Opinion
15816, 3737/10.
10-08-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jamel WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Rachel T. Goldberg of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Deborah L. Morse of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Rachel T. Goldberg of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Deborah L. Morse of counsel), for respondent.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., ANDRIAS, SAXE, GISCHE, KAPNICK, JJ.
Opinion Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ruth Pickholz, J.), rendered June 25, 2012, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree (two counts), robbery in the second degree and burglary in the second degree (two counts), and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 18 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The People established an overriding interest that warranted a courtroom closure that was limited to the exclusion of a single spectator during the testimony of a single witness (see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 [1984] ). Contrary to defendant's arguments, the witness articulated a specific fear of testifying in the presence of defendant's brother, and we find that this fear justified the limited closure (see People v. Ming Li, 91 N.Y.2d 913, 917, 669 N.Y.S.2d 527, 692 N.E.2d 558 [1998] ; see also People v. Joseph, 59 N.Y.2d 496, 465 N.Y.S.2d 915, 452 N.E.2d 1243 [1983] ). The trial court was in the best position to determine whether the witness' expression of fear rose to a level justifying the closure. We note that the court was aware of the brother's approach to a different witness. Although “a timely objection ... would have permitted the court to rectify the situation instantly by making express findings” (People v. Doster, 13 A.D.3d 114, 115, 786 N.Y.S.2d 166 [2004], lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 763, 792 N.Y.S.2d 6, 825 N.E.2d 138 [2005] ), defendant made no such objection, and thus did not preserve his complaint that the court failed to set forth express findings of fact to justify the exclusion of defendant's brother. Accordingly, we decline to review this claim in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that the court's ruling “implicitly adopted the People's particularized showing” and was “specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered” (id.; see also People v. Manning, 78 A.D.3d 585, 586, 912 N.Y.S.2d 183 [2010], lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 861, 923 N.Y.S.2d 422, 947 N.E.2d 1201 [2011], cert. denied 565 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 268, 181 L.Ed.2d 158 [2011] ).
The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant's mistrial motion, made after a juror reported possible premature deliberations. The court conducted thorough individual inquiries of the jurors, which established that there were no actual premature deliberations. There is no basis for disturbing the court's credibility determinations (see People v. Jamison, 291 A.D.2d 298, 299, 737 N.Y.S.2d 614 [1st Dept.2002], lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 652, 745 N.Y.S.2d 510, 772 N.E.2d 613 [2002] ).
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.