Opinion
2d Crim. No. B228548
10-25-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TEDDY SAMUEL WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Hamanaka, Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. 1333973)
(Santa Barbara County)
Teddy Samuel Williams appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of misdemeanor indecent exposure. (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1.) The jury acquitted him of two felony offenses: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery with serious bodily injury. (§ 243, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced appellant to county jail for 180 days and ordered him to register as a sex offender. (§ 290.)
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to represent himself. We conclude that the trial court did not err because the record establishes that (1) appellant was not competent to represent himself because of mental disorder or disability, and (2) appellant lacked the ability and willingness to conform his conduct to procedural rules and courtroom protocol. Accordingly, we affirm.
Procedural Background
Because the facts underlying the charged offenses are irrelevant to the issues on appeal, we omit the customary statement of facts.
In July 2010, during appellant's arraignment on the felony complaint, he moved to represent himself. The court initially granted the motion. But the court reconsidered its decision after appellant made incoherent, bizarre statements and the prosecutor expressed "serious concerns whether this man is competent to represent himself." The arraignment court denied appellant's motion for self-representation but stated that he "may be able to renew [it] at another time."
Appellant was held to answer at a preliminary hearing. In the trial court he filed a renewed motion to represent himself. At a hearing on the motion, the court stated that it had read appellant's "paperwork." The court went on to say: "I also cannot ignore past experiences since you and I had a number of appearances over the years together . . . ." "I'm going to deny the request. I think it's appropriate that you be represented by counsel. I note that in the past we've had some issues where when you did represent yourself and we had some discussions about being out of custody and you did that and then you went on a walkabout for about a year or so. We've had other issues that have come up. And I think that on whole you are better off represented.
I have a doubt whether or not you can appropriately represent yourself in this case, particularly with felony charges. And I'm going to deny the Faretta motion." (Italics added.)
Discussion
Under state law, there is no constitutional or statutory right to self-representation in criminal cases. (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 871-872 & fn. 8.) Appellant contends that the trial court's refusal to grant his request for self-representation violated his federal constitutional rights under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525] (Faretta). In Faretta the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case "has a [Sixth Amendment] constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so." (Id., 422 U.S. at p. 807.) The erroneous denial of a timely Faretta motion is reversible per se. (People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 948; People v. Rivers (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1050.) "As the high court has stated, however, 'Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute.' (Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, [171] [171 L.Ed.2d 345, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2384]. . . .) Thus, a Faretta motion may be denied if the defendant is not competent to represent himself (Indiana v. Edwards, at [pp. 177-178] . . . ." (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721.)
Based on Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, [125 L.Ed.2d 321, 113 S.Ct. 2680], the California Supreme Court concluded that the United States Supreme Court had adopted the same standard for both competence to stand trial and competence to represent oneself. (People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 876 & fn. 11.) But in Indiana v. Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, the court drew a distinction between competence to stand trial and competence to represent oneself. It permitted, but did not require, states to set a higher standard for competence to represent oneself. The court held: "[T]he Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves." (Id., at pp. 177-178.) The court noted that a defendant who is mentally competent to stand trial "may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel." (Id., at pp. 175-176.) These tasks include "organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and jury." (Id., at p. 176.)
Appellant maintains that he had "an absolute right to represent himself" because he was "competent to stand trial" and made "a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel." Appellant argues that the distinction in Edwards between competence to stand trial and competence to represent oneself should not apply here because "California has not adopted" a higher standard for competence to represent oneself. But nothing precludes this court from applying a higher standard to the instant case, especially since appellant has not presented any reason why it would be inappropriate to do so. "Imposing a higher competence standard [for self-representation] will prevent many defendants with serious mental illness or developmental deficiencies from representing themselves at trial, improving the fairness and efficiency of trials." (Marks, State Competence Standards for Self-Representation in a Criminal Trial: Opportunity and Danger for State Courts after Indiana v. Edwards (2010) 44 U.S.F. L.Rev. 825, 828.) "By declining Edwards' invitation [to impose a higher standard of competence for self-representation], a state would lose the opportunity provided by the Supreme Court to improve the fairness, reliability, and efficiency of criminal trials. Trial courts would continue to be required to grant self-representation to those who, while satisfying the [competence to stand trial standard], are, due to mental disorder or disability, largely or completely incapable of undertaking the much more complex and difficult tasks involved in defending themselves at trial." (Id., at p. 838.)
The question whether trial courts should apply a higher standard of mental competence for self-representation than for trial with counsel is pending before the California Supreme Court in People v. Johnson (Oct. 25, 2010, A124643), nonpub. opn., review granted Feb. 16, 2011, S188619. In People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 877-878, the California Supreme Court discussed the higher standard issue: "The court in [Indiana v. Edwards, supra, 554 U.S 164,] did not hold . . . that due process mandates a higher standard of mental competence for self-representation than for trial with counsel. The Edwards court held only that states may, without running afoul of Faretta, impose a higher standard . . . . 'In light of Edwards, it is clear . . . that we are free to adopt for mentally ill or mentally incapacitated defendants who wish to represent themselves at trial a competency standard that differs from the standard for determining whether such a defendant is competent to stand trial. It is equally clear, however, that Edwards does not mandate the application of such a dual standard of competency for mentally ill defendants. In other words, Edwards did not alter the principle that the federal constitution is not violated when a trial court permits a mentally ill defendant to represent himself at trial, even if he lacks the mental capacity to conduct the trial proceedings himself, if he is competent to stand trial and his waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.' [Citation.] Edwards thus does not support a claim of federal constitutional error in a case . . . in which defendant's request to represent himself was granted."
Appellant contends that the trial court's denial of his request for self-representation was not based on his incompetence to represent himself. "Instead, the trial court simply denied the request based upon some kind of past experience with appellant where he apparently disappeared for a year or so when he was out of custody with charges pending." Appellant is referring to the trial court's statement that, when appellant represented himself in a prior case, he had gone "on a walkabout for about a year or so."
The People concede that "[a]ppellant is correct that [particular] statements [by the trial court] cannot justify denial of a Faretta motion . . . ." "Specifically, appellant is correct that failure to appear in past cases is not part of the Faretta analysis." The People also concede that the trial court improperly considered "the severity of the charges against [appellant]" when it stated that it doubted whether appellant could "appropriately represent [himself] in this case, particularly with felony charges." "[T]he nature of the charge is irrelevant to the decision to grant or deny a timely proffered Faretta motion. If . . . the accused is fully aware ' "of the probable risks and consequences of his action" ' [citation], then whether a guilty verdict can subject the accused to a state prison term or only a fine or short jail term is of no consequence." (People v. Joseph, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 945, fn. omitted.)
We need not decide whether the trial court denied appellant's Faretta motion for improper reasons. If the motion were denied for improper reasons, we would still uphold the court's ruling. Our independent review of the record as a whole establishes that, because of mental disorder or disability, appellant was not competent to conduct trial proceedings without the assistance of counsel. (People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218 ["Even though the trial court denied the request [for self-representation] for an improper reason, if the record as a whole establishes defendant's request was nonetheless properly denied on other grounds, we would uphold the trial court's ruling"].)
Appellant's conduct in the arraignment court and his written, renewed Faretta motion in the trial court show that he was not mentally competent to represent himself. In the arraignment court, appellant rambled on incoherently while the court and prosecutor were discussing whether his motion for self-representation should be granted:
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: I, I'm not saying necessarily that he [appellant] meets any kind of [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5150 criteria. What I'm talking about -
"THE COURT: (Overlapping). Well, but that's not the standard for representing himself, it isn't. He might not be competent to represent himself but not be 5150.
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Exactly. That's, that's exactly what I'm saying. I, I am suggesting that he's not -
"[APPELLANT]: (Overlapping). (Inaudible).
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: - - competent to represent himself -
"[APPELLANT]: (Overlapping). - - (inaudible).
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: - - especially with the kind of case we're dealing - -"[APPELLANT]: (Overlapping). (Inaudible) talk to Judge, ah, (inaudible) and Judge Adams and Judge Slater -
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: We hear him rambling on adds -
"[APPELLANT]: (Overlapping). (Inaudible).
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: - - adds fuel to the point I'm trying to make [that appellant is not competent to represent himself].
"[APPELLANT]: He can talk to Kristine, you can talk to Terry, other D.A.'s, that's all he has to do (inaudible) himself. [¶] You can talk (inaudible) -
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. Williams -
"[APPELLANT]: (Overlapping. - - (inaudible).
"THE COURT: - - [The prosecutor] makes some good points. Um -
"[APPELLANT]: He can talk to George (inaudible)."
Appellant then declared in open court: "I already know what he's [the prosecutor's] afraid of. At one point I'll be so explicit it ain't funny. [The court reporter notes that at this point appellant made a "brief pause."] First of all, you, you need to look at, I've been in school, Santa Barbara City College, working on studying other countries etcetera [sic]. I've been taking care of business; I've been working out every day after - - physically, ah, ah, taking care of myself. And people want to kill me because I take care of myself." "You can talk to some of the police officers. I've seen people shot. I stopped Julie from gettin' raped. Just this is last week. Just 'cause I was on the street, walking in the street." Appellant did not say who "Julie" was or how she might be relevant to any of the issues in his case.
After appellant was held to answer at a preliminary hearing, he mailed his renewed Faretta motion to the trial court. On the outside of the envelope, appellant wrote, "Ellen on inside DeGeneres yes." Appellant directed the motion to the attention of various persons and entities, including Laura Bush, Hillary Clinton, Cindy Crawford, Oprah Winfrey, the Nation of Islam, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Appellant requested that a copy of the motion be sent to Michele Bachmann and Sarah Palin. In the margin at the top of the second page of the motion, appellant referred to a song, "Let[']s Straighten [It] Out," by "Latimore." In the margin at the top of the third page of the motion, appellant referred to a song, "Wake Up Everybody - [I]t[']s [T]ime," by "Harold [Melvin] and [the] [B]lue [N]otes."
The renewed motion contains numerous handwritten, unintelligible statements. For example, appellant declared: "Refuse to give grievance [illegible word] others President, mr (P)[.] Teddy S. Williams [appellant] is requesting my whole record be erase. This is why again today at Santa Barbara County Jail - - commissary man -employee withheld intentionally denied mental health services. Not processing commissary on 07/09/2010 and 07/15/2010. Reflecting on-going everyday sexual improprieties, and sexual misconduct causing rapes to rise yearly, connected to writ of habeas corpus dated sent 07/02/2010 filed on 07/08/2010 case number was not returned - I am requesting correct case number right now! Please today as we speak, and 3 copys of and charges filed against attacker please."
In making the renewed motion, appellant used a preprinted form that required him to answer various questions. One of the questions was as follows: "I understand that in the event that prior felony convictions are pleaded and proved against me, that may affect my sentence as follows." Appellant gave a nonresponsive answer: "My fingers [fingerprints] are not on it [a weapon], this why the police report should not have been filed against Teddy S. Williams on 06/27/2010, its plain and simple."
Appellant's trial testimony confirmed his lack of competence to represent himself because of mental disorder or disability. Appellant testified that Diane Feinstein, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama "have a history of communicating with [him]." Appellant further testified that he had "mental health issues" as a result of "a couple injuries to the head, brain, prebirth injuries, before [he] was even born." He alleged that he was unable to remember prior incidents because of his "brain injuries and [his] prebirth injuries." Furthermore, he "sometimes hear[s] voices." On cross-examination, appellant was asked: "So then after she [the victim of the indecent exposure] came in the booth, you said she put you in another booth[?]" Appellant gave the following nonresponsive answer: "Sir, I got girls chasing me all over the town everywhere I go." During a break in appellant's testimony, defense counsel declared in the trial court's chambers: "He's [appellant's] speaking in a way that is apparent to the jury that he's not entirely there." "He's mentally ill. We all know he's mentally ill." The prosecutor concurred: "Obviously, from his testimony it's clear that he's got a mental illness of some sort . . . ."
For the first time in his reply brief, appellant argues that his due process rights would be violated if he were found mentally incompetent to represent himself without a psychiatric evaluation and a trial on the issue. This argument is forfeited because appellant failed to raise it in his opening brief and because he has not cited supporting authority. (People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410; People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29.) Indiana v. Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, did not consider the matter.
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In any event, regardless of appellant's mental competence to represent himself, the record demonstrates that his Faretta motion was properly denied because in the arraignment court he "manifested an inability to conform his conduct to procedural rules and courtroom protocol. It would be a nonsensical and needless waste of scarce judicial resources to proceed to trial [without counsel] when, as here, defendant has shown by his conduct during pretrial proceedings that he is unable to conform to procedural rules and protocol." (People v. Watts (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) "[A] defendant requesting the right of self-representation must possess the ability and willingness 'to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.' [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 629, fn. omitted.)
During the arraignment proceedings, appellant made incomprehensible outbursts and frequently interrupted both the court and prosecutor. On one occasion, appellant interrupted the prosecutor to interject a groundless diatribe against him: "I, I'd like to disqualify the D.A. too. I'd like to prosecute him as misconduct with some of the things he's already stated, they, they were inaccurate." Moreover, appellant rambled on incoherently while the court and prosecutor were discussing his Faretta motion. The arraignment court found appellant's behavior to "be very inappropriate." "We are . . . aware that the extent of a defendant's disruptive behavior may not be fully evident from the cold record, and that one reason for according deference to the trial court is that it is in the best position to judge defendant's demeanor." (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 735.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J. We concur:
GILBERT, P.J.
COFFEE, J.
Clifford P. Anderson III, Judge
Frank J. Ochoa, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Hamanaka, Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.