Opinion
May 17, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Finnegan, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree for having sold crack cocaine to an undercover police officer on a street corner. Contrary to the defendant's contention on appeal, the court properly refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment, since no reasonable view of the trial evidence indicates that the defendant was actively induced or encouraged to sell the drugs or that he had no predisposition to do so (see, CPL 40.05; People v Butts, 72 N.Y.2d 746; People v Alwadish, 67 N.Y.2d 973).
The fact that the undercover officer twice asked the defendant whether he was "working" shows only that the officer afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the crime (see, CPL 40.05). It does not establish the inducement or encouragement necessary to support an entrapment defense (see, People v Butts, supra; People v Pilgrim, 154 A.D.2d 407). Furthermore, the defendant's quick response to the officer's second inquiry negates his assertion that he was not otherwise disposed to make the sale (see, People v Pilgrim, supra).
Because he failed to raise an objection to the presentence report at sentencing, the defendant's present claim that it was incomplete is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Blas, 192 A.D.2d 540; People v Thompson, 186 A.D.2d 294), and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
The defendant's sentence was neither harsh nor excessive (see, People v Delgado, 80 N.Y.2d 780; People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Bracken, J.P., Rosenblatt, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.