Opinion
11-10-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Verniel L. WILSON, Defendant–Appellant.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester, Muldoon, Getz & Reston (Gary Muldoon of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Verniel L. Wilson, Defendant–Appellant pro se. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester, Muldoon, Getz & Reston (Gary Muldoon of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Verniel L. Wilson, Defendant–Appellant pro se.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15[4] ), robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10[1] ), and attempted robbery in the second degree (§§ 110.00, 160.10[1] ), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the identifications of him by the victims on the grounds that he was unlawfully detained by the police and that the showup procedures were unduly suggestive. We reject that contention. “The police had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant for a showup identification based on ... a radio transmission providing a general description of the perpetrator[s] of [the] crime[s, the] proximity of the defendant to the site of the crime[s], the brief period of time between the crime[s] and the discovery of the defendant near the location of the crime[s], and the [officers'] observation of the defendant, who matched the radio-transmitted description [of one of the perpetrators]” (People v. Owens, 39 A.D.3d 1260, 1261, 836 N.Y.S.2d 385, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 849, 840 N.Y.S.2d 775, 872 N.E.2d 888 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Smith, 128 A.D.3d 1434, 1434, 8 N.Y.S.3d 777, lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 1011, 20 N.Y.S.3d 552, 42 N.E.3d 222 ; People v. Mitchell, 118 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 988 N.Y.S.2d 367, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 963, 996 N.Y.S.2d 222, 20 N.E.3d 1002 ; People v. Evans, 34 A.D.3d 1301, 1302, 825 N.Y.S.2d 617, lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 845, 830 N.Y.S.2d 704, 862 N.E.2d 796 ). With respect to the showup procedures, we conclude that they were not unduly suggestive. “[T]he victim[s'] observation of defendant being removed from a patrol car, and the fact that defendant was handcuffed, did not render the showup[s] unduly suggestive as a matter of law” (Smith, 128 A.D.3d at 1435, 8 N.Y.S.3d 777 ; see People v. Boyd, 272 A.D.2d 898, 899, 709 N.Y.S.2d 269, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 850, 714 N.Y.S.2d 1, 736 N.E.2d 862 ; People v. Aponte, 222 A.D.2d 304, 304–305, 636 N.Y.S.2d 13, lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 980, 649 N.Y.S.2d 386, 672 N.E.2d 612 ).Contrary to defendant's contention, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to call a cross-racial identification expert at trial (see White v. Georgia, 293 Ga. 635, 636–637, 748 S.E.2d 888 ; see generally People v. Jones, 85 A.D.3d 612, 614, 926 N.Y.S.2d 463, affd. 21 N.Y.3d 449, 971 N.Y.S.2d 740, 994 N.E.2d 831 ), especially considering that defendant was identified both by an individual of the same race and by an individual of a different race. Nor was counsel ineffective in failing to timely request a missing witness charge. Defendant was acquitted of the charge relating to the missing witness, and thus he suffered no prejudice from counsel's alleged misstep in that regard (see People v. Santana, 114 A.D.3d 557, 558, 980 N.Y.S.2d 454, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 1067, 994 N.Y.S.2d 326, 18 N.E.3d 1147 ; see generally People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 284, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883, rearg. denied 3 N.Y.3d 702, 785 N.Y.S.2d 29, 818 N.E.2d 671 ; People v. Glanda, 18 A.D.3d 956, 960, 794 N.Y.S.2d 712, lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 754, 810 N.Y.S.2d 422, 843 N.E.2d 1162, reconsideration denied 6 N.Y.3d 848, 816 N.Y.S.2d 754, 849 N.E.2d 977 ).
In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant contends that the court erred in admitting testimony that violated his constitutional right of confrontation (see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ). As defendant correctly concedes, however, that contention is not preserved for our review, and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[6][a] ). We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions, including the additional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in his pro se supplemental brief, and we conclude that they lack merit.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.