subd. (g)); and mother had failed to reunify with a half sibling of the children, placing the children at risk of similar abuse (§ 300, subd. (j)).
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The half sibling is mother's seventh and oldest child, who was removed from her care in 2006 because of her substance abuse. She failed to reunify with that child and the court placed the child with his father.
At the detention hearing, the court found a prima facie case for detaining the children. Mother indicated father-2 was in prison out of state. She had not seen father-2 since eight-year-old N.B. was nine months old. She believed father-1 was somewhere in the county, but she had no way of contacting him.
In preparation for the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, CFS reported the children did not have any known mental health diagnoses and were not on psychotropic medications. Their health and education passports reported no known issues. Mother had disappeared and lost contact with CFS since the detention hearing. In addition, CFS had not located either father since the detention hearing.
By the time of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, CFS had located father-2 in prison in Idaho, and mother appeared for the hearing. CFS had still not located father-1. Mother pleaded no contest to the allegations of the petitions. The court sustained the allegations of substance abuse, domestic violence, and failure to reunify with the half sibling, but dismissed the failure to provide allegations with respect to mother and father-1. The court sustained, with a minor amendment, the failure to provide allegations with respect to father-2. It granted mother and father-1 reunification services but denied father-2 reunification services. The court also appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate a substantiated referral to CFS involving physical abuse by H.R.'s foster parent. CFS had moved H.R. to the same foster home as N.B. and J.R. II as a result of that referral. B. Six-month Review and M.R.'s Birth
In the six-month review report, CFS recommended the court terminate mother's and father-1's reunification services. They had both appeared at the CFS office and asked to start services, but they had not followed through and had lost contact with CFS again. They had visited with the children only three times during the review period and were 30 minutes to one hour late for the visits.
All five children were doing well in their foster home placements and their welfare was stable during the review period. All the children had received medical, dental, and mental health exams. N.B. had no significant health or developmental problems. H.R. had no significant medical problems, but her foster parent reported that she struggled with constant lying and extreme tantrums, and she had made comments about harming herself. The screening, assessment, referral, and treatment program (SART) referred H.R. to an agency for further services. J.R. II and A.R. had speech delays. SART referred J.R. II to the school district for treatment, and A.R., who was too young for school, was receiving speech therapy through SART. J.R. II also had anemia and was receiving treatment for that. A.R. and T.R. had been diagnosed with an unspecified emotional disorder. Their treatment plans included mental health treatment, pediatric and neurodevelopmental evaluations, and speech and language consultations.
A.R. and T.R.'s foster parents wanted to adopt the children if the parents failed to reunify. N.B., H.R., and J.R. II's foster parent also wanted to be a concurrent planning home for the children, but preferred a legal guardianship. The foster parent was "diligently" trying to help H.R. correct her issue with lying.
Mother gave birth to M.R. during the review period and admitted to smoking methamphetamine throughout the pregnancy. Although both of them drug tested negative at M.R.'s birth, mother had last used methamphetamine approximately two weeks before the birth. CFS removed newborn M.R. from mother and father-1 and placed her with a foster family. It filed a petition alleging mother and father-1 had substance abuse problems impacting their ability to care for M.R. (§ 300, subd. (b)), and M.R.'s siblings were currently dependents because of the parents' abuse or neglect, thus placing M.R. at risk of similar harm (§ 300, subd. (j)). The court found a prima facie case for detaining M.R.
At the six-month review hearing for the other children, mother's counsel noted mother had enrolled in an inpatient treatment program, but the social worker discovered mother had left that program without completing it. The court found mother and father-1 had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in their case plans. It terminated reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26.
H.R.'s guardian ad litem also reported on his investigation. He concluded the former foster parent had pulled H.R.'s hair "in a moment of frustration," and H.R. had not sustained any injuries. He did not believe a civil action was necessary and asked to be relieved. The court accepted the guardian ad litem's report and relieved him.
M.R.'s jurisdictional/dispositional hearing took place after the six-month review hearing for the other children. The court sustained all allegations in the petition and bypassed reunification services for mother and father-1. It set a selection and implementation hearing for M.R. as well. The court gave CFS authority to place M.R. in a concurrent planning home because M.R.'s current foster home was an interim placement and not a concurrent planning home. C. Selection and Implementation Hearing
In December 2016, the court granted CFS a 180-day continuance of the selection and implementation hearing to attempt to locate an adoptive home for all the children, although CFS recognized the sibling group might have to be split. The social worker opined the five oldest children were adoptable, as they were "well behaved, well mannered and a joy to be around." The worker described them as having no "serious medical or health issues." M.R. was healthy, except that she was receiving breathing treatments for a chronic cough. Mother reported that all of the children required breathing treatments at one point. M.R. was meeting all of the developmental milestones for a six-month-old child. The social worker opined M.R. was also adoptable.
N.B., J.R. II, and H.R. remained together in the same foster home, while T.R. and A.R. remained together in the same foster home, and M.R. was in a third home. CFS found a prospective adoptive home in January 2017 that wanted to take T.R., A.R., and M.R. together. CFS had a meeting with the prospective adoptive family in February 2017 "to present all the information in regards to the children and their backgrounds."
By the time of the continued hearing in June 2017, N.B. and J.R. II had been with the same foster parents since the beginning of the case—approximately one year seven months. H.R. had been with that same foster family for approximately one year five months. All three children wanted to be adopted by their foster parents and "stay with them forever." The foster parents loved the children and wanted to adopt them as well, and they considered them to be family. T.R., A.R., and M.R. had been together in their new foster home for approximately four months. While these three children were too young to understand adoption, they looked to their foster parents for their needs and affection. The foster parents loved them and wanted to adopt. The social worker opined that the attachment between all six children and their foster parents was strong, and adoption by the foster parents was in their best interests.
At the hearing, the court terminated the parental rights of all three parents and found clear and convincing evidence that the children would likely be adopted.
III. DISCUSSION
The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court's adoptability finding. We conclude their argument lacks merit.
At the selection and implementation hearing for a dependent child, "the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption" if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, "that it is likely the child will be adopted." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The court should base this determination on CFS's adoption assessment report and any other relevant evidence. (§§ 361.5, subd. (g)(1), 366.21, subd. (i)(1), 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
"The adoptability issue . . . focuses on the dependent child, e.g., whether his or her age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt." (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1311.) While the child need not be in a prospective adoptive home at the time of the selection and implementation hearing, or have a prospective adoptive parent "'"waiting in the wings,"'" "the existence of a prospective adoptive parent, who has expressed interest in adopting a dependent child, constitutes evidence that the child's age, physical condition, mental state, and other relevant factors are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the child. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent's willingness to adopt generally indicates the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family." (Id. at pp. 1311-1312.)
We review the court's adoptability finding for substantial evidence. (In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.) We determine whether there is any substantial evidence, disputed or not, that supports the court's conclusion, resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the finding. (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1560.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the children are likely to be adopted. The three oldest children—N.B., J.R. II, and H.R.—had been with their prospective adoptive parents for over a year, and the prospective adoptive parents loved them and wanted to adopt. The three younger children—T.R., A.R., and M.R.—had been with their prospective adoptive parents for only a few months, but their prospective adoptive parents had already grown to love them and wanted to adopt. We have no doubt the bond between the children and their caregivers and the caregivers' willingness to adopt constitutes sufficient evidence of adoptability. (In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312.)
The parents argue there is insufficient evidence for a variety of reasons that do not persuade us. They contend CFS did not prepare an adoption assessment report as required by statute, and CFS's reports did not address several issues, including why the older children's prospective adoptive parents changed their minds and agreed to adoption, whether the children had progressed in the treatment of their behavioral and emotional issues, and whether the younger children's prospective adoptive parents knew of T.R.'s and A.R.'s diagnoses and need for treatment.
First, CFS did prepare an assessment report. It filed a report in advance of the selection and implementation hearing and then filed an addendum report when the court continued the hearing. Second, the report addressed the strong bond between the caregivers and the children, and the fact that the caregivers loved them and considered them family. This sufficiently explained the caregivers' motives for adoption as opposed to legal guardianship, which was their expressed preference much earlier, at the six-month review. There was no requirement that the report further address the change.
Third, it is true the report did not provide much information about the children's medical, developmental, and emotional status, other than to say they were well-behaved, well-mannered, and did not have any serious medical or health issues. The report did not expressly address the emotional and developmental issues identified at the six-month review. This omission would be more important if there were no families desiring adoption and the court had to rely solely on the characteristics of the children to find them likely to be adopted. The children's so-called general adoptability based on their individual characteristics must be distinguished from their specific adoptability, which is based on evidence that specific families want to adopt. (In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 493-494.) Either general or specific adoptability suffices to show the children are likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (Ibid.) Thus, regardless of whether the court had updated information on the children's medical, developmental, and emotional status, the court had evidence that they are specifically adoptable.
Fourth, contrary to the parents' assertion, there is evidence the prospective adoptive parents knew of T.R.'s and A.R.'s diagnoses and need for treatment. In advance of the June 2017 selection and implementation hearing, CFS met with the prospective adoptive parents in February 2017 to review the children's background. The court could reasonably infer the caregivers received that information then. And as to H.R.'s emotional issues—her lying, tantrums, and comments about harming herself—her prospective adoptive mother was the one to report these issues. There is no doubt H.R.'s prospective adoptive family was aware of them. Knowing about the children's issues, the prospective adoptive families loved the children and wanted to adopt. Substantial evidence that the children are likely to be adopted exists. (In re R.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 [holding that the child's age, physical condition, and emotional condition were not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting him when his caregivers were aware of his challenges and remained committed to adoption].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. MILLER
J.