Opinion
NO. 5-14-0434
04-19-2018
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VONZELL D. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
Decision filed 04/19/18. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti ion for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County.
No. 10-CF-149
Honorable William G. Schwartz, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and Cates concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to sever after finding that the offenses were part of the same comprehensive transaction; the defendant's claim is forfeited regarding the court's noncompliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) where the evidence was not so closely balanced that the error may have affected the outcome of the trial; and the defendant is entitled to pretrial detention credit.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Vonzell Williams, was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2008)) and theft over $10,000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(4)(A) (West 2008)). After the circuit court merged these two charges, the defendant was convicted only of theft over $10,000. He was
subsequently sentenced to six years' imprisonment and ordered to pay $5000 in fines and $1000 in restitution. The defendant contends on appeal that the circuit court committed reversible error when it denied his motion to sever the charged offenses and failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) during voir dire. Additionally, the defendant argues that the imposition of restitution was erroneous and that he was entitled to pretrial detention credit. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On March 16, 2010, Max Snyder (Snyder), a detective with the Jackson County Sheriff's Department, was driving an unmarked police vehicle when he observed a Dodge Challenger commit a traffic violation. After Snyder ran an inquiry on the Missouri dealer license plates, he discovered that the plates had been reported as stolen. Subsequently, Snyder followed the defendant to a local residence where the defendant parked the Dodge Challenger and entered the home. After backup arrived, police officers repeatedly knocked on the door of the residence, but the defendant did not respond. At that time, search warrants for the Dodge Challenger and residence were obtained. Shortly thereafter, the defendant exited the residence and was placed under arrest.
¶ 5 The search of the residence yielded items with cannabis residue and a trash can that held cannabis packaging material, small plastic sandwich bags that contained cannabis residue, and a fraudulent insurance card for Maureen Cameron. A subsequent search of the Dodge Challenger yielded a small quantity of cannabis, a computer bag, a cell phone, an insurance card, and a vehicle title. A large amount of cannabis was found inside a Chevy Caprice parked in the attached garage. Shortly thereafter, the defendant
was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (count I) (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2008)); theft over $10,000 (count II) (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(4)(A) (West 2008)); unlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis (count III) (720 ILCS 550/5(e) (West 2008)); and unlawful possession of cannabis (count IV) (720 ILCS 550/4(e) (West 2008)).
¶ 6 In January 2014, the defendant filed a motion to sever, arguing that the theft (counts I and II) and cannabis (counts III and IV) charges were not based on the same act or comprehensive transaction. In support, the defendant argued that the Dodge Challenger and cannabis had been purchased on separate dates. In response, the State argued that separating the charges would create gaps in witness testimony and cause juror confusion, given that all four charges flowed from one investigation. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion finding that the charged offenses involved interrelated evidence that stemmed from one continuous investigation.
¶ 7 In April 2014, the case proceeded to trial. During voir dire, the circuit court individually asked each prospective juror whether they understood the four trial principles enumerated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), but did not ask if each juror accepted these principles. Defense counsel made no objection.
¶ 8 The following evidence was adduced at trial. Julia Richardson (Richardson), an employee at Expressway Dodge, a car dealership in Indiana, testified to the following. In February 2010, two new Dodge Challengers, both "top of the line" SRT models worth $44,705, were stolen from Expressway Dodge. Richardson identified the recovered Dodge Challenger by the vehicle identification number (VIN).
¶ 9 Snyder testified to the following. On March 16, 2010, while driving an unmarked police vehicle, he observed a Dodge Challenger, with Missouri dealer license plates, commit a traffic violation. After Snyder ran an inquiry, he discovered that the license plates had been reported as stolen. Snyder followed the defendant until the defendant parked the vehicle and entered a residence through the garage. After law enforcement backup arrived, officers repeatedly knocked on the door of the residence, but the defendant did not respond. At that time, search warrants for the Dodge Challenger and residence were obtained. Shortly thereafter, the defendant exited the residence and was placed under arrest. During the search of the Dodge Challenger, Snyder discovered an insurance card, a vehicle title, and a small quantity of cannabis. Snyder initially believed that the insurance card and title were genuine, as they "would easily fool anyone," but later determined that the documents were fraudulent.
¶ 10 Jennifer Lindsey (Lindsey), a patrol officer and crime scene investigator with the Jackson County Sheriff's Department, testified to the following. After Lindsey responded to Snyder's call for backup, she learned that the Dodge Challenger had been stolen from Indiana. During the search of the Dodge Challenger, Lindsey observed a partially removed VIN sticker on the driver's side door; an insurance card for Melissa Wright, a St. Louis, Missouri, resident; a computer bag; a small quantity of cannabis; and a fraudulent title. The title did not contain buyer information and the seller was listed as an individual from Atlanta, Georgia, with a transfer date of March 13, 2010.
¶ 11 Michael Ryan (Ryan), a detective with the Jackson County Sheriff's Department, testified to the following. After Ryan obtained search warrants for the Dodge Challenger
and residence, he discovered cannabis and materials commonly used to package and sell cannabis outside of the residence. A search of the attached garage yielded a Chevy Caprice and a large amount of cannabis.
¶ 12 Michael Laughlin (Laughlin), a detective with the Murphysboro Police Department, testified to the following. Laughlin located a trash can outside of the residence that contained cannabis packaging material, small plastic sandwich bags with cannabis residue, and a 1995 insurance card for Maureen Cameron.
¶ 13 Tim Legere (Legere), a detective with the Murphysboro Police Department, assigned to investigate drug crimes in Jackson County, Illinois, testified to the following. Legere located a cannabis pipe and tray that contained burnt cannabis residue in the residence and three large bags of cannabis on the rear driver side floorboard of the Chevy Caprice that had been parked in the garage. Based on his extensive experience investigating drug-related crimes, Legere believed that the large quantity of individually packaged cannabis was intended for distribution rather than personal use.
¶ 14 After the defendant's arrest, Legere and Ryan interrogated the defendant regarding the stolen Dodge Challenger. The defendant told the detectives that a friend named Little Chris had facilitated the purchase of the Dodge Challenger from an individual named Mike. The defendant was unable to provide the detectives with Little Chris's last name, and he indicated that he did not know Mike before the sale. After Little Chris informed the defendant that Mike was selling a Dodge Challenger, the defendant met Mike in Murphysboro, Illinois, and agreed to purchase the Dodge Challenger for $20,000, even though he did not have the full amount with him. Mike, although initially reluctant,
accepted $650, a laptop computer, and a television as collateral until the defendant returned with the vehicle and the full $20,000.
¶ 15 According to Legere, the defendant initially told the detectives that he intended to trade in or sell the Chevy Caprice to pay the outstanding balance on the Dodge Challenger. The defendant claimed he had purchased the Chevy Caprice for $4000 and put the title in his grandmother's name. The defendant, however, later stated that he was unsure whether the purchase price of the Dodge Challenger included the value of the Chevy Caprice. The defendant explained that Mike sold the Dodge Challenger to "get up out of it." Legere testified that the defendant admitted that the sale seemed "too good to be true" and that Mike's reasons for selling the vehicle seemed "fishy." The defendant admitted that he had sold cannabis in the past and had recently purchased three pounds of cannabis for $1800. He explained that he placed the cannabis in the Chevy Caprice before the search. The defendant later stated that he paid $1500 because the cannabis weighed a little less than three pounds.
¶ 16 After the State rested, the defense called the defendant's father, Joe Thorner (Thorner). Thorner testified that he had purchased the cannabis and placed it in the Chevy Caprice. On cross-examination, Thorner claimed that he had informed the defendant's first attorney four years earlier that he had purchased the cannabis, but never informed the police during the investigation.
¶ 17 The defendant testified to the following. In March 2010, the defendant's friend, Demiko, informed him that a man named Mike was selling a Dodge Challenger. On March 12, 2010, the defendant and Demiko met Mike in the parking lot of a Kentucky
Fried Chicken (KFC) to inspect the vehicle. Although the defendant noticed that the Dodge Challenger had Missouri dealer plates and protective paper floor mats, he believed that Mike had purchased the vehicle at an auction for a reduced price because of previous body damage that had been repaired.
¶ 18 The defendant had never purchased a new vehicle and was unaware of the actual value of the Dodge Challenger at the time of the sale. He believed that $20,000 was a reasonable price because his friend had purchased a Dodge Challenger for less than $30,000. Although initially reluctant, Mike allowed the defendant to take the vehicle while the defendant collected the remaining balance. The defendant indicated that he left $500, a laptop, and studio equipment, valued at $2000 to $2500, for Demiko to hold as collateral until the defendant returned with the full asking price. Once he returned, the defendant paid Mike the full $20,000, which consisted of $12,500 to $13,000 he had saved while working as a barber and $7000 to $7500 that his father had loaned him. Subsequently, the defendant received a title, insurance card, and a bill of sale from Mike, all documents he believed were legitimate. The defendant testified that he only purchased the cannabis in the Dodge Challenger, and he denied expressing concerns to the detectives regarding Mike's sale.
¶ 19 After the defense rested, the State called Ryan as a rebuttal witness to testify to several discrepancies in the defendant's interview statements and testimony. Ryan first testified, consistent with Legere, that the defendant initially stated that he had provided Mike a down payment, which consisted of $650, a laptop, and a television but never indicated whether he paid the full $20,000 for the Dodge Charger. In contrast, the
defendant testified that Demiko held $500, a laptop, and studio equipment as collateral until the defendant returned with the full $20,000. Next, Ryan noted that the defendant stated during the interview that Little Chris had facilitated the transaction. The defendant later, however, testified that Demiko had arranged the purchase.
¶ 20 Following the close of the evidence, the defendant was acquitted of the cannabis charges, but he was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and theft over $10,000. In July 2014, the circuit court held the defendant's sentencing hearing. The State requested, without objection by defense counsel, to supplement the presentence investigation report (PSI) with two documents—an invoice, which valued the Dodge Challenger at $42,505, and a letter indicating that Expressway Dodge had sustained a $1000 loss after filing a claim with its insurance company. After the State requested the defendant to pay $1000 in restitution, defense counsel argued that the State had failed to present a receipt of payment. Although defense counsel questioned the accuracy of the documents, counsel stated that the court should "make [the defendant] pay the thousand dollars" if found to be accurate.
¶ 21 The circuit court, finding that the offenses involved the same criminal conduct, merged the two theft charges and entered a judgment of conviction of theft over $10,000. The defendant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and ordered to pay $5000 in fines and $1000 in restitution. The sentencing order did not include pretrial detention credit. The defendant filed a timely appeal.
¶ 22 ANALYSIS
¶ 23 On appeal, the defendant contends that the circuit court committed reversible error in two respects. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to sever and failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) during voir dire. Additionally, the defendant argues that the court erred by ordering him to pay restitution and failing to provide pretrial detention credit. We address the defendant's contentions in turn.
¶ 24 A. Severance of Charges
¶ 25 The defendant first argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to sever the cannabis and theft charges. The defendant maintains that it was prejudicial to join these charges because they were not part of the same comprehensive transaction. We disagree.
¶ 26 Section 111-4(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that two or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment in a separate count for each offense "if the offenses charged *** are based on *** 2 or more acts which are part of the same comprehensive transaction." 725 ILCS 5/111-4(a) (West 2012). If, however, it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by the joinder of separate charges, the circuit court "may order separate trials *** or provide any other relief as justice may require." 725 ILCS 5/114-8(a) (West 2012). Accordingly, the analysis of whether two events are part of the same comprehensive transaction is a preliminary requirement for statutory joinder and is separate from the issue of assessing potential prejudice from joining separate offenses for trial. People v. Walston, 386 Ill. App. 3d 598, 603 (2008). The decision to consolidate
separately charged offenses for a single trial, and to sever charges, rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court. People v. White, 129 Ill. App. 3d 308, 315 (1984). A court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or no reasonable court would take the adopted view. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003).
¶ 27 In exercising its discretion, a circuit court considers a number of factors when determining whether charges are part of the same comprehensive transaction. People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (2d) 110535, ¶ 47. Specifically, the court considers the following factors: (1) the proximity in time and location of the offenses; (2) the identity of evidence needed to demonstrate a link between the offenses; (3) whether there was a common method in the offenses; and (4) whether the same or similar evidence would establish the elements of the offenses. People v. Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d 937, 942 (1996). The first and second factors are the two most important factors when deciding whether criminal offenses are part of the same comprehensive transaction. People v. Quiroz, 257 Ill. App. 3d 576, 586 (1993).
¶ 28 After applying these legal principles to the instant case, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion when it determined that the charged offenses were part of the same comprehensive transaction. Although the court did not expressly indicate consideration of each factor, the record demonstrates a focus on the first two factors in support of its determination. The court determined that the charges arose from one continuous investigation and that the discovered evidence connected the cannabis and theft charges. In particular, the circuit court determined that the charged offenses occurred within close proximity in time and location because it was undisputed that the
police found the stolen Dodge Challenger and the large quantity of cannabis at the same residence on the same day. Thus, the circuit court determined that the first factor, the close proximity in time and location of the offenses, weighed in favor of joinder.
¶ 29 Next, the circuit court determined that the second factor, the identity of evidence needed to demonstrate a link between the offenses, also weighed in favor of joinder. In particular, the court determined that the cannabis-related charges arose directly out of the investigation of the stolen Dodge Challenger. Specifically, the investigation began after the defendant was discovered driving a stolen Dodge Challenger. After the defendant parked the stolen vehicle in the driveway, he entered the residence and failed to respond when officers repeatedly knocked on the front door. Search warrants were subsequently obtained to search the Dodge Challenger and residence, which led to the discovery of cannabis in both the Dodge Challenger and Chevy Caprice. Moreover, officers also discovered a trash can that contained a fraudulent insurance card and cannabis-related materials. Thus, we agree with the court's finding that the evidence demonstrated a link between the charged offenses.
¶ 30 In looking to the third factor, the proper inquiry is whether the offenses supply "a piece of a larger criminal endeavor." Johnson, 2013 IL App (2d) 110535, ¶ 51. Here, the defendant argues that the purchase of the cannabis occurred before the defendant purchased the Dodge Challenger, and thus, the offenses were not part of a common scheme. The defendant further asserts that the State did not present evidence that the Dodge Challenger was used to facilitate the purchase of the cannabis. Although we agree with the defendant, we note that the record is not completely void of evidence of a
common scheme. In particular, the record demonstrates that the defendant claimed to have paid for the Dodge Challenger with approximately $12,500 to $13,000 he earned as a barber and $7000 to $7500 he borrowed from his father. The defendant did not support his claimed earnings with financial records, and his father did not corroborate the defendant's statements. However, because the State did not pursue evidence of a common scheme, we find that the third factor does not favor joinder or severance. Thus, the weight of the third factor is neutral.
¶ 31 With regard to the fourth factor, severance is favored. In particular, it is understood that theft and cannabis-related offenses are dissimilar and require different evidence to establish the elements. However, as previously noted, the first and second factors are the two most important factors when deciding whether criminal offenses are part of the same comprehensive transaction. Quiroz, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 586. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion where the court relied heavily on the first two factors, which are the "most important" factors, given that the interrelated evidence weighed in favor of joinder. As such, we cannot find that the defendant demonstrated prejudice to support severance of the charges, especially in light of the defendant's acquittal on the cannabis-related charges.
¶ 32 B. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b)
¶ 33 Next, the defendant contends that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed to ask prospective jurors whether they accepted the trial principles under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). In response, the State asserts that the defendant's claim is forfeited on review.
¶ 34 To preserve a claim for review, a defendant must object at trial and include the alleged error in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 187 (1988). Here, the defendant did not object and did not include this issue in a posttrial motion. Accordingly, we agree that this issue is forfeited on review. Nevertheless, the defendant asserts that the circuit court's noncompliance constituted plain error.
¶ 35 The plain error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved claims of error. People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2010). A reviewing court may address a forfeited claim under the plain error doctrine when two circumstances arise: "(1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). The first step of plain error review is to determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565.
¶ 36 We first note that the State acknowledges that the circuit court failed to strictly comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) voir dire requirements. " '[T]he language of Rule 431(b) is clear and unambiguous; the rule states that the trial court "shall ask" whether jurors understand and accept the four principles set forth in the rule. The failure to do so constitutes error.' " See People v. Mueller, 2015 IL App (5th) 130013, ¶ 23 (quoting People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 45). Although the
court asked prospective jurors whether they understood the four trial principles, the court failed to ask prospective jurors whether they accepted these principles. Thus, the court's failure constituted clear error.
¶ 37 Having established that the circuit court erred by failing to strictly comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), we must next determine whether, pursuant to the application of the plain error doctrine, the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant. Unless actual juror bias can be demonstrated, which is not the case here, a violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) is not reviewable under the second prong. See People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 52. When determining whether the evidence meets the closely-balanced prong of plain error, a reviewing court must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of the evidence presented in the case. People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 139. Under a plain error analysis, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion. People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 43.
¶ 38 We note that the defendant was convicted of theft over $10,000 after the circuit court merged count I (possession of a stolen motor vehicle) and count II (theft over $10,000). With regard to count II, the defendant does not dispute that he purchased and possessed a stolen vehicle that was worth approximately $44,000. Rather, he argues that the evidence was so closely balanced because no direct evidence was presented to rebut his testimony that he believed that the vehicle was not stolen.
¶ 39 As such, we limit our discussion to the evidence adduced at trial to prove the mental elements required to commit the offense of theft over $10,000. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(4)(A) (West 2008); People v. Cleveland, 104 Ill. App. 2d 415, 418 (1969) ("Section 16-1 defines the two elements necessary to constitute a theft—a proscribed act and the requisite intent."). Intent is usually proven through circumstantial evidence, that is, inferences based upon defendant's conduct. People v. Ybarra, 156 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1002-03 (1987).
¶ 40 Here, the State had the burden to prove both that (1) the defendant purchased the Dodge Challenger "under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen" and (2) he "[i]ntend[ed] to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property" (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(4)(A) (West 2008)). In doing so, the State introduced circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew he had purchased a stolen vehicle for his own use. The State's evidence generally established that the defendant agreed to purchase a new Dodge Challenger, valued at approximately $44,000, for $20,000 from an unknown individual in a KFC parking lot. Although the defendant testified that he believed Mike had purchased the vehicle from an auction, the evidence supports otherwise. In particular, the vehicle had Missouri dealer plates, protective paper floor mats covering the carpet, and a partially removed VIN sticker on the driver's side door. Moreover, the defendant received a fraudulent vehicle title and an insurance card for Melissa Wright, a St. Louis, Missouri, resident.
¶ 41 The defendant argues that these documents support his claim of innocence because they appeared to be genuine, which was corroborated by Snyder's testimony. However,
we note several unexplained deficiencies in the documents. First, the insurance card listed Melissa Wright, a St. Louis, Missouri, resident, as the insured, and an additional insurance card, which listed Maureen Cameron as the insured, was recovered in a trash can outside the residence. Moreover, the title did not contain buyer information and the seller was listed as an individual from Atlanta, Georgia. As such, we are unconvinced that these documents support the defendant's claim of innocence.
¶ 42 The State also presented testimony regarding the defendant's inculpatory statements made shortly after his arrest. Specifically, the defendant admitted during the interview with detectives that the "deal seemed too good to be true" and that Mike's reasons for selling the vehicle seemed "fishy." Although the defendant points out that his trial testimony directly contradicted these statements, we note that the defendant's credibility was undermined following several inconsistencies between the initial interview and his trial testimony.
¶ 43 We observe that the defendant's version of events differed significantly from Legere and Ryan's testimony in the following respects. First, the officers testified that the defendant stated in the initial interview that Little Chris had arranged the purchase, but the defendant then testified that Demiko had facilitated the sale. Second, the officers testified that the defendant represented in the initial interview that he gave Mike $650, a laptop, and a television as a down payment for the vehicle. However, the defendant testified that he gave Demiko $500, a laptop, and studio equipment as collateral. The defendant testified that he paid Mike $20,000, approximately $12,500 to $13,000 from his own savings and an additional $7000 to $7500 from his father after he returned,
although he never indicated to the detectives that he had paid the full balance. In viewing the defendant's testimony in a commonsense manner, we conclude that the defendant's "explanation of events, though not logically impossible, was highly improbable" in the context of the totality of the circumstances. See People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, ¶ 22.
¶ 44 Our commonsense assessment of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the evidence regarding the defendant's requisite knowledge was not so closely balanced in this case. The State presented ample evidence regarding the circumstances of the purchase and testimony regarding the defendant's inculpatory statements. The defendant's claim that the evidence was so closely balanced relies heavily upon his own trial testimony, which differed in significant respects from the statements he made to two detectives. Accordingly, the first prong of plain error review does not provide a basis for excusing the defendant's procedural default where he failed to establish that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant.
¶ 45 C. Restitution
¶ 46 The defendant asserts next that the circuit court erred in ordering him to pay restitution. The defendant specifically argues that the court improperly considered supplemented documents at the sentencing hearing as conclusive evidence of the monetary loss suffered by Expressway Dodge. The State argues that the defendant's claim is forfeited. While the defendant acknowledges that he forfeited his claim by failing to raise it in a postsentencing motion, he asserts that it is reviewable under the plain error doctrine, or, alternatively, as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We disagree.
¶ 47 As previously discussed, the first step of a plain error analysis requires a determination of whether a clear or obvious error occurred. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) provides the statutory authority for the circuit court to require a criminal defendant to pay restitution for "out-of-pocket expenses, damages, losses, or injuries found to have been proximately caused by the conduct of the defendant" (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(a) (West 2008)) and suffered by the victim or victims of a defendant's conduct (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(b) (West 2008)). However, the Code "does not mandate that the court fix the amount of restitution based upon any specific type of evidence, nor does the statute prohibit the parties from stipulating as to the proper amount" of restitution. People v. Hanson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130330, ¶ 40. While the Code does not specify the type of evidence required to support an order of restitution, uncontested facts contained in a presentence report concerning the value of a victim's loss have been considered sufficient to support a restitution order. People v. Powell, 199 Ill. App. 3d 291, 295 (1990); see also People v. Gallinger, 252 Ill. App. 3d 816, 820 (1993). "In the absence of some specific claim of inaccuracy in a presentence report *** no additional evidence regarding restitution, beyond the information on that subject contained in the presentence report, was required." Powell, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 295.
¶ 48 Here, the defendant contests an invoice and attached letter which indicated that Expressway Dodge had sustained a $1000 loss after filing a claim with its insurance company. The State requested, with no objection by defense counsel, to supplement the PSI with these documents. Defense counsel objected only after the State requested the
court to order the defendant to pay restitution. At that time, defense counsel raised general concerns regarding the accuracy of the supplemented documents, although defense counsel was unable to identify any specific inaccuracies. The record demonstrates that the court accepted these documents, without further objection from defense counsel, as an accurate representation of Expressway Dodge's loss. We find no error in the court's consideration of the documents and in ordering the defendant to pay restitution. Accordingly, the defendant's claim is not reviewable under the plain error doctrine.
¶ 49 D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 50 We next address the defendant's claim that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to contest the accuracy of the supplemented documents. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and (2) it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Here, the defendant cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had defense counsel contested the accuracy of the documents. Specifically, the defendant does not argue that the documents actually contained inaccurate information. As such, he cannot demonstrate that defense counsel would have prevailed in contesting the accuracy of the documents. Thus, we reject the defendant's claim.
¶ 51 E. Pretrial Custody Credit
¶ 52 Lastly, the defendant claims, and the State concedes, that he is entitled to monetary credit for seven days of pretrial detention. Defendants are entitled a $5 per diem credit toward fines for each day spent in custody prior to sentencing. 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2008). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(1) allows a reviewing court to modify the sentencing order without remand to reflect credit for the amount of time served in presentence custody. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to monetary credit toward his fine for seven days spent in pretrial detention. Thus, we modify the sentencing order to reflect a $35 credit.
¶ 53 CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Jackson County is hereby affirmed. The sentencing order is modified to include pretrial detention credit.
¶ 55 Affirmed.