Opinion
2012-07-18
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Robert WILLIAMS, appellant.
Abbie Goldbas, Utica, N.Y., for appellant. Francis D. Phillips II, District Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Robert H. Middlemiss and Andrew R. Kass of counsel), for respondent.
Abbie Goldbas, Utica, N.Y., for appellant. Francis D. Phillips II, District Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Robert H. Middlemiss and Andrew R. Kass of counsel), for respondent.
DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, J.P., RANDALL T. ENG, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Freehill, J.), rendered March 9, 2010, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that the defendant's initial statement at the crime scene was made in response to a police officer's simple question, “what happened?”, which was justified to clarify the nature of the situation confronting the officer ( see People v. Santiago, 77 A.D.3d 422, 908 N.Y.S.2d 345;People v. Taylor, 57 A.D.3d 327, 328, 869 N.Y.S.2d 442;People v. Vasquez, 2 A.D.3d 759, 770 N.Y.S.2d 116). Further, the statements made by the defendant in the booking room at police headquarters were spontaneous and not triggered by police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a declaration from him ( see People v. Oliver, 87 A.D.3d 1035, 1036–1037, 929 N.Y.S.2d 182;People v. Carlton, 85 A.D.3d 1196, 1197, 926 N.Y.S.2d 161;People v. Fernandes, 62 A.D.3d 721, 878 N.Y.S.2d 418). Accordingly, neither the defendant's statements at the crime scene nor his statements in the booking room were the product of custodial interrogation improperly conducted without the administration of Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694). The hearing evidence also supports the County Court's determination that despite the fact that the defendant was suffering from a stab wound, his subsequent statements were voluntary because he was capable of, and did in fact, intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights ( see People v. Legere, 81 A.D.3d 746, 748, 916 N.Y.S.2d 187;People v. Timmons, 54 A.D.3d 883, 885, 864 N.Y.S.2d 111;People v. Braithwaite, 286 A.D.2d 507, 729 N.Y.S.2d 636;People v. Hughes, 280 A.D.2d 694, 695, 720 N.Y.S.2d 586).
During voir dire, several prospective jurors raised their hands when defense counsel asked whether any of them would be unable to find the defendant not guilty if he did not testify. After conducting a follow-up inquiry of the entire panel, the County Court excused two prospective jurors who indicated that they would find it difficult not to hold the defendant's failure to testify against him. Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial ( see People v. Kenner, 8 A.D.3d 296, 297, 777 N.Y.S.2d 669;People v. Henriques, 307 A.D.2d 937, 762 N.Y.S.2d 887), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection ( seeCPL 270.20[2]; People v. Lynch, 95 N.Y.2d 243, 248–249, 715 N.Y.S.2d 691, 738 N.E.2d 1172;People v. Arguinzoni, 48 A.D.3d 1239, 1241, 852 N.Y.S.2d 546;People v. Libardi, 12 A.D.3d 534, 535, 784 N.Y.S.2d 636;People v. Nelson, 288 A.D.2d 329, 733 N.Y.S.2d 618).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly admitted testimony from the victim's mother and sister regarding his prior physical assaults upon the victim, as the testimony was probative of the defendant's relationship with the victim and his intent to kill or injure her ( see People v. Sanchez, 73 A.D.3d 1093, 1094, 900 N.Y.S.2d 679;People v. James, 19 A.D.3d 616, 797 N.Y.S.2d 129), and rebutted his defense of justification ( see People v. Martinez, 53 A.D.3d 508, 860 N.Y.S.2d 632;People v. Lawrence, 4 A.D.3d 436, 771 N.Y.S.2d 362).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.