Opinion
A129079
12-14-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AARON JOSEPH VARGAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUKCRCR0989189)
Defendant Aaron Joseph Vargas pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in state prison. He contends the trial court should have granted him probation instead. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Defendant shot and killed Darryl McNeill, the man he asserts sexually molested him as a child and who, according to sworn declarations, molested numerous other children in the Fort Bragg area. By information filed April 22, 2009, prosecutors charged defendant with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), false imprisonment (§ 236), and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). The information alleged a gun use enhancement in each count. On April 6, 2010, defendant, pursuant to a plea bargain, pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted a gun use enhancement.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In June 2010, the trial court conducted a two-day sentencing hearing. It heard from 11 witnesses, including defendant, and reviewed various briefs and reports from the parties, the probation department, psychiatrists, and others. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court declined to grant probation and sentenced defendant to nine years in prison. The trial court found defendant presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203 because of the nature of his crime. It then considered whether the case was "unusual" such that a grant of probation would nonetheless serve the interests of justice.
The court noted defendant suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder and alcoholism as a result of years of sexual abuse and noted while defendant's "mental condition . . . would not excuse the crime" it did "mitigate its seriousness." It further noted defendant, at the time of the shooting, was likely "overwrought and intoxicated" because he believed McNeill was stalking him, had just learned McNeill might have molested McNeill's own son and stepson, and feared for the safety of McNeill's newborn daughter. Further, the court acknowledged the report of defendant's forensic expert "suggests the decedent may have been reaching for the gun when it went off." On the other hand, the court, citing the probation report's account, found several aspects of the shooting suggested it was with "express intent" and "intended to make the victim suffer." For instance, defendant shot McNeill in the gut, watched him die and kicked him as he did, and refused to allow McNeill's wife to render aid or call for help. Finally, the court noted defendant's two previous felony convictions and lack of success when on probation before.
With these facts at hand, the trial court then concluded on the record:
"Justice must strike a balance between the interests of the individual and the general community at large. To grant probation in this case would be to put the court's stamp of approval on the defendant's actions, which I cannot do.
"Reporting sexual abuse and subjecting the perpetrator to public scrutiny through the legal system deters not only the individual involved, but others that may be similarly situated. The use of violence to correct a wrong under most
circumstances only encourages more violence and, in the opinion of this court, is the wrong message to send our youth or our community.
"The court does not find that the grant of probation in this case to be in the interests of justice. Defendant's request for probation is therefore denied."
On July 8, 2010, Vargas filed a notice of appeal taking issue with the trial court's sentence.
DISCUSSION
Section 1203, subdivision (e), renders certain defendants—including those who "used . . . a deadly weapon upon a human being in connection" with their crime, or those with two previous felony convictions—presumptively ineligible for probation. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(2).) Defendant concedes section 1203 applies to him.
"[P]robation shall not be granted" to anyone presumptively ineligible for it "[e]xcept in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be served if the person is granted probation." (§ 1203, subd. (e).) California Rules of Court, rule 4.413, which requires the trial court to determine a defendant's eligibility for probation, lists two types of facts that courts "should" consider which "may" make a case "unusual": (1) facts showing the basis for presumptive probation ineligibility is not fully applicable and (2) facts reducing the defendant's culpability for the charged offense. (Rule 4.413(b)-(c).) The existence of such facts "does not necessarily establish an unusual case; rather, those facts merely 'may indicate the existence of an unusual case.' " (People v. Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 165, 178 (Stuart).)
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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"If a court determines the presumption against probation is overcome, it evaluates whether or not to grant probation pursuant to . . . rule 4.414. However, 'mere suitability for probation does not overcome the presumptive bar . . . . [I]f the statutory limitations on probation are to have any substantial scope and effect, "unusual cases" and "interests of justice" must be narrowly construed,' and rule 4.413 'limited to those matters in which the crime is either atypical or the offender's moral blameworthiness is reduced.' " (Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.)
" 'The standard for reviewing a trial court's finding that a case may or may not be unusual is abuse of discretion.' [Citation.] The trial judge's discretion in determining whether to grant probation is broad. [Citation.] '[A] " 'decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. "An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge." ' " ' [Citation.] '[T]hese precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.' [Citation.] Generally, ' " '[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.' " ' [Citation.]" (Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 178-179.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining defendant's case was not one in which probation would best serve the interests of justice. The court's oral decision denying probation, spanning some five transcript pages, was not irrational or capricious but rather considered the broad array of facts before it and demonstrated compliance with its obligation under the Rules of Court to provide a reasoned assessment on probation eligibility. (Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 178-179; see also rules 4.406, 4.413.)
Defendant contends the trial court wrongly considered certain facts in denying probation under rule 4.414, the rule that, in contrast to rule 4.413, sets forth criteria affecting the grant of probation to those eligible for it. Specifically, defendant faults the trial court for noting he took the law into his own hands and killed McNeill rather than reporting him to authorities. Killing, defendant argues, is inherent in every voluntary manslaughter and therefore the mere fact of killing cannot be a valid basis for denying probation. (See People v. Golliver (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1619-1620 ["death of a victim" as opposed to facts related to how death occurred "would not be an appropriate 'circumstance of the crime' [under rule 4.414's predecessor] on which to choose imprisonment over probation in a manslaughter case because, otherwise, probation would be presumptively unavailable in all manslaughter cases—a result clearly not intended by the Legislature"].)
But defendant misconstrues the trial court's decision. The trial court found him ineligible for probation under rule 4.413. It therefore never had occasion to apply the criteria of rule 4.414. Vargas cites no authority, and we are aware of none, prohibiting the sort of holistic case assessment the trial court made here under rule 4.413. Even if Golliver applied in the context of a rule 4.413 "unusualness" determination, which is an issue we do not decide, we would find no error. It is not surprising that the trial court spoke about the ills of vigilante justice during sentencing in this case, and it did so in the context of discussing and considering facts about defendant's crime not inherent to voluntary manslaughter, such as facts indicating he acted intentionally and intended to inflict suffering. (See People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 832 [manslaughter can be an intentional or unintentional killing].) The trial court did not decline to find defendant's case unusual because of "killing" per se; rather, it was "defendant's actions" taken as a whole which it "could not condone."
Defendant next faults the trial court for having stated at the sentencing hearing: "The use of violence to correct a wrong under most circumstances only encourages more violence and, in the opinion of this court, is the wrong message to send our youth or our community." While acknowledging that an objective of sentencing is "deterring [others from] criminal conduct," defendant contends the statement "comes perilously close to violating the requirement of individualized sentencing." (See People v. Lock (1981) 30 Cal.3d 454, 457, fn. 5 [noting requirement].) Defendant's sentence was individualized. When the record indicates the trial court "carefully and sufficiently considered the specific circumstances of [a] case" statements such as the one the trial court made concerning general deterrence are "within its discretion" to make. (Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 187 [finding no error when trial court stated: " 'I owe it to all of the senior citizens in our community, and to their children and other caregivers who lovingly tend to them, to impose a severe sanction on you for killing your mother' "].)
Because we conclude the trial court committed no error in denying probation, we need not address defendant's contention the trial court's purported error was prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Banke, J.
We concur:
Marchiano, P. J.
Dondero, J.