Opinion
2019-11639 Index 8982/16
12-01-2021
Pedro Peralta-Mejia, appellant, v. Park Terrace Owners, LLC, et al., respondents.
Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky (Mitchell Dranow, Sea Cliff, NY, of counsel), for appellant. Margaret G. Klein & Associates (Barclay Damon LLP, Albany, NY [Colm P. Ryan and Steven E. Mach], of counsel), for respondents.
Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky (Mitchell Dranow, Sea Cliff, NY, of counsel), for appellant.
Margaret G. Klein & Associates (Barclay Damon LLP, Albany, NY [Colm P. Ryan and Steven E. Mach], of counsel), for respondents.
HECTOR D. LASALLE, P.J. COLLEEN D. DUFFY WILLIAM G. FORD DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Salvatore Modica, J.), dated June 18, 2019. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff, who lived in an apartment building owned and managed by the defendants, allegedly sustained personal injuries when he slipped and fell on water on the floor of the lobby of that building. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the defendants. Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it did not create the hazardous condition which allegedly caused the fall, and did not have actual or constructive notice of that condition for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it (see Blazejewski v New York City Dept. of Educ., 144 A.D.3d 851, 852; Murray v Banco Popular, 132 A.D.3d 743, 744; Beceren v Joan Realty, LLC, 124 A.D.3d 572). While a defendant is not required to cover all of its floors with mats, or to continuously mop up all moisture resulting from tracked-in precipitation (see Paduano v 686 Forest Ave., LLC, 119 A.D.3d 845; Curtis v Dayton Beach Park No. 1 Corp., 23 A.D.3d 511, 512; Negron v St. Patrick's Nursing Home, 248 A.D.2d 687), a defendant may be held liable for an injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition created by water, snow, or ice tracked into a building if it either created the hazardous condition, or had actual or constructive notice of the condition and a reasonable time to undertake remedial action (see Mentasi v Eckerd Drugs, 61 A.D.3d 650, 651; Ruic v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 1000, 1001).
Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not create the alleged hazardous condition or have actual or constructive notice of its existence (see Yarosh v Oceana Holding Corp., 172 A.D.3d 1142, 1143; Blazejewski v New York City Dept. of Educ., 144 A.D.3d at 852; Beceren v Joan Realty, LLC, 124 A.D.3d at 573; Rui-Jiao Liu v City of White Plains, 95 A.D.3d 1192, 1193). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
LASALLE, P.J., DUFFY, FORD and DOWLING, JJ., concur.