Opinion
E070571
11-26-2018
In re S.N. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Niti Gupta, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIFJ1800087) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed. Niti Gupta, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant S.G. is the mother of the two children at issue in this dependency appeal. She challenges the juvenile court's orders granting sole legal and physical custody of the children to their previously noncustodial father, terminating dependency jurisdiction over the children, and setting the terms of mother's visitation. She contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) placing the children with father; (2) having placed the children with father, failing to retain jurisdiction to supervise the placement under a family maintenance plan; and (3) setting terms of visitation for mother that are unreasonable and not in the best interests of the children. We affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The children (girls born in 2009 and 2010) were referred to plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) on February 2, 2018. Law enforcement had taken mother into custody on a psychiatric hold pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, and there was no one else available to care for the children or their half siblings. Law enforcement was called after mother went to the children's school and "express[ed] paranoid ideation and threats of possible self-harm." For example, she "reportedly stated that she was going to cut her arm off because there was a creature inside her arm," and that "people were trying to get her through the stars and people had been following her, including a UPS driver." School officials told the social worker that mother "has always presented as very paranoid" and has "expressed concerns about evil spirits being at the school." A maternal great-aunt of the children told the social worker that mother "has a long history of becoming very angry and paranoid," and that mother "has isolated herself from all of her family members and will not allow them to see the children."
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Three younger half siblings of the children, with the same mother but different fathers, were also taken into protective custody at the same time. This appeal directly involves only the children, not their half siblings, who will be mentioned only as necessary for context. --------
DPSS was not immediately able to reach father. Mother reported that he resided in Fresno, California, but stated that she had no contact information for him. The children both reported that they did not have contact with father. A records search did not reveal a current address or phone number.
DPSS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the children on February 6, 2018. The petition included allegations involving father under subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support), in addition to allegations against mother and the fathers of the children's half siblings. With respect to father, the petition alleged under section 300, subdivision (b), that he "is not a member of his children's household, and he fails to maintain contact and fails to provide [the children] with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, and protection," and that he and mother "have a history of engaging in domestic violence altercations." The petition alleged under section 300, subdivision (g), that father's "exact whereabouts . . . are unknown, and he is unavailable to provide [the children] with care and support." On February 7, 2018, the juvenile court detained the children.
On February 8, 2018, father contacted DPSS and explained that he had just learned the children had been taken into protective custody. He told the social worker that he wanted to visit the children and that he would be present for the next hearing. The social worker agreed to set up telephone contact with the children the next week.
A three-hour in-person visitation between father, the children, and the children's paternal grandmother on February 22, 2018, "went well and no concerns were observed." During the visit, the social worker observed that father and paternal grandmother were "very appropriate and did great with redirecting the children if they said something about the case." The children "had smiles on their faces the whole visit," and "when it came time to leave, [the older child] expressed how much she wanted to stay with her father and grandmother and not leave them." In a subsequent interview with the social worker, the older child stated that the last time she saw father was when she was two years old. She used to talk to father by telephone, but mother and father had blocked each other's phone numbers. She reported that she had been very happy to see her father during their visit, and that she wanted to continue to see him.
In contrast, visitation between mother, the children, and their half siblings did not go well. A supervisor repeatedly had to intervene to ask mother to "behave appropriately," with limited success. Over several visits, mother "never played with the children, did not speak to the children on their level, and [was] not aware of what the children can understand and perform." She also "did not avoid sharing her personal situations that may trouble children, show concern for the children's fears and uncertainties, or give her full attention to the children." She would speak "'to the air,'" rather than to any specific person, quoting scripture under her breath. She repeatedly spoke "negatively about everyone and everything" within earshot of the children, including speaking to the children "about their future living arrangements and poor treatment in the foster system that she experienced as a child," and "talking about lawyers and the Court." During one visitation, one of the children's half siblings, then three years old, hit mother; mother responded by hitting the child back. When "informed . . . that it was not appropriate to hit the child, [mother] stated that she ha[d] to hit him because 'that's how they learn how not to grow up and shoot up schools.'"
In a jurisdiction/disposition report filed on March 6, 2018, DPSS reported that it was considering placing the children in father's care "as he appears to be a non-offending parent." In an addendum report filed on March 21, 2018, DPSS recommended that the court terminate dependency jurisdiction and issue orders granting father joint legal and sole physical custody of the children, with mother to have joint legal custody and "reasonable supervised visitation."
Father was residing in Fresno, California. He told the social worker that he was "able, willing, and wanting to provide care and support to his children and he is ready for them to come to his home as soon as possible." He reported that he and his current wife had been in a relationship for "'seven or eight years,'" and had been married for two years. She, too, told the social worker that she wanted to care for the children, and expressed willingness to take in the children's half siblings as well. Father and his wife had recently moved into a three-bedroom home and stated that they had "two extra beds for the children and the funds to purchase additional ones if need be." Father's wife was employed, though he was not. They had four children in their care; the social worker observed them to be "well taken care of and safe." Father reported that he had a total of six children.
Father attributed his previous absence from the children's lives to mother, stating that he "was never given the opportunity to take care of his children." He told the social worker that after he and mother broke up and he began dating his current wife, mother "stopped letting him see his children" and prevented him from maintaining contact with them by changing her telephone number and moving around. Mother did not respond to father's attempts to contact her through social media. According to father, mother never filed for child support "because he would have known where they were and he would have wanted to provide and care for them." He did not pursue his rights in family court "because he did not want [the children] 'to go through that.'" Father stated that he "has called Child Support Services in attempts to find his children, but was unable to get any information." He investigated putting out an Amber Alert for the children but decided not to when he learned "what 'they' would do, like put [the children's] pictures around."
Father disclosed to DPSS that he had a criminal history. He reported an arrest in 2000 for residential burglary; three convictions for driving under the influence, the most recent of which was in 2008; and a misdemeanor charge of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm from an incident at a bar "'about one year ago.'" He was on probation for the firearm offense and stated that he checks in with the probation office once a month. Father's probation officer confirmed to the social worker that he had been sentenced to four years of probation in July 2017, after an arrest for being in possession of a firearm in April 2017. Father had been "compliant" with the terms of his probation with "no reported concerns."
Father denied that he had engaged in domestic violence with mother. He stated that when he was in a relationship with mother, she would "'yell and scream'" at him and "would call Law Enforcement and report that he hit her," but she "is a liar." Father "reported that Law Enforcement told him that he needed to get away from [mother] before she gets him into trouble." In June 2011, mother requested a domestic violence restraining order against father; she obtained a temporary restraining order but failed to appear for a July 2011 hearing, and the case was dismissed. DPSS's investigation of the family's prior child welfare history revealed a referral in 2010 regarding an incident of domestic violence by mother against father, resulting in her arrest. Father's child welfare history also included two referrals, dating to January 2014 and September 2015, for alleged domestic violence by father, reported by the mother of one of his other children. During one of those two investigations, the mother reported that father "had previously been arrested for domestic violence and was participating in an anger management program." But both of those referrals "were closed as unfounded against [father]." Father denied that he had ever been convicted of domestic violence or ever "brought before a Judge" on any type of domestic violence charge.
Father was party to a previous dependency case, filed in November 2005, involving a child of his by a different mother, arising out of her substance abuse (a half sibling of father's child was born drug exposed). Father's whereabouts were initially unknown, but in December 2005 he was located in prison. Father was denied reunification services, and the dependency eventually was terminated in 2010, with the child placed in legal guardianship with her maternal grandfather.
On March 26, 2018, DPSS filed an amended section 300 petition, from which the earlier allegations against father were stricken. On the same date, the juvenile court ruled that the children came within section 300, subdivision (b), finding true many of the allegations in the amended petition involving mother and the fathers of the half siblings. The juvenile court, after confirming that DPSS had conducted an evaluation of father's home in Fresno and found it satisfactory, ordered that the children have an extended "Spring break home visit" there.
In an addendum report filed on April 6, 2018, DPSS again recommended that the juvenile court terminate dependency jurisdiction over the children and issue orders granting father joint legal and sole physical custody of them, with mother to have joint legal custody and "reasonable supervised visitation." The children had been staying with father at his home in Fresno since March 31, 2018. Upon arrival, both children expressed that they were happy to visit father, and the older stated "'I hope no one plays an April fool's joke on me and makes me leave my dad's house tomorrow.'" When interviewed by a social worker on April 4, 2018, both children expressed that they enjoyed being in father's household, that they felt safe there, and that they wanted to stay. Both reported that father and his current wife get along well, with no fighting or domestic violence, and that they had not observed any drug or alcohol abuse by either parent. The social worker performed a home evaluation and found no concerns. An investigator working for the children's attorney also visited the children "to determine how they were doing in their father's home"; the investigator reported no concerns, and the children appeared to be doing well.
While staying with father, the children did not want to contact mother by telephone but were encouraged to do so. The conversations were usually short, as the children largely refused to speak to mother, and mother was repeatedly "inappropriate" and sometimes vulgar.
At a contested disposition hearing on April 9, 2018, the juvenile court removed the children from mother's care and granted father sole legal and physical custody. The court, applying section 361.2, subdivision (a), found father to be a "noncustodial" parent who "was not residing with the children . . . at the time that the events or conditions . . . arose that brought the children within the provisions of [section 300]," and that he "does desire custody of the children." The court "recognize[d] that [father] has less than a stellar past," but found that "placement with [him] would not be detrimental to the safety, protection, [or] physical or emotional health of the children." The court further found that "the previously non-custodial parent and children are not in need of services at this time."
The juvenile court expressed concern that mother represented "a potential danger to the children," based on DPSS's reports and her behavior in court. It ordered mother to have one visit per month with the children, supervised "by a responsible adult chosen by [father] or a professional supervisor" from the "Family Law Professional Monitors List," with mother to pay the cost for a professional supervisor. The court authorized DPSS to assist mother with the cost of transportation to Fresno for visitation and authorized telephone contact between the children and mother at father's discretion. The court ordered that dependency jurisdiction would be terminated upon filing of the family law orders.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother claims the juvenile court erred in three ways. First, she contends that the trial court should have declined to place the children with father because "any reasonable court" would have found doing so to be "'detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being'" of the children under section 361.2, subdivision (a). (Some capitalization omitted.) Second, she argues that the court, having determined to place the children with father, should have retained jurisdiction to supervise the placement. Third, she asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion by setting terms of visitation for mother that are unreasonable and not in the best interests of the children. We reject each of mother's claims.
A. Placement with Father
Once a child is removed from a custodial parent pursuant to section 361, section 361.2 "requires the court to evaluate placement with the noncustodial parent based on detriment." (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423.) "A nonoffending parent has a constitutionally protected interest in assuming physical custody of his or her dependent child which may not be disturbed '"in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parent's choices will be 'detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.'"'" (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400; see § 361.2, subd. (a).) "The nonoffending parent does not have to prove lack of detriment. Rather, the party opposing placement with a nonoffending parent has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed if the nonoffending parent is given custody." (In re C.M., supra, at p. 1402.) History is a relevant consideration, but the focus of the detriment analysis is the parent's and child's "current circumstances," so pursuant to section 361.2, the court may place a child with a parent who, "despite earlier shortcomings and mistakes, has stabilized his or her circumstances and may be able to provide a safe home for the child." (In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1506.)
There is clear and convincing evidence in support of a finding of detriment when "the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt." (In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.) When the juvenile court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence of detriment, we review that finding under the substantial evidence standard. (In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569 (John M.).) But when, as here, we review a juvenile court finding that the party seeking a detriment finding did not carry its burden, the substantial evidence standard is inappropriate, and "'the question . . . becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.'" (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465-466.) We may reverse the juvenile court's determination only if mother's evidence of detriment is "'(1) "uncontradicted and unimpeached" and (2) "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient . . . ."'" (Id. at p. 466.)
The evidence here does not compel a finding of detriment. Father was neither involved in the circumstances that brought the children to the attention of DPSS, nor was he aware of those circumstances. Father already had four children in his care, whom the social worker observed to be "well taken care of and safe." Father expressed that he desired to and was able to care for the children, as did his wife. Although father had not been in the children's lives previously, they demonstrated from their first visit an immediate rapport with one another. When the children had an extended visit with father in his home, they reported that they enjoyed living with him and wanted to continue to do so. Both a social worker and an investigator for the children's counsel assessed how the children were doing in father's home during the visit and expressed no concerns. Father was an ex-felon and was currently on probation for a relatively recent misdemeanor conviction. But the most recent of his felony convictions was a decade old, and the conviction offenses did not involve crimes against children or other offenses that would inherently warrant particular concern about ever placing a child with him. Additionally, father's probation officer confirmed that he had been compliant with the terms of his probation, and the social worker opined that being on probation did not interfere with father's ability to care for the children. The trial court reasonably concluded that, at a minimum, there was substantial doubt that placement with father would be detrimental to the children, so placement with him was required pursuant to section 361.2. (§ 361.2, subd. (a); see In re C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400; In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.)
In arguing for a different conclusion, mother contends that "overwhelming evidence" demonstrates the children were at risk of harm in father's care. Her arguments rest, however, on characterizations of the record that are at least uncharitable, and at points simply unsupported. For example, she states in briefing that father has "a recent domestic violence history with two different mothers," and asserts as a fact that father "threatened to shoot a five-year-old child." Mother ignores, however, that two investigations into alleged domestic violence reported by the mother of one of father's children, including the allegation that father had threatened to shoot the child, were each closed as "unfounded." Also, mother sought and obtained a temporary restraining order against father for alleged domestic violence against her. But those proceedings were dismissed when mother failed to appear, and no permanent restraining order was ever issued. Furthermore, father expressly denied committing any domestic violence against mother, asserting that mother would make false reports of domestic violence to law enforcement when she was angry with him. Mother was arrested for committing domestic violence against father, but there is no suggestion in the record of any domestic violence between father and his current wife. On this record, the juvenile court was not compelled to find on the basis of father's "domestic violence history" that it would be detrimental to place the children with him. (See Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 465-466.)
Similarly, mother emphasizes father's "child welfare history that involved losing a child to legal guardianship," and his "recent criminal history." But she does not articulate why that history compels the conclusion that it would be detrimental to place the children with father now. The prior dependency was initiated in 2005 when a half sibling of one of father's children was born drug exposed. Father was denied reunification services because he was incarcerated at the time, and eventually (in 2010) the child was placed into legal guardianship. Father's current circumstances, however, are different. He is not incarcerated and, although he is on probation, his probation officer reported that he is "compliant," and the social worker opined that being on probation did not interfere with father's ability to care for the children. Father already has four children in his care, whom the social worker observed to be "well taken care of and safe." The juvenile court was entitled to assign father's history, whether in relation to his criminal record or his previous encounters with the child welfare system, "such weight . . . as it considers appropriate in view of the parent's and [children's] current circumstances." (In re Nickolas T., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506.) It was not unreasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that, based on father's current circumstances and despite the less positive aspects of his history, it would not be detrimental to the children to be in his care.
Mother asserts that the juvenile court should have conducted a more thorough investigation of father, his background, and his current household before placing the children with him. She cites John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564, as authority for the proposition that a more thorough investigation was required. That case, however, addressed a juvenile court's finding that it would be detrimental to return a child to a noncustodial parent pursuant to section 361.2. (John M., supra, at p. 1567.) The Court of Appeal reversed because the juvenile court made its finding of detriment based in part on the "paucity of information" about the noncustodial father seeking custody, and after refusing the father's request for a continuance for further investigation. (Id. at pp. 1568, 1570, 1572.) Thus, John M. stands for the proposition that a lack of evidence about a parent does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to place a child with that parent pursuant to section 361.2. (See John M., supra, at p. 1571.) It does not stand for the proposition that any particular degree of investigation must be conducted before a finding of no detriment may be made.
To the contrary, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of detriment, section 361.2 requires placement with the noncustodial parent who desires custody. (§ 361.2, subd. (a); In re Nickolas T., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1504-1506.) John M. emphasizes that the juvenile court may order further investigation to satisfy itself about suitability of the noncustodial parent's home. (John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1572-1573, 1576.) The scope of the investigation to be ordered, however, is left to the juvenile court's discretion. (See id. at p. 1576 [remanding with instruction that court "may order the Agency to obtain information about the suitability of [the parent's] home" (italics added) and that the court "shall make its placement decision after receiving any information it deems necessary"]; see also id. at p. 1573 [noting that "[b]ecause [the appellant] is a parent, the appropriate investigation is a basic one, less rigorous than the investigation necessary for placement with a more distant relative such as a cousin"].)
In short, mother has at most identified certain factors that might support a finding that placement of the children with father would be detrimental, or that a decision regarding detriment should be delayed for further investigation. We are not persuaded, however, that she has demonstrated the evidence requires such findings, as would be necessary for us to disturb the juvenile court's ruling.
B. Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction
When a juvenile court places a child with a previously noncustodial parent pursuant to section 361.2, it then has "three dispositional options": (1) it "may grant custody to the previously noncustodial parent and terminate dependency jurisdiction"; (2) it "may order that a home visit be conducted within three months of the minor's new placement and that the results of that visit be provided to the court before it takes further action with respect to the custody of the minor"; or (3) it may "order that the previously noncustodial parent 'assume custody' of the minor subject to the supervision of the juvenile court," and order services be provided to either or both parents, with the court later determining which parent, if either, will have custody of the child. (In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281-1282 (Jaden E.); see § 361.2, subd. (b).)
In choosing among dispositional options, the juvenile court has "'"broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest . . . ."'" (In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 536.) The trial court may not terminate jurisdiction "until it analyzes whether ongoing supervision of the child is necessary." (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129.) We review the juvenile court's decision for abuse of discretion, reversing only if it "'"has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination . . . ."'" (Jaden E., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288; see In re Austin P., supra, at p. 1135.) "'"When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court."'" (Jaden E., supra, at p. 1288.)
We do not find the trial court's decision to terminate jurisdiction over the children to be arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. All the factors we identified above as supporting the juvenile court's placement of the children with father also support its finding that retaining jurisdiction to supervise the children in their new home with father was unnecessary. Despite the less favorable aspects of father's history, there are no specific facts in the record about his present circumstances that require the conclusion that ongoing supervision is necessary. Father already had four children in his care who were "well taken care of and safe." Importantly, while the court maintained jurisdiction, the children had a spring break visit of more than a week to father's home. The children were observed to be doing well in father's household, and they each reported that they enjoyed living there. DPSS and the children's attorney had each independently assessed the household, found it satisfactory, and concurred that termination of jurisdiction over the children was appropriate. The juvenile court was well within the bounds of its discretion to accept those recommendations.
Mother argues that "there were many unknown variables surrounding the children's safety that justified continued jurisdiction." (Italics added.) We are sympathetic to this argument. For example, particularly given the short amount of time the children had been in father's care, the juvenile court would have been well justified in retaining jurisdiction pending a subsequent home visit, pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2), to make sure things continued to go well. There is nothing in the record, however, that demonstrates that the juvenile court was required to take that alternative course of action, or any other possible alternative. Section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1), expressly contemplates that the juvenile court may terminate jurisdiction immediately after placing a child with a parent, without any caveats about how long the children have been in the parent's care or the nature of the relationship between the parent and the children. We have no authority, on these facts, to disturb the ruling of the juvenile court. (See Jaden E., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.)
C. Mother's Visitation
When the juvenile court grants custody of a child to a parent pursuant to section 361.2, it "may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent." (§ 361.2, subd.(b)(1).) Here, the juvenile court ordered that mother have one visit with the children per month, supervised "by a responsible adult chosen by [father] or a professional supervisor" from the "Family Law Professional Monitors List," with mother to pay the cost for a professional supervisor. The juvenile court also authorized telephone contact between the children and mother at father's discretion. Mother contends these conditions too severely limit her contact with the children, and effectively delegate to father control over whether her visits happen at all. We disagree.
We review the juvenile court's orders concerning visitation under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557-1558.) As above, we will reverse only if the juvenile court "'"has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination . . . ."'" (Jaden E., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.) As to custody and visitation orders, the test has sometimes been articulated as "whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child." (In re Marriage of Carlson (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1330, 1337, overruled on another ground in In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 37, fn. 9.)
We find no abuse of discretion here. Based on mother's behavior, both as observed directly during hearings and as reported by DPSS, the juvenile court concluded that she represented a "potential danger to the children." This finding is amply supported by the record. Mother's previous visitations with the children, both in person and by telephone, had been unproductive, and even potentially traumatizing for the children, due to mother's failure to interact with them appropriately. The juvenile court was well justified in ruling that the children's best interests required that mother have only limited, closely supervised visitation with them.
Mother cites In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123, in support of her argument that "[t]he power to determine the extent of mother's visitation resides with the court and may not be delegated to the previously noncustodial parent." She contends that the juvenile court's order "gave father an effective veto power over her right to visitation," and therefore should be reversed as an abuse of discretion.
We are not persuaded. In re T.H. involved a situation where a trial court required no particular visitation frequency. In that case, the Court of Appeal reversed a juvenile court visitation order that provided for supervised visitation "only upon the 'agreement of the parents.'" (In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) Thus, the custodial mother could "conceivably agree to only one visit a year or less without violating the letter of the court's order," and effectively gave her the "power to determine whether visitation will occur at all." (Ibid.) In contrast, in the present case, mother's right to visitation does not depend on father agreeing to allow her to visit. Rather, the juvenile court ordered that mother have visitation with the children once per month.
Mother proposes father has "de facto" control over whether the visits take place through potential manipulation of the court's requirement that the visits be supervised either "by a responsible adult chosen by [father] or a professional supervisor" from the "Family Law Professional Monitors List," with mother to pay the cost for a professional supervisor. Mother reasons that father "could fail to provide a monitor," and asserts that paying for a professional supervisor would be "impossible" for her. We note, however, that in the juvenile court mother did not object to the order regarding the supervision of the visitation, so she has forfeited any challenge to that aspect of the trial court's orders. (See In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558 [nonjurisdictional dependency issues must be subject of objection or appropriate motions in the juvenile court, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal].) Moreover, nothing in the record establishes (1) that father has unreasonably failed to choose a "responsible adult" to supervise visitation, (2) how much it costs to hire a professional monitor for the visitation, or (3) that mother cannot afford that cost. Even if the issue were not forfeited, therefore, mother has failed to establish that father has an unreasonable degree of control over her right to visitation.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. FIELDS
J.