Opinion
147 KA 15–01500
03-20-2020
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jason R. WILLIAMS, also known as Errol Bowry, Defendant–Appellant.
MARK D. FUNK, CONFLICT DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CAROLYN WALTHER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
MARK D. FUNK, CONFLICT DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CAROLYN WALTHER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CURRAN, TROUTMAN, WINSLOW, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law
§ 140.25 [2] ). Defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction because the People did not establish that he entered the victim's home with intent to commit a crime therein. We reject that contention (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). It is well established that "[a] defendant's intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the circumstances of the entry ..., as well as from defendant's actions and assertions when confronted" ( People v. Maier, 140 A.D.3d 1603, 1603–1604, 34 N.Y.S.3d 544 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 933, 40 N.Y.S.3d 361, 63 N.E.3d 81 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, we conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer defendant's criminal intent, i.e., the victim testified that she saw defendant, who was on the premises without permission, climbing out of her bedroom window, defendant fled when the victim made noise as she walked toward the bedroom, and a television had been moved across the bedroom and was sitting near the window (see generally People v. Beaty, 89 A.D.3d 1414, 1416–1417, 932 N.Y.S.2d 280 [4th Dept. 2011], affd 22 N.Y.3d 918, 977 N.Y.S.2d 172, 999 N.E.2d 535 [2013] ; People v. Pendarvis, 143 A.D.3d 1275, 1275, 39 N.Y.S.3d 348 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1149, 52 N.Y.S.3d 300, 74 N.E.3d 685 [2017] ; People v. Hymes, 132 A.D.3d 1411, 1411–1412, 17 N.Y.S.3d 561 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1146, 32 N.Y.S.3d 60, 51 N.E.3d 571 [2016] ). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we further conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ).
We also reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in its instruction to the jury in response to a jury note requesting a legal definition of the word "enter." The court responded to the note by reading a definition from case law, i.e., that "[t]he entry element of burglary is satisfied ‘when a person intrudes within a [dwelling], no matter how slightly, with any part of his or her body’ " ( People v. Sterina, 108 A.D.3d 1088, 1090, 968 N.Y.S.2d 296 [4th Dept. 2013], quoting People v. King, 61 N.Y.2d 550, 555, 475 N.Y.S.2d 260, 463 N.E.2d 601 [1984] ). We conclude that the court "respond[ed] meaningfully to the jury's request" ( People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 449 N.Y.S.2d 168, 434 N.E.2d 237 [1982], cert denied 459 U.S. 847, 103 S.Ct. 104, 74 L.Ed.2d 93 [1982] ), and that "the charge as a whole adequately conveyed to the jury the appropriate standards" ( People v. Adams, 69 N.Y.2d 805, 806, 513 N.Y.S.2d 381, 505 N.E.2d 946 [1987] ). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.