Opinion
KA 00-03001
May 3, 2002.
Appeal from a judgment of Monroe County Court (Geraci, Jr., J.), entered December 8, 2000, convicting defendant after a jury trial of, inter alia, attempted murder in the first degree.
CRIMI CRIMI, ROCHESTER (JOSEPH P. CRIMI OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
ANTHONY YOUNGBLOOD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
HOWARD R. RELIN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (ARTHUR G. WEINSTEIN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: PIGOTT, JR., P.J., GREEN, SCUDDER, AND KEHOE, JJ.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of attempted murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 110.00, 125.27 [a] [vii], [b]) and lesser crimes and sentencing him as a persistent violent felony offender to concurrent indeterminate terms of incarceration, the longest of which is 20 years to life. Contrary to the contention of defendant, the People met their burden of establishing that the police had probable cause to arrest him ( see People v. Chaney, 253 A.D.2d 562, 564; cf. People v. Roach, 265 A.D.2d 855, 856, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 906). Based on the facts and circumstances known to them, the arresting officers had a reasonable belief that it was more probable than not that an offense had been committed and that defendant was its perpetrator ( see People v. Carrasquillo, 54 N.Y.2d 248, 254; People v. Nicodemus, 247 A.D.2d 833, 835-836, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 858; People v. Parris, 136 A.D.2d 882, 883, appeal dismissed 71 N.Y.2d 1031).
Defendant further contends that his statements to the police should have been suppressed because he did not receive Miranda warnings and the statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. We reject that contention. County Court properly refused to suppress the initial statements of defendant to the police, made before he received Miranda warnings. Questions that are necessary for processing a suspect or providing for his physical needs need not be preceded by Miranda warnings because such questions do not constitute interrogation ( see People v. Hester, 161 A.D.2d 665, 666, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 858; cf. People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173). Further, the court properly found that defendant's statements, which were nonresponsive to the officer's inquiry, were spontaneous and not the product of interrogation ( see People v. DePonceau, 275 A.D.2d 994, 994, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 962; People v. Reinard, 244 A.D.2d 936, 936, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 896; People v. Tarsczowicz, 88 A.D.2d 772).
The court further properly denied suppression of the statements subsequently made by defendant at the Public Safety Building. The interrogating officers testified that defendant was given his Miranda warnings and explicitly waived them before speaking with the officers. They further testified that defendant never requested counsel and that no promises or threats were made by the officers. The determination of the suppression court, particularly its assessment of the witnesses' credibility, is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed where, as here, it is supported by the record ( see People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761; People v. Welch, 289 A.D.2d 936; People v. May, 263 A.D.2d 215, 219, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 950).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in refusing to relieve defense counsel of his assignment; defendant himself never moved for substitution of counsel and instead opposed counsel's application to withdraw ( cf. People v. Tineo, 64 N.Y.2d 531, 535-536). In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion in the absence of a showing of good cause for the substitution of counsel ( see People v. Torres, 289 A.D.2d 991, 991; People v. Kerruish, 288 A.D.2d 921; see generally People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822, 824).
Defendant failed to object to the court's second supplemental charge and thus his challenge to that charge is not preserved for our review ( see CPL 470.05; People v. Bratcher, ___ A.D.2d ___ [decided Feb. 1, 2002]). In any event, that challenge lacks merit. The court properly instructed the jurors that attempted murder in the first degree could be predicated on either an underlying robbery or attempted robbery of the victim ( see Penal Law § 125.27 [a] [vii], supra).
Finally, we conclude that the verdict finding defendant guilty of attempted murder in the first degree is not against the weight of the evidence on the issue of defendant's intent to cause death or on the issue whether the shooting occurred during and in furtherance of a robbery or attempted robbery ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).
We have considered the contentions raised in the pro se supplemental brief and conclude that they are lacking in merit.