Opinion
October 17, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (I. Aronin, J.).
Ordered that the amended order is affirmed, with costs.
We find that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervention in the present case. The motion to intervene was premised upon CPLR 1012 (a) (2) which provides for intervention by a third party as of right when the representation of that person's interest by the parties is inadequate and that person is or may be bound by the judgment, and CPLR 1012 (a) (3), which provides for intervention by a third party as of right, inter alia, in an action involving the disposition of property where that person may be adversely affected by the judgment. However, it has been held under liberal rules of construction that whether intervention is sought as a matter of right under CPLR 1012 (a), or as a matter of discretion under CPLR 1013 is of little practical significance (see, Matter of Norstar Apts. v Town of Clay, 112 A.D.2d 750; Plantech Hous. v Conlan, 74 A.D.2d 920, 921, appeal dismissed 51 N.Y.2d 862). Thus, intervention should be permitted where the intervenor has a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings (see, Guma v Guma, 132 A.D.2d 645; Vantage Petroleum v Board of Assessment Review, 91 A.D.2d 1037, affd 61 N.Y.2d 695; Plantech Hous. v Conlan, supra). Upon our review of the motion papers and the testimony elicited at the hearing, we find the evidence of the interest of the appellants Zucco and Scotto in the subject matter of this litigation insufficient to warrant intervention.
Our disposition on the issue of intervention renders it unnecessary to reach any other issues raised on this appeal. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Rubin and Eiber, JJ., concur.