Opinion
2017–03933 Ind. No. 952/13
12-23-2020
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Kyan WASHINGTON, appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Anthea H. Bruffee, and Terrence F. Heller of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Anthea H. Bruffee, and Terrence F. Heller of counsel), for respondent.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (ShawnDya L. Simpson, J.), rendered March 21, 2017, as amended March 23, 2017, convicting him of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts), and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment, as amended, is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's guilt of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts), and endangering the welfare of a child. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe their demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the prosecution to call an expert to testify about rape trauma syndrome, as the testimony was properly admitted "to explain behavior of a victim that might appear unusual or that jurors may not be expected to understand" ( People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 387, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084 ; see People v. Davis, 118 A.D.3d 906, 907, 988 N.Y.S.2d 217 ). Moreover, the expert "spoke about victims in general and never opined that the defendant committed the crimes, that the victim was sexually abused, or that the victim's specific actions and behavior were consistent with abuse" ( People v. Rich, 78 A.D.3d 1200, 1202, 912 N.Y.S.2d 124 ; see People v. Piedra, 87 A.D.3d 706, 706, 928 N.Y.S.2d 752 ).
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial misconduct is without merit (see People v. Grace, 179 A.D.3d 1092, 1093, 114 N.Y.S.3d 668 ; People v. Rich, 78 A.D.3d at 1201–1202, 912 N.Y.S.2d 124 ).
The contentions raised in point I of the defendant's pro se supplemental brief are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ), and we decline to reach them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
CHAMBERS, J.P., AUSTIN, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.