Opinion
109809
08-10-2023
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Vahnjordan D. WOODRUFF, Appellant.
Robert C. Kilmer, Binghamton, for appellant. Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Zachary S. Persichini of counsel), for respondent.
Robert C. Kilmer, Binghamton, for appellant.
Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Zachary S. Persichini of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Garry, P.J., Lynch, Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and McShan, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Richard W. Rich Jr., J.), rendered March 18, 2016, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in satisfaction of a four-count indictment alleging that he shot a loaded firearm at a victim in a residential area, as well as another pending matter. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement to seven years in prison followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole challenge on appeal is to the severity of his sentence. Although defendant has served his prison sentence, he has not reached the maximum expiration date of his undischarged period of postrelease supervision and, thus, his challenge is not moot (see People v. Ramjiwan, 209 A.D.3d 1176, 1177, 177 N.Y.S.3d 740 [3d Dept. 2022] ; People v. Purdie, 205 A.D.3d 1225, 1226, 168 N.Y.S.3d 190 [3d Dept. 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1135, 172 N.Y.S.3d 849, 193 N.E.3d 514 [2022] ; see also People v. Hancarik, 202 A.D.3d 1151, 1151, 160 N.Y.S.3d 497 [3d Dept. 2022] ). Nevertheless, in view of the egregious nature of defendant's conduct, we do not find the negotiated period of postrelease supervision imposed, which was within the permissible statutory range (see Penal Law § 70.45[2] ), to be unduly harsh or severe (see CPL 470.15[6][b] ; People v. Brodhead, 106 A.D.3d 1337, 1337, 965 N.Y.S.2d 250 [3d Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 1087, 981 N.Y.S.2d 672, 4 N.E.3d 974 [2014] ; People v. Smith, 100 A.D.3d 1144, 1144, 953 N.Y.S.2d 399 [3d Dept. 2012] ). To the extent that defendant asserts that he should be afforded youthful offender status, he is not eligible for such treatment as the record reflects that he was previously adjudicated to be a juvenile delinquent upon his commission of a designated felony act as defined in Family Ct Act § 301.2(8) (see CPL 720.10[2][c] ; Penal Law §§ 140.25, 160.10 ; People v. Middlebrooks, 25 N.Y.3d 516, 525, 14 N.Y.S.3d 296, 35 N.E.3d 464 [2015] ).
Garry, P.J., Lynch, Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and McShan, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.