Opinion
2014-01-22
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Marlon YOUNG, appellant.
Stuart D. Rubin, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Rhea A. Grob of counsel), for respondent.
Stuart D. Rubin, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Rhea A. Grob of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ozzi, J.), rendered August 14, 2012, convicting him of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The People's obligation to produce the pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses is limited to that material which is in the People's possession or control ( see People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 75, 531 N.Y.S.2d 228, 526 N.E.2d 1086). The handwritten notes of a caseworker for the New York City Administration for Children's Services were not in the possession or control of the prosecution and, thus, did not constitute Rosario material ( see People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 173 N.E.2d 881; People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 75, 531 N.Y.S.2d 228, 526 N.E.2d 1086; People v. White, 210 A.D.2d 447, 620 N.Y.S.2d 437).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the testimony of the People's expert regarding the possibility of a delayed outcry by a child sexual abuse victim impermissibly bolstered the testimony of the complaining witness ( see People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620; People v. Rodriguez, 91 A.D.3d 797, 797–798, 936 N.Y.S.2d 896; People v. Carfora, 69 A.D.3d 751, 894 N.Y.S.2d 440). Such testimony explained behaviors of sexual abuse victims that jurors might not be expected to understand ( see People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620; People v. Persaud, 98 A.D.3d 527, 528, 949 N.Y.S.2d 431).
The defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of a prior consistent statement is without merit. When a “witness'[s] testimony is assailed—either directly or inferentially—as a recent fabrication, the witness may be rehabilitated” with a prior consistent statement ( People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 18, 595 N.Y.S.2d 364, 611 N.E.2d 265). Defense counsel's questioning of the complaining witness during cross-examination implied that the testimony was a recent fabrication, thus opening the door for the prosecutor, on redirect examination, to rehabilitate the witness's credibility ( see id.; People v. Sing Yuen Chen, 253 A.D.2d 898, 899, 680 N.Y.S.2d 98). Accordingly, the trial court correctly admitted the witness's prior consistent statement into evidence. DILLON, J.P., DICKERSON, AUSTIN and SGROI, JJ., concur.