Opinion
766 KA 11-01474
06-19-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David J. WEINSTOCK, Defendant–Appellant.
Shirley A. Gorman, Brockport, for Defendant–Appellant. David J. Weinstock, Defendant–Appellant Pro Se. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Daniel Gross of Counsel), for Respondent.
Shirley A. Gorman, Brockport, for Defendant–Appellant.
David J. Weinstock, Defendant–Appellant Pro Se.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Daniel Gross of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35[1] ). We reject defendant's contention in his main and pro se supplemental briefs that his waiver of the right to appeal was invalid. We agree with defendant that County Court's statement to defendant that, “by pleading guilty, [he was] giving up [his] right to allege that the police unlawfully collected evidence or did anything else illegal” was misleading insofar as it improperly implied that defendant's right to challenge the court's suppression ruling on appeal was forfeited upon entry of the guilty plea (see People v. Braxton, 129 A.D.3d 1674, 1675, 10 N.Y.S.3d 791 [2015] ; see generally People v. Moyett, 7 N.Y.3d 892, 892–893, 826 N.Y.S.2d 597, 860 N.E.2d 59 ; People v. Billingslea, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 257, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ). “Nevertheless, we conclude that [the court's] plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (Braxton, 129 A.D.3d at 1675, 10 N.Y.S.3d 791 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Buske, 87 A.D.3d 1354, 1354, 930 N.Y.S.2d 155, lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 882, 939 N.Y.S.2d 751, 963 N.E.2d 128 ). That valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses his contention that the court erred in refusing to suppress identification testimony (see People v. Jenkins, 117 A.D.3d 1528, 1529, 985 N.Y.S.2d 372, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 1063, 994 N.Y.S.2d 322, 18 N.E.3d 1143 ). By pleading guilty, moreover, defendant forfeited his further contention that the court erred in refusing to reopen the Wade hearing (see People v. Fulton, 30 A.D.3d 961, 962, 815 N.Y.S.2d 846, lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 789, 821 N.Y.S.2d 818, 854 N.E.2d 1282 ).
Contrary to the contentions in defendant's main and pro se supplemental briefs, the court afforded him a reasonable opportunity to advance the claims in his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea (see People v. Frederick, 45 N.Y.2d 520, 525, 410 N.Y.S.2d 555, 382 N.E.2d 1332 ; People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 544 ), and “the court did not abuse its discretion in discrediting those claims” (People v. Merritt, 115 A.D.3d 1250, 1250–1251, 982 N.Y.S.2d 276 ). Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for new counsel on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea inasmuch as defense counsel did not take a position adverse to the motion (see People v. Rossborough, 105 A.D.3d 1332, 1333, 963 N.Y.S.2d 494, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1045, 972 N.Y.S.2d 542, 995 N.E.2d 858 ). Further, defense counsel's failure to join in the motion did not constitute ineffective assistance (see People v. Carpenter, 93 A.D.3d 950, 952, 939 N.Y.S.2d 658, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 863, 947 N.Y.S.2d 411, 970 N.E.2d 434 ).
The contention in defendant's pro se supplemental brief that the court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence based upon an uncharged crime survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v. Williams, 35 A.D.3d 1198, 1199, 825 N.Y.S.2d 885, lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 928, 834 N.Y.S.2d 519, 866 N.E.2d 465 ). That contention lacks merit, however, inasmuch as “the record establishes that the court did not impose an enhanced sentence but in fact imposed the agreed-upon sentence” (People v. Ibrahim, 48 A.D.3d 1095, 1095, 849 N.Y.S.2d 850, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 864, 860 N.Y.S.2d 491, 890 N.E.2d 254 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.