Opinion
2016-04631 Ind. No. 830/14
03-03-2021
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Kadeem WILKINSON, appellant.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Whitney A. Robinson of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Morgan J. Dennehy of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Whitney A. Robinson of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Morgan J. Dennehy of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Guy J. Mangano, Jr., J.), rendered April 8, 2016, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree in connection with his actions in December 2013 where he fatally stabbed the victim, a stranger, after having had an altercation with the victim earlier that same night. The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court should have granted his application to charge manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser included offense of intentional murder is without merit (see CPL 300.50[1] ; People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 112, 124, 989 N.Y.S.2d 446, 12 N.E.3d 444 ). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant acted recklessly when he approached the victim and stabbed him in the back with the kitchen knife he had retrieved from his apartment after the initial altercation had concluded (see People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d at 124, 989 N.Y.S.2d 446, 12 N.E.3d 444 ; People v. Stephens, 189 A.D.3d 1270, 1271, 134 N.Y.S.3d 278 ).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in its response to a jury note also is without merit. The court responded to the jury's question about the difference between "harm" and "serious harm" by informing the jury that there was no legal definition for those terms and by reiterating the definition of serious physical injury. That response was meaningful and proper under the circumstances (see People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 302–303, 449 N.Y.S.2d 168, 434 N.E.2d 237 ). Moreover, after the court repeated the definition to the jury, it informed the jurors that further explanation would be provided if requested by a subsequent note. The jurors requested no further instruction (see People v. Mattison, 162 A.D.3d 905, 907, 79 N.Y.S.3d 274 ; People v. Chase, 225 A.D.2d 789, 790, 639 N.Y.S.2d 853 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
The defendant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.
DILLON, J.P., AUSTIN, DUFFY and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.