Opinion
October 1, 1993
Appeal from the Genesee County Court, Morton, J.
Present — Callahan, J.P., Green, Fallon, Boomer and Davis, JJ.)
Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed in accordance with the following Memorandum: Upon his plea of guilty of driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a felony and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 1/3 to 4 years on the felony DWI conviction and a fine of $500 and he was ordered to pay restitution to the Genesee County Sheriff's Department in the amount of $386.03. The plea was in full satisfaction of a pending indictment as well as an uncharged bail jumping charge resulting from defendant's failure to appear in court for arraignment on the indictment.
County Court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution to reimburse the Sheriff for monies expended to secure defendant's return to New York on the warrant issued for defendant's failure to appear on the DWI charge. No bail jumping charge was ever filed against defendant. Therefore, defendant did not commit an "offense" within the meaning of Penal Law § 60.27 (4) (a) for which restitution could properly be ordered. Furthermore, the Genesee County Sheriff's Department was not a "victim" within the meaning of Penal Law § 60.27 (4) (b). The expenditure of public monies by the Sheriff's Department in returning defendant to the jurisdiction of the court for prosecution was part of its normal law enforcement operating costs. Thus, the Sheriff's Department did not thereby become a "victim" as that term is defined in the restitution statute (see, People v. Rowe, 152 A.D.2d 907, 908, affd 75 N.Y.2d 948; People v. Purcell, 161 A.D.2d 812; cf., People v. Cruz, 81 N.Y.2d 996).
There is no merit to the People's argument that defendant affirmatively waived his rights as part of his negotiated plea agreement. Although the record establishes that defendant agreed to pay restitution as part of his plea agreement, his agreement is of no moment. A defendant cannot be deemed to have waived his right to be sentenced as provided by law (see, People v Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 9; People v. Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152, 156; People v. Taylor, 197 A.D.2d 858 [decided herewith]). We modify the judgment, therefore, by vacating that part of defendant's sentence ordering defendant to pay restitution.