Opinion
No. 51313.
06-09-2011
Gina PEREZ and Frank Perez, Appellants, v. Melville KRIEGH, Individually; and Tejas Underground, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Respondents.
Frank Perez Gina Perez Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP Roger P. Croteau Joseph Garin
Frank Perez
Gina Perez
Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP
Roger P. Croteau
Joseph Garin
ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
This is a proper person appeal from a district court judgment on a jury verdict in a tort action and a post-judgment award of attorney fees and costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, Judge.
Summary judgment and trial issues
Prior to trial, the district court granted summary judgment to respondents on appellants' claims for negligence per se and negligent entrustment. As to the negligence per se claim, the district court properly granted summary judgment to respondents because appellants failed to identify any statutory provision supporting that claim. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (explaining that this court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, without deference to the district court's conclusions); see also Vega v. Eastern Courtyard Assocs., 117 Nev. 436, 440, 24 P.3d 219, 221 (2001) (explaining that negligence per se occurs when a defendant violates a statute, the injured party belongs to the class of persons that the statute was meant to protect, and the injury suffered is the type of injury the statute was meant to prevent).
With regard to negligent entrustment, respondent Tejas Underground admitted respondeat superior liability for respondent Melvill Kriegh's liability to appellants. However, appellants failed to establish Kriegh's liability to them. The jury verdict in favor of respondents necessarily meant that the jury concluded that Kriegh was not liable. In the absence of any liability on the part of Kriegh, it cannot be established in this case that appellants' alleged damages resulted from Tejas Underground's entrustment of Kriegh with its vehicle. See Zugel v. Miller, 100 Nev. 5252, 527, 688 P.2d 310, 312 (1984) ; see also Neilson v. Gambrel, 520 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Kan.1974) (explaining that a negligent entrustment action “is dependent upon the establishment of negligence on the part of the person to whom the automobile is entrusted”). Accordingly, we conclude that appellants' arguments with regard to these two issues lack merit, and we affirm the district court's decisions.
Appellants have raised several additional arguments on appeal relating to the jury trial. Appellants, however, have not provided this court with copies of the trial transcripts. Accordingly, we presume that the contents of the trial transcripts support the district court's decisions on these issues, Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. Of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007), and we also affirm the district court's judgment with regard to these arguments.
Attorney fees and costs
With regard to attorney fees, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees against appellant Gina Perez. See Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. PETA, 114 Nev. 1348, 1353–54, 971 P.2d 383, 386 (1998) (explaining that this court reviews a district court's award of attorney fees for a manifest abuse of discretion). Although the district court did not make specific findings, the parties thoroughly briefed the factors identified in Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588–89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983), respondents provided extensive billing information in support of the amount of the attorney fees, and the district court ultimately reduced the amount requested by respondents. See Schwartz v. Estate of Greenspun, 110 Nev. 1042, 1049–50, 881 P.2d 638, 642 (1994) (explaining that although the district court must consider the Beattie factors, the court is not required to “make explicit findings as to all of the factors where support for an implicit ruling regarding one or more of the factors is clear on the record,” but cautioning the district court that making findings as to the Beattie factors is of special importance because it is difficult for this court to review the propriety of an attorney fees award in the absence of express findings). As to appellant Frank Perez, we note that the district court did not award attorney fees to respondents from Frank Perez, and thus, his argument that attorney fees were improper as to him because he was never served with an offer of judgment is misplaced. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's award of attorney fees.
As to costs, however, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion to the extent that it awarded respondents costs for Kriegh's lost wages due to his attendance at trial and a vehicle inspection. See NRS 50.225(5) (providing that a party defendant cannot recover as costs reimbursement for attendance as a witness on his or her own behalf); see also Bobby Berosini, 114 Nev. at 1352, 971 P.2d at 385 (stating that while costs are within the trial court's discretion, statutes permitting recovery of costs must be strictly construed). Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the district court's order as to the costs award. With regard to the remainder of appellants' costs arguments, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion with regard to this award. See Bobby Berosini, 114 Nev. at 1352, 971 P.2d at 385. Accordingly, the remainder of the costs award is affirmed.
In light of these conclusions, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.