Opinion
A166807
05-09-2024
In re Z.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. Z.O., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J22-00350
SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
Z.O. (Minor) appeals the juvenile court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The sole issue on appeal is whether evidence found on Minor's person during an illegal search would have been inevitably discovered after his subsequent arrest. It is undisputed on appeal that Minor was lawfully detained, the search of his person during this detention was unlawful, and probable cause supported his subsequent arrest. We set forth only those background facts relevant to the disputed issue of inevitable discovery.
In the same general location and close in time, Guillermo R.'s wallet was stolen at gunpoint and Maria R.'s purse was stolen at gunpoint. Responding police officers detained Minor and two other individuals. An officer pat-searched Minor for weapons, finding nothing, then searched Minor's pocket and found financial cards belonging to Guillermo R. and Maria R.
Guillermo R. and Maria R. both testified through an interpreter.
Subsequently, Maria R. identified Minor as the individual who robbed her. Minor was placed under arrest and transported to the police station. No officer testified to searching Minor incident to his arrest or to witnessing another officer conduct such a search. An officer testified it was standard department procedure for an arrestee to be searched incident to arrest before being transported to the police station.
A third stolen card was found in Minor's pocket after Minor told the officer who transported him to the police station about it.
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 wardship petition was filed alleging Minor committed two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). Minor filed a motion to suppress (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 700.1). Following a combined jurisdictional and suppression hearing, the juvenile court denied Minor's motion to suppress the cards found in his pocket. The court found that, while the prearrest search was unlawful, the cards were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court found true the allegation of robbery as to Guillermo R. and found not true the allegation of robbery as to Maria R. Minor was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation.
DISCUSSION
In our review of the juvenile court's ruling,"' "[w]e defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." '" (People v. Cervantes (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 867 (Cervantes).)
" 'The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence "if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police."' [Citations.] . . . [¶] 'The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence otherwise unlawfully obtained would have been inevitably discovered.' [Citation.] 'The showing must be based not on speculation but on "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment."' [Citation.] However, in assessing whether evidence would inevitably have been discovered, 'this "court does not leave its common sense at the door." '" (Cervantes, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 872, fn. omitted.) Moreover, "the 'doctrine does not require certainty. [Citation.] Rather, the People must show a "reasonable probability that [the challenged evidence] would have been procured in any event by lawful means." '" (Id. at p. 872, fn. 11.)
Minor argues no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that police would have inevitably discovered the stolen cards. Minor contends the testimony that it was standard procedure to conduct searches incident to arrest was insufficient because no such search was in fact conducted following Minor's arrest. The juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that no such search took place because prior to his arrest, Minor had been pat-searched and had his pockets searched, revealing stolen items and the absence of weapons. (See People v. Johnson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1033 [upon arrest," '[t]here is ample justification . . . for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence' "].) Minor also argues the testimony was insufficient because it was speculative and provided no specifics about what a search incident to arrest would entail. But there was specific testimony about the department policy of conducting searches incident to arrest. (See People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072 [the People may establish evidence would have been inevitably discovered through the "application of routine police procedures"].) The cards were in Minor's pocket, and it was not necessary for the People to present testimony that a search of Minor's person would have included his pockets. (See Cervantes, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 873 ["Common sense tells us Officer Larson intended to search the interior of the car, including the center console [where the evidence was found]."].)
Minor's reliance on People v. Wallace (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82 (Wallace) is unavailing. In Wallace, a weapon was found during an illegal search of the defendant's vehicle. (Id. at pp. 86, 89-93.) The Court of Appeal rejected the People's argument that the weapon would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search after the defendant's vehicle was towed because it required "speculative inference on top of speculative inference": there was no evidence about "whether anyone even considered towing the vehicle"; "the understanding of the [relevant] officer . . . of the department's standardized criteria for towing and inventorying or of whether the vehicle met these criteria"; "the location of the vehicle at the time of defendant's arrest"; or whether "the vehicle was actually towed." (Id. at pp. 94-95.) Here, in contrast, there was evidence that it was standard procedure to conduct searches incident to arrest, that Maria R. identified Minor as the robber and that, subsequent to her identification, Minor was in fact arrested. The levels of speculation present in Wallace are not present here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BURNS, J., CHOU, J.