Opinion
A149989
07-23-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DARRIUS YORK, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 223052-02)
This appeal arises out of a fatal shooting incident in the early morning hours of July 22, 2014, at the Henry Hotel in San Francisco. Defendant Darrius York was charged with murder, two counts of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm (a semiautomatic handgun). York testified at trial that he acted in self-defense. The jury acquitted him on all charges except for the felon in possession charge. He argues on appeal that this conviction must be reversed for insufficient evidence, bolstered by the fact that it seems inconsistent with the verdicts of acquittal. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2014, York lived most of the week at the Henry Hotel, a single room occupancy hotel on Sixth Street in San Francisco. York's close friend from childhood, codefendant Joseph Young, worked as a desk clerk at the hotel and lived in a room at the hotel. York testified that in July 2014, when he did not have a place to stay, he called Young, who permitted him to stay in a room at the hotel in exchange for helping Young with chores and paying Young some rent. York knew that the Henry Hotel was "pretty rough," that people who use drugs stay there, and that drugs are sold there.
York testified he and Young were like brothers. He described himself as a "people person" loved by everyone, and a "son of God." York was 34 years old in July 2014. He testified he had never held a job and sold drugs for a living. When he was staying at the hotel, he stored his drugs and his money at the hotel, and he would leave the hotel to sell drugs. York had prior convictions for grand theft from a person, possession of cocaine base for sale, and possession of cocaine. He knew that as a result of his felony convictions that it was illegal for him to possess a handgun.
In cross-examination, York testified that a "stack" in the drug dealing business is a stack of bills totaling one thousand dollars. York identified photographs from his cell phone showing his hand and his watch, with "stacks" of money. One photograph showed him with about 20 "stacks" of money. York demurred that this depicted $20,000 by his definition of "stacks" and estimated it was only about $7,000 in cash. "[I]n this day and age, people take pictures and post them on Instagram or whatever. So call myself a reflection." He then denied that all of the money was drug proceeds. "Well, to tell you the truth, most of the money is Henry money. Me and Joseph [Young] was acting around, sitting in there, just taking pictures, posting it on the phone, doing, I guess, ignorant, stupid stuff." He added, "not all of it" was from drug dealing.
To enter the Henry Hotel from the sidewalk on Sixth Street, there is a door and an iron gate, which lead into the outer hotel lobby. To gain access to the inner lobby, there is another locked iron gate. A person who wishes to gain access to the inner lobby of the hotel must be buzzed in through this second iron gate. At the back of the inner lobby is a stairwell and an elevator. A person in the outer lobby can see people coming out of the elevator or coming down the stairs. The desk clerk's office in the inner lobby has a glass window that looks out on the outer lobby. The desk clerk's office has an array of security monitors that display a camera view of the hotel, including the interior of the elevator. In all, the Henry Hotel had 32 video cameras inside and outside the hotel. At trial many of these time-stamped videos were shown to the jury in connection with witness testimony.
The series of events that led to the shooting began around 5:00 a.m. on July 22, 2014. Jose Beltran (Beltran) testified that he and four others drove to the hotel to buy cocaine. Beltran's nephew, Daniel Beltran, who would soon be shot and killed, drove the car fast and recklessly, doing "donuts" on Sixth Street before parking the car. They went to the Henry Hotel because Beltran's friend, Roger Alarcon (who was part of the group that morning), had a cocaine connection there. Beltran and Alarcon went into the hotel to buy cocaine.
As the incident was about to unfold, York was on the seventh floor of the hotel "chilling" with Young and some women friends. York testified that he went to the third floor to use the restroom, and then took the elevator downstairs to get a towel from the front desk. By the time he arrived in the lobby, he heard yelling, and spoke to Gary Owens, the desk clerk. Owens, who York had known for 17 years and regarded as an "uncle," seemed "nervous, jittery" and "in distress." When York asked him for some towels, Owens replied, " 'No. Ain't no towels, man. You go get the thing, man. These motherfuckers in the . . . lobby talking about they gonna do something to me.' " Owens told York, " 'these motherfuckers gonna shoot me, shoot the place up.' " Owens identified the people making threats as " '[t]hese two Mexican dudes up at the front tell me how they're going to do this, that, and the other to me.' "
York knew when Owens told him to get the "thing" that Owens meant a gun, and that "it was serious." York saw a group of people in the lobby yelling. He heard one shout, " 'I light this motherfucker up with this trey 5-7 on my hip.' " York knew that meant a "357" gun. York admitted he decided to take matters into his own hands.
So York immediately "went upstairs to grab a gun" in a room on the seventh floor and to tell Young what was going on. He then ran back to the elevator and went down to the lobby, intending to use the gun to scare people. "So my whole—my whole point was to go down there and just, like, you know, scare them. 'You all got guns. We got a gun too. Man, you all just leave,' period, point blank." York just assumed the handgun he had retrieved was loaded.
When York returned to the lobby, he saw Young and desk clerk Owens there, as well as four or five others he did not know. York did not know which of these unknown persons had a gun at the time. York's attention was drawn to a man in a white bucket hat, identified as Alarcon at trial. York brandished his weapon at Alarcon, because he thought Alarcon was approaching him. York told Alarcon to back up, but Alarcon approached, so York punched him two or three times. York admitted that after he punched Alarcon, Alarcon was no longer a threat to him. Then York saw Young come back through the door and heard Young say, " 'Bro, he got a hammer,' " meaning someone had a gun. York saw someone, but all he saw was that person's "frame." York testified, "I can't really see him but I can—I can see his frame. I can see his arm, him coming back through the gate. That made me react. I think he going to shoot. When [Young] saying what he saying and I'm reacting—it just happened that fast." York stepped around Young and fired his gun outside, not even seeing the victim's hands. After he heard the gunshot from his gun go off, York stepped outside, and he and Young pursued a man later identified as Daniel Beltran. York never saw Daniel Beltran with a weapon. And he never saw a gun during the entire incident.
When York was asked by his counsel at trial what was the "reason" he shot the gun, York testified, "Because I thought he was going to shoot through the door . . . [Young] telling me he got a hammer. Like I said, it happened—it just happened so fast. It—it happened real fast."
York went back into the hotel. Alarcon was still there. Codefendant Young punched Alarcon, and another person, Ebony "L.A." Holt, fought with Alarcon. York walked around the fighting. As Alarcon eventually got up and walked to the door, York told him to leave. York testified that Alarcon said statements like, " 'Yeah, you motherfuckers, you all going to get it. And, you know, this ain't over.' " York closed the gated door behind Alarcon.
York eventually went back upstairs by elevator. He put the gun under the bed in a room on the third floor, Room 301, and then went back to the seventh floor. Later that morning when York heard sirens and saw police at the hotel, he left by the back door, scared because he found out Daniel Beltran had been shot. He went to his sister's house in San Francisco and then a few hours later to Fremont, where Young had gone. He wanted to talk to Young "to really see what he saw and, you know, get a better understanding of things." He was thinking of turning himself in to police, but before he did, he and Young were arrested in Fremont later the same day. Daniel Beltran died at San Francisco General Hospital from a single gunshot wound of the left chest.
York admitted Holt gave him a "fist pump" and a "high five" in the elevator.
A jury acquitted York of the murder of Daniel Beltran (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); two counts of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)). The jury convicted him of possession of a firearm by a felon, to wit, a semiautomatic handgun. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).)
His codefendant, Joseph Young, who had also been charged with four counts of felony assault, was acquitted of these charges, and convicted only of a lesser offense of misdemeanor simple assault. --------
This appeal followed, raising only the issue whether there was sufficient evidence to convict York of possession of firearm by a felon.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence and Standard of Review
When a challenge is made to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, " 'we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] "Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]" [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence "is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support' " the jury's verdict. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87 (Manibusan).)
The same standard of review applies to insufficiency of the evidence claims that involve circumstantial evidence. (Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 87.) " 'We "must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]" ' " (Ibid.) " 'Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, a reviewing court's conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment's reversal. [Citation.]" (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357-358.)
It is settled that an "inherently inconsistent verdict is allowed to stand; if an acquittal of one count is factually irreconcilable with a conviction on another, or if a not true finding of an enhancement allegation is inconsistent with a conviction of the substantive offense, effect is given to both. [Citations.]" People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 911; 6 Witkin and Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 85, p. 128) ["any verdict of guilty that is sufficiently certain is a valid verdict, even though the jury's action in returning it was, in a legal sense, inconsistent with its action in returning another verdict of acquittal or guilt of a different offense"].)
Elements of The Crime of Felon in Possession
York was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon on or about July 22, 2014 (the day of the shooting), in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). Without question the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the crime: the defendant possessed a firearm, he knew he possessed it, and he had previously been convicted of a felony. The jury was also instructed that self-defense may be applicable to the charge if defendant "temporarily possessed the firearm in self-defense or in defense of another." Relying on CALCRIM No. 2514 ("Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self Defense"), the court fully instructed the jury on self-defense and defense of another in connection with the charge. It said, in part: "The defendant possessed the firearm in lawful self-defense or defense of another if the defendant reasonably believed that he or Gary Owens was in imminent danger of suffering great bodily injury; the defendant reasonably believed the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger; a firearm became available to the defendant without planning or preparation on his part; the defendant possessed the firearm temporarily and, that is, for a period no longer than necessary for self-defense; no other means of avoiding the danger of injury was available; and the defendant's use of the firearm was reasonable under the circumstances." The jury was told the parties had stipulated that defendant had a prior felony conviction.
Discussion
Although York concedes that inconsistent verdicts are allowed to stand, and inconsistent verdicts alone do not require reversal of his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, he argues that the judgment of conviction must be reversed because the "contradiction between finding that appellant acted in legitimate self-defense when he shot Mr. Beltran (Cts. 1-5), but did not act in self-defense when he briefly obtained the weapon he used to fire the shot . . . is so glaring that it reveals the unreasonableness of the latter finding."
The Attorney General contends that a rational jury could have found defendant guilty of the felon in possession charge because the evidence showed he did not possess the firearm only temporarily, i.e., "for a period no longer than necessary for self-defense." We agree with the Attorney General.
York testified he knew there was a gun in room 702 or 703 because his friend Otis had told him this sometime before. (Otis had died by the time of trial.) When Owens told him to go get "the thing," York knew exactly where to go. Room 702 or 703 was a corner room on the seventh floor. York had been there "approximately probably five" times before July 22, 2014. The gun was "in a seat, seated couch, where you could lift off—like a stool where you can lift the top off and you can put things in it. It was a black, like, leather stool." York just assumed the weapon was loaded. Despite the fact that there was allegedly an emergency, he admitted he never bothered even to check. A jury could have concluded that because York knew precisely where the gun was hidden (room and furniture), its condition (loaded) and because he had such easy access to it that he controlled the gun and possessed it before he used it during the incident on July 22.
Further, after he fired the gun, York did not return it to the place where he had retrieved it. Instead, he went upstairs and put the gun under a bed in a different room on a different floor. No one told him to put the gun in room 301; it was solely his decision to do so. York described room 301 as "nobody's room . . . I got keys to every room." No one was occupying room 301 at the time. A jury reasonably might infer that York putting the gun in the room of his choice on the third floor and secreting it under a bed, rather than taking it back to the room on the seventh floor where he retrieved it, was evidence that York remained in control of the gun after he had used it, even if that use had been in self-defense.
Or the jury may not have believed York's testimony that the gun was not his. As it was properly instructed, the jury could consider York's prior felony convictions in evaluating his credibility as a witness. The Attorney General posits the jury could have concluded that York was "exaggerating his good character" by describing himself as a "son of God," all the while admitting that he made a living selling drugs. And they might not have believed his testimony that he had never in his entire life possessed a handgun, in light of his admitted career selling drugs, his felony convictions, and the fact that when Owens asked him to get "the thing," York knew exactly what Owens meant and where to find the gun, and rushed back downstairs without hesitation and brandished it before he fired a fatal shot.
All of this evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that even if York had used the gun in self-defense at the moment he shot Daniel Beltran, he was in possession of the gun on July 22, 2014, separate and apart from that temporary possession. He possessed it before he picked it up and used it, and after the incident was over.
Because we find the evidence is sufficient to convict York of the felon in possession charge on this theory, we do not address the Attorney General's other argument that a reasonable jury could have concluded that York did not shoot in self-defense.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
/s/_________
Miller, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Stewart, J.