Opinion
No. D040181.
11-3-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SEAN DAVID WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Sean David Williams appeals from a conviction of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)) with personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). He contends: (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that antecedent threats by a victim justify quicker and harsher measures in self-defense; and (2) in the alternative, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request such an instruction. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of May 23, 2001, appellant Sean David Williams and several friends went to a bar called "The Dog" in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego. At the bar, Williams friend, Jason Scarnecchia, introduced Williams to the victim, William Agnello. Williams and Agnello were both drinking. Around midnight, Williams, Agnello, and several others walked toward another bar called "Plan B." Along the way, Williams decided to go home. He walked to his house in Pacific Beach. Scarnecchia and Agnello stayed at Plan B for a short time, then left to join Williams at his house.
Williams was home with his girlfriend, Christina Davila, and several others, and was in the kitchen cooking when Scarnecchia and Agnello arrived. Shortly after Agnello arrived at the house, he grabbed Davila in the living room and said, "This girls coming with me." Agnello pulled Davila outside onto the patio. Davilas friend, Sarah Rose, told Agnello to let Davila go. Agnello called Rose a "bitch" and walked away from the house. Davila and Rose related to Williams what had just occurred.
Agnello returned to the house a short time later. Williams asked Agnello what he had called Rose. Agnello said he had called her a "bitch." Williams repeatedly asked Agnello to leave the house. While they were outside the house on the patio, Agnello charged at Williams, grabbed him, and put him in a headlock. Williams managed to free himself and he told Agnello, "Dude, I dont want to wrestle you, just leave."
Williams walked inside the house and asked Scarnecchia to tell Agnello to leave. Agnello followed Williams into the house and he and Williams started fighting. Williams picked up a knife with an 8-inch blade from the kitchen counter. During the fight, Williams stabbed Agnello in the chest with a horizontal slashing motion. Agnello asked Williams, "What are you doing?" He grabbed his chest and left the residence.
Williams followed Agnello into the street, still holding the knife. Rose got between them and yelled at Williams, "Stop, stop, stop." Williams stabbed Agnello in the left upper chest and then in the back. When Agnello fell to the ground, Williams kicked him in the back of his head. Williams said to Agnello, "You think youre hard now?" Williams then walked away and threw the knife into an alley.
Agnello died as a result of three stab wounds, one to the upper left chest, one in the lower left chest, and one in the lower right back. The stab wound to the upper left chest penetrated Agnellos heart. The bleeding from all three of the wounds contributed
to the death. Agnellos blood alcohol level was between .17 percent and 0.3 percent and his blood tested positive for amphetamine and a metabolite of cocaine.
The distance from the kitchen of Williams house to the location where Agnello fell outside was 141 feet. At a normal walking pace, it would have taken approximately 35 seconds to walk this distance.
Williams testified in his own defense. He saw Agnello drag Davila onto the patio, and he went outside to talk to Davila and her friends. He learned that Agnello had been acting rude and had been groping Davila. When Agnello returned, Williams confronted him on the patio and asked him to leave. Agnello lunged at Williams and put him in a headlock. Williams freed himself and again told Agnello to leave. Williams walked inside the house and told Scarnecchia to tell Agnello to leave. Agnello followed Williams into the house and started hitting him in the kitchen. Williams pushed Agnello back and threw a punch. Agnello lunged at him. Williams picked up a knife from the kitchen counter and continued throwing punches at Agnello. Agnello was not armed. Williams believed he must have cut Agnello with the knife while punching him. Williams and Agnello continued to wrestle their way through the living room. Williams pushed Agnello out of the house.
Williams testified that he followed Agnello to the street corner because he thought Agnello would try to return to the house. At the corner, they started fighting again. Williams kicked Agnello in the chest, causing him to fall to the ground. Williams did not recall stabbing Agnello in the back or saying, "You think youre hard now?"
According to Williams, he intended merely to end Agnellos attack and protect his home. Williams reacted impulsively out of fear when he grabbed the knife. When Agnello fell to the ground, Williams did not know Agnello had been seriously injured. Williams never saw Agnello bleeding. Williams admitted that he had been "very angry" at Agnello for grabbing him and his girlfriend and insulting his friends.
Williams was charged with murder (§ 187) with personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) At trial, the jury acquitted Williams of first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. However, the jury convicted Williams of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (b).) The jury also found true the allegation that Williams personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the crime. The trial court sentenced Williams to five years in state prison.
II
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Had No Duty To Instruct Sua Sponte on Antecedent
Threats or Assaults
The trial court instructed the jury with the standard CALJIC instructions on self-defense. Williams did not request any additional self-defense instructions. However, Williams contends on appeal that the trial court should have instructed the jury sua sponte regarding antecedent threats, based on Agnellos assaults against Williams and his girlfriend that occurred immediately before the stabbing. Specifically, Williams argues that the trial court should have instructed as follows:
The trial court gave the following CALJIC self-defense instructions: CALJIC No. 5.30 (Self-Defense Against Assault), CALJIC No. 5.31 (Assault With Fists—When Use of Deadly Weapon Not Justified), CALJIC No. 5.50 (Self-Defense—Assailed Person Need Not Retreat), CALJIC No. 5.51 (Self-Defense—Actual Danger Not Necessary), CALJIC No. 5.52 (Self-Defense—When Danger Ceases), CALJIC No. 5.53 (Self-Defense Not An Excuse After Adversary Disabled), CALJIC No. 5.54 (Self-Defense By An Aggressor), CALJIC No. 5.56 (Self-Defense—Participants In Mutual Combat), CALJIC No. 5.40 revised (Defense of Property—Ejection of Trespasser), CALJIC No. 5.42 (Resisting An Intruder Upon Ones Property), CALJIC No. 5.10 (Resisting Attempt To Commit Felony), CALJIC No. 5.16 (Forcible and Atrocious Crime—Defined), CALJIC No. 5.12 (Justifiable Homicide in Self-Defense), CALJIC No. 5.13 (Justifiable Homicide—Lawful Defense Of Self Or Another), and CALJIC No. 5.17 (Actual But Unreasonable Belief In Necessity to Defend—Manslaughter).
Although Williams frames his argument in terms of antecedent threats, the evidence he relies on actually involves assaultive conduct by the victim. In this context, however, the same general principles apply to antecedent threats and antecedent assaults. (See People v. Gonzales (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1663-1664 ["It is well settled a defendant asserting self-defense is entitled to an instruction on the effect of antecedent threats or assaults by the victim on the reasonableness of defendants conduct"].)
"One who has received threats against his life or person made by another is justified in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures for his own protection in the event of assault either actual or threatened, than would be a person who had not received such threats.
"If in this case you believe that William Agnello made prior threats against the defendant and that the defendant, because of such threats, had reasonable cause to fear greater peril in the event of an altercation with William Agnello, you are to consider such facts in determining whether the defendant acted reasonably in protecting his own life or bodily safety."
We find that the trial court had no duty to give such an instruction. In criminal cases, the trial court must instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jurys understanding of the case. (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531.) Specifically, the trial court has a duty to instruct, sua sponte, on a defense if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendants theory of the case. (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195.)
Although the trial court must instruct the jury sua sponte on general principles of law, there is no duty to give "pinpoint" instructions sua sponte that "relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or `pinpoint the crux of a defendants case, such as mistaken identification or alibi." (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119.) Such pinpoint instructions need be given only upon request if there is evidence to support them. (Ibid.)
It is settled that a homicide defendant who asserts self-defense is entitled upon request to a pinpoint instruction on antecedent threats or antecedent assaults by the victim, if there is evidence in the record to support such an instruction. (See, e.g., People v. Moore (1954) 43 Cal.2d 517, 528-529; People v. Gonzales, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1663-1664; People v. Pena (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 462, 475; People v. Bush (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 294, 302-304; People v. Torres (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 146, 151-153.) However, a trial court has no duty to give such an instruction sua sponte. (People v. Garvin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488-489.) Such an instruction is a pinpoint instruction that need be given only upon request, because it relates particular facts in evidence (antecedent threats or assaults by the victim) to a general legal issue in the case (self-defense). (Id. at p. 489.) Where the trial court gives the standard CALJIC self-defense instructions, a pinpoint instruction on antecedent threats or assaults is "analogous to a clarifying instruction," which need not be given sua sponte. (Ibid.)
The trial court here fully discharged its duty to instruct on self-defense by giving the standard CALJIC instructions on this topic. (People v. Garvin, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 489, citing People v. Gonzales, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1665 [noting that the concept of antecedent threats or assaults "is closer to rough and ready common sense than abstract legal principle" and "is also fully consistent with the otherwise complete self-defense instructions given by the court"].) Because the concept of antecedent threats or assaults is a "specific point" and "not a general principle of law", "the trial court was not obligated to instruct on this issue absent request." (People v. Garvin, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.)
Further, the cases establishing the right to a pinpoint instruction regarding antecedent threats or assaults, all involve prior threats or assaults made by the victim on occasions prior to and separate from, the events underlying the charged offense. (See, e.g., People v. Pena, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 [distinguishing between antecedent threats made by the victim on prior occasions and events actually perceived by the defendant immediately before the shooting].) In such circumstances, a pinpoint instruction may be necessary or helpful to assist the jury in evaluating the significance of otherwise unrelated events in the past.
The same reasoning does not logically apply to threats or assaults such as those at issue here, which constitute an integral part of the events immediately preceding the fatal stabbing. In a homicide case where the defendant claims self-defense based on threatening conduct by the victim, jurors do not need a special pinpoint instruction to understand the significance of the victims assaultive conduct that immediately preceded the killing. The standard CALJIC self-defense instructions are sufficient to cover the topic. Thus, Williams would not have been entitled to a jury instruction on antecedent threats or assaults even if he had requested one.
Significantly, both sides argued to the jury the significance of Agnellos assaultive behavior in addressing Williams claim of self-defense.
B. Defense Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance of Counsel By Failing To Request A Jury Instruction On Antecedent Threats Or Assaults
Williams argues that even if the trial court had no duty to instruct sua sponte regarding antecedent threats or assaults, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request such an instruction. We reject this claim as well.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsels performance fell below a standard of reasonable competence, and that there is a reasonable probability the result would have been more favorable to the defense in the absence of counsels deficient performance. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.) When a claim of ineffective assistance is made on direct appeal, and the record does not show the reason for counsels challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.)
Williams has failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice under the Strickland standard. As we have discussed, Williams would not have been entitled to a pinpoint instruction on antecedent threats or assaults even if he had requested one. Based on the instructions given, defense counsel was able to argue to the jury that Agnellos conduct on the night in question, including his assaults of Williams and Davila, gave rise to a claim of self-defense. Because the self-defense instructions given were sufficient to cover the theory of the defense, and a pinpoint instruction on antecedent threats or assaults would have been properly refused, defense counsel had a reasonable basis for not requesting such an instruction. (Cf. People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1222 [finding no ineffective assistance where defense counsel reasonably could have concluded that requesting a particular jury instruction would have been futile].)
Further, there is no "reasonable probability" the jury would have reached a different result if such an instruction had been given. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) Defense counsel did not argue to the jury that it should acquit Williams entirely based on his claim of self-defense. Instead, defense counsel wisely chose to defend against the murder charge by arguing that Williams was at most guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, on the theory that Williams may have used excessive or unreasonable force in defending himself. This was a reasonable tactical choice in light of the evidence that Williams was angry at Agnello, he used a long knife to stab an unarmed combatant, he followed Agnello down the street after stabbing him inside the house, he stabbed Agnello again in the chest and back outside the house, and he kicked Agnello while Agnello was on the ground, and said to him, "You think youre hard now?" In view of this evidence, defense counsels strategy was remarkably successful in obtaining acquittals of first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter.
In these circumstances, the jurys verdict of involuntary manslaughter was as favorable to Williams as it realistically could have been. There is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict if it had been instructed on antecedent threats or assaults. Thus, defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request such an instruction.
III
CONCLUSION
The trial court had no duty to instruct the jury, sua sponte, regarding antecedent threats or assaults. Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request such an instruction.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR NARES, Acting P.J. and McDONALD, J.