Opinion
April 17, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kay, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, we conclude that the hearing court did not err in denying suppression of the showup identification made by the complainant at the scene of the crime. This showup occurred close in time and proximity to the event, while the complainant's memory was fresh, and was not unduly suggestive (People v. Brnja, 70 A.D.2d 17, affd 50 N.Y.2d 366). Showing the witness the coat recovered near the defendant did not render the identification suggestive (see, People v. Johnson, 137 A.D.2d 719; People v. Meeks, 134 A.D.2d 290). We additionally note that the People established an independent source for the in-court identification. Since no identification procedures were conducted at the precinct, the coincidental meeting of the witness and the defendant there, after the initial identification, did not taint the identification as it was not an initial encounter and was not arranged by the police (cf., People v. James, 111 A.D.2d 254). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. We find that the defendant was identified by the complaining witness as one of the robbers within two minutes of the incident when he was caught hiding underneath a parked car.
The defendant's remaining arguments, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit (see, CPL 190.50 [c]; Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78; People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105; People v. Reddy, 108 A.D.2d 945). Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.