Opinion
A150035
08-23-2018
In re T.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.L., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. JV84624)
T.L., a minor, appeals from a dispositional order. He challenges several technology-related probation conditions and a curfew condition under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and constitutional principles of vagueness and overbreadth. We modify T.L.'s probation conditions and affirm as modified.
BACKGROUND
On May 7, 2016, T.L., then 15 years old, and a companion attacked and robbed another teenager. They took his cell phone and attempted to steal his hoverboard. Two days later, after being identified by the victim, T.L. was arrested. T.L. was charged with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)), and attempted robbery in the second degree (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 212.5, subd. (c)). The juvenile court sustained the allegations.
In September 2016, the court adjudged T.L. a ward of the court and placed him on probation in his mother's home. He was subject to various conditions, including that he not use controlled substances; attend school without tardiness or unexcused absences; behave at all times while in school; and report to the probation officer as directed.
Two months later, the San Mateo County Probation Department filed a notice alleging several violations of probation. The notice alleged on two separate occasions T.L. used marijuana. It further alleged he had over a dozen unexcused absences from school, had been suspended from school, and failed to show up to an appointment with his probation officer. In a negotiated plea, T.L. admitted to the unexcused absences, and the remaining allegations were dismissed.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court committed T.L. to Camp Greenwood. It also imposed additional technology-related probation conditions and a curfew condition, which T.L. now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 authorizes the juvenile court to "impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) In planning conditions of probation, the juvenile court must consider the minor's entire social history, in addition to the circumstances of the offense. (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20 (Todd L.).)
The juvenile court has broad discretion. (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 (Josh W.).) Because juvenile probation conditions are imposed on the minor to ensure his or her rehabilitation, "[a] condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court." (Todd L., supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 19.) Indeed, a juvenile court may impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional in an adult context, "so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile." (Josh W., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 5.)
But the juvenile court's discretion is not unlimited. A probation condition is invalid if it: "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality." (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) "This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term." (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) In addition, a juvenile court may not adopt probation conditions that are constitutionally vague or overbroad. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889-891 (Sheena K.).)
While we generally review the court's imposition of a probation condition for abuse of discretion, we review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143 (Shaun R.).) In an appropriate case, a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn may be modified in this court and affirmed as modified. (See, e.g., Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 892.)
Social Networking Condition
T.L. first challenges the probation condition that states: "The Minor shall not access or participate in any Social Networking Site, including but not limited to Facebook.com."
T.L. argues that this condition is invalid under Lent, because it is unrelated to his offenses, involves non-criminal conduct, and is not reasonably related to future criminality. He says the condition should be stricken.
The People correctly point out that this objection is being raised for the first time on appeal, and they argue it is forfeited as a result. To avoid any possible claim based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, we shall consider the merits. (See, e.g., In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016; In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 183-184.)
The parties do not dispute the first two Lent factors are satisfied. The condition is not directly related to crimes for which T.L. was convicted. Nor is social networking inherently unlawful. They disagree, however, on whether the third Lent factor—the condition's deterrent effect on future criminality—is satisfied.
On this point, In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907 (Erica R.) is instructive. There, the court considered a Lent challenge to a probation condition requiring Erica, who admitted to possessing ecstasy, to submit to a search of her electronics and provide her passwords to her probation officer. (Id. at p. 910.) The juvenile court imposed the condition because " 'many juveniles, many minors, who are involved in drugs tend to post information about themselves and drug usage.' " (Id. at pp. 910, 913.) The appellate court concluded the electronic search condition was not reasonably related to preventing Erica's future criminality. The court explained, " '[N]ot every probation condition bearing a remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous connection to future criminal conduct can be considered reasonable.' [Citation.] There is nothing in this record regarding either the current offense or Erica's social history that connects her use of electronic devices or social media to illegal drugs. In fact, the record is wholly silent about Erica's usage of electronic devices or social media. Accordingly, '[b]ecause there is nothing in [Erica's] past or current offenses or [her] personal history that demonstrates a predisposition' to utilize electronic devices or social media in connection with criminal activity, 'there is no reason to believe the current restriction will serve the rehabilitative function of precluding [Erica] from any future criminal acts.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 913.)
So, too, here. T.L. committed second-degree robbery of a cell phone and an attempted second-degree robbery of a scooter, and he violated his probation with multiple unexcused absences from school. The probation department also alleged he used marijuana, failed to meet with his probation officer, and was suspended from school. None of these transgressions arose from or were shown to be in any way connected to online activity. Because T.L.'s misbehavior was unrelated to social networking, a probation condition that forbids him from accessing social networking sites is not reasonably related to his future criminality. Neither does it serve a rehabilitative purpose, nor is it necessary to protect the public. Accordingly, we strike the condition.
The People contend the social networking prohibition enables T.L.'s probation officer to monitor his compliance with other conditions and deters future criminality. They contend that the social networking condition helps ensure he does not use such sites for other prohibited activities like procuring drugs. We are not persuaded. Nothing in the record indicates T.L. has a disposition to plan crimes using social networking sites. Absent such evidence, we have no reason to believe keeping him away from such sites will rehabilitate T.L. or deter his future criminality.
The People also rely on In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902 (Victor L.), but that case is distinguishable. The minor there was a known and admitted member of a street gang. (Id. at p. 908.) On the night he was arrested, he was found drinking with several other young men and with weapons in the car he was driving without a license. (Ibid.) One of his probation conditions forbade him from accessing or participating in social networking sites, which the court noted "limit[ed] Victor's access to the Internet in ways designed to minimize the temptation to contact his gang friends." (Id. at pp. 926, 923.) The crux of Victor's challenge—and the focus of the court's analysis—was whether this condition was internally consistent with two other conditions which prohibited Victor from using a computer attached to a modem and forbade unsupervised internet use. (Id. at p. 923.) The court modified the condition barring use of a modem-connected computer in order to prevent a vagueness problem and then left the social networking condition in place. (Id. at p. 927.) Victor L. did not consider the reasonableness of the condition under a Lent analysis, as we do here. Had it done so, Victor's admitted membership in a street gang would have been a reasonable basis to impose a condition against social networking as a way to restrict his communications with fellow gang members. There is no such nexus here.
Accordingly, the condition that "[t]he Minor shall not access or participate in any Social Networking Site, including but not limited to Facebook.com" is stricken. In light of our conclusion, we need not address T.L.'s constitutional challenge to the social networking condition.
Electronic Search Condition
T.L. challenges the electronic search condition, which provides: "Any electronic data storage and/or communication device under the Minor's control and/or which the Minor has shared, partial or limited access, is subject to a full and complete search, by any probation officer, in any manner required to guarantee full disclosure by any probation officer, during the day or night, with or without his consent, with or without a search warrant, and without regard to probable and reasonable cause. [¶] The Minor shall provide encryption keys or passwords to the probation officer for any computer or electronic data storage devices, in his possession, custody or control and to which he has sole, shared, partial, or limited access."
The reasonableness and constitutionality of electronic search probation conditions is pending before the California Supreme Court. (See, e.g., In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923; In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016, S236628; People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122, review granted Dec. 14, 2016, S238210; In re Q.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1231, review granted Apr. 12, 2017, S240222.)
He contends this condition is unconstitutionally overbroad because it "threatens unfettered access to all content contained on and accessible to any electronic devices" accessible to T.L. He asserts this condition encroaches upon his constitutional rights of privacy and free speech belonging to him and possibly third parties. He asks us to strike or modify the condition.
As we have observed, a juvenile court may not adopt overbroad probation conditions. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 890-891.) "The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153 (E.O.).)
In In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896 (Malik J.), this court addressed a similar condition imposed upon a minor who had committed several robberies, including one involving a smartphone. (Id. at p. 899.) The condition authorized the warrantless search of electronic devices in Malik's control and required him to provide passwords to such devices as well as to his social media accounts. (Id. at p. 900.) We found it reasonable to require Malik to provide passwords for electronic devices in his custody and control as a way for a probation officer to determine whether the device had been stolen. (Id. at p. 903.) However, we were concerned with the scope of the information subject to search and explained: "[I]n performing such searches, officers must show due regard for information that may be beyond a probationer's custody or control or implicate the privacy rights of the probationer or third parties. . . ." (Id. at pp. 903-904.) After pointing out the exceptional privacy concerns arising from a probation officer having access to all of the data stored and accessible on one's cell phone, we restricted the scope of searches authorized by the condition and struck the requirement that the minor provide social media passwords as constitutionally overbroad. (Id. at pp. 902-904.)
Even though the electronic search condition does not require disclosure of any social media passwords as in Malik J., it still presents many of the same concerns. While we similarly view the electronics search condition as a reasonable way for officers to ascertain if devices in T.L.'s possession are stolen, the scope of the search authorized is too broad. The electronic search condition places no limit on the type of data subject to search, potentially allowing access to private information such as health or financial information which has nothing to do with illegal activity and is not likely to shed light on whether T.L. is complying with his other probation conditions. Nothing in the record supports an electronic search condition that is so all encompassing. Since the condition is not narrowly tailored to its purpose of furthering T.L.'s rehabilitation, it must be modified like the condition in Malik J.
The People argue that the electronics search condition is not overbroad, again asserting that it is focused on ensuring T.L.'s compliance with his probation conditions and on deterring his future criminality. To the extent that the electronic search allows T.L.'s probation officer to check that any cell phones in T.L.'s possession are not stolen, we agree. However, it goes far beyond this. The cases the People rely upon are inapplicable.
In re Q.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1231, review granted Apr. 12, 2017, dealt with a limitation that restricted the electronic search condition to the minor's personal cell phone, and not other devices. (Id. at pp. 1236-1237.) Our modification imposes no such limitation.
In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016, involved a minor who had "a constellation of issues requiring intensive supervision." (Id. at p. 801.) He was extensively involved in gangs, had significant drug problems, and had an unstable family life. (Id. at p. 798.) The electronic search condition was considered " 'critical' for the minor's rehabilitation" by allowing the probation officer to " 'monitor the purchase, or sales, [or] usage' of drugs." (Id. at p. 801.) As a result, the court concluded "[a] broad electronic search condition is appropriate for the level of supervision Minor requires." (Id. at p. 807.) There is no evidence that T.L. used any electronic device to promote gang activity or to purchase or sell drugs, nor is there any evidence that he requires especially intensive supervision.
In People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122, review granted Dec. 14, 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor whom he had contacted through social media and with whom he had exchanged sexually explicit text messages. (Id. at p. 1125.) The court affirmed an electronic search condition that required him to submit to warrantless searches of his computers and recordable media based in part on his past electronic communications with his victim. (Id. at pp. 1124, 1128-1130.) Other evidence indicated he had a moderate to high risk of reoffending on probation and intense monitoring would improve his chances of success. (Id. at p. 1130.) The circumstances in Nachbar are readily distinguishable.
The People also contend that "to the extent [T.L.] argues the electronics search condition affects the privacy rights of third parties, he has no standing to raise the claim." We do not base our analysis on third party privacy rights and need not address this argument. Courts have concluded a probationer does not have standing to assert the privacy rights of those third parties when challenging a condition of probation. (See, e.g., In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 759.)
As in Malik J., the electronic search condition is ordered modified to authorize warrantless searches of electronic devices accessible to T.L. only after the devices have been disabled from any internet or cellular connection and without utilizing specialized equipment designed to retrieve deleted information that is not readily accessible to users of the device.
Data Deletion Tools Condition
T.L.'s next challenge is to the data deletion condition, which provides: "Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device." T.L. contends that condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because "it is not clear how broadly it applies in banning T.L.'s use of data deletion tools." T.L. says the condition should be remanded to the juvenile court for clarification.
"A probation condition 'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,' if it is to withstand a [constitutional] challenge on the ground of vagueness. . . ." [Citation.]" (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350.) "A restriction failing this test does not give adequate notice—'fair warning'—of the conduct proscribed. [Citations.]" (E.O., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153.) "This concern for fair warning is aimed at ensuring that a ' "person of ordinary intelligence [has] a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." ' [Citations.] The fear is that vague laws will ' "trap the innocent." ' [Citation.]" (In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351, 357-358, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503, fn. 2.) " 'In deciding the adequacy of any notice afforded those bound by a legal restriction, we are guided by the principles that "abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context," and that, although not admitting of "mathematical certainty," the language used must have " 'reasonable specificity.' " ' [Citation.]" (Shaun R., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144, italics omitted.) " 'A probation condition should be given "the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader." ' " (People v. Forrest (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1080.)
It is unclear to us what programs or applications this condition prohibits T.L. from using. It may have been intended to prevent T.L. from using smartphones having remote erase capability. Or it may have been designed to prevent him from using applications such as Snapchat which destroy evidence that a communication has occurred. But it may also have sought to prevent T.L. from setting up the automatic deletion of his browsing data on a search engine. It is possible none of these were contemplated by the juvenile court, especially given some of the other conditions imposed. One of those conditions banned him from using social networking sites. Another, as we will discuss, precluded T.L. from possessing any portable communication device absent permission from his probation officer, thus effectively restricting his ability to have a cellphone. Given this lack of clarity, the condition fails to give T.L. fair warning of the scope of prohibited conduct. Since there is no connection between this condition and T.L.'s crimes or rehabilitation, we strike it.
The People argue that this condition is not vague because it can be construed reasonably and practically. We agree that the condition may reasonably be understood to exclude the manual deletions that occur when a user presses the "delete" button on a device or in a program. Beyond this, however, it remains unclear. In an effort at clarity, the People explain the "condition bars programs that allow deletion of material when the device is not accessible to the person engaged in deleting data." This is only more confusing. We would not fault T.L. for being reasonably confused as to the types of program he is not supposed to use. As such, the condition is unconstitutionally vague and is properly stricken.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not rely on In re Ana C. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 333 (Ana C.), disapproved by People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503, fn. 2. Nor do we address whether Ana C. is citable authority following the Supreme Court's grant of review and subsequent transfer to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration which yielded a new unpublished opinion. --------
Portable Communication Equipment Condition
The next condition we consider bars T.L. from possessing certain communication equipment without his probation officer's permission. According to this condition, "[t]he Minor shall not be in possession of any paging devices or any other portable communication equipment, including but not limited to scanners, without the express permission of the probation officer[.]"
T.L. contends this condition is unconstitutionally overbroad because it curtails his speech more than necessary and allows his probation officer too much discretion to restrict his use of communication devices. He asks us to modify the condition such that it only prohibits him from possessing such equipment "for any unlawful purpose" and eliminates the grant of authority to his probation officer.
T.L. relies on In re Englebrecht (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 486 (Englebracht) to argue the portable communication equipment condition is overbroad. There, the court concluded a similar provision in a preliminary injunction prohibiting gang members from using pagers or beepers was unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 496.) According to Englebrecht, free speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment included not only the right to be free from content censorship but also the right to utilize available means of dissemination. (Id. at pp. 496-497.) The court stated, "In today's world of instant and mobile communications, cellular telephones, pagers and beepers are almost becoming ubiquitous; they are important communication devices. In this regard, they are analogous to the telephone, which for much of the twentieth century has been an essential tool for disseminating speech. Regulation of such modes of communication must not run afoul of the First Amendment; any regulation must be narrowly tailored so that it does not proscribe a substantial amount of protected speech. 'The right of free speech necessarily embodies the means used for its dissemination because the right is worthless in the absence of a meaningful method of its expression. . . . The right to speak freely must encompass inherently the right to communicate.' " (Id. at pp. 496-497.) Of particular concern to the court was the fact that "pagers and beepers are not used only for illicit reasons, but have countless lawful, legitimate and everyday uses, both in the personal sense and professionally. For example, pagers and beepers are used to contact workers in the field in numerous businesses and professions, and they enable parents and family members to be readily contacted if the need arises." (Id. at p. 498.) Englebrecht concluded that the injunction's "all-encompassing ban on pagers and beepers poses a greater burden on the defendants' right to free speech than is necessary to serve the district attorney's legitimate interest in curtailing illegal gang activity and abating the public nuisance." (Id. at p. 498.)
Even though Englebrecht addressed a gang injunction, its reasoning applies equally to the probation condition here, which suffers from similar defects. By prohibiting T.L. from possessing any portable communication equipment, it effectively precludes his use of cell phones or smartphones, devices which have legitimate communication and informational utility. The condition does not allow him to use and possess a basic cell phone to communicate with his mother on his whereabouts. Thus, the condition barring T.L. from possessing portable communication equipment imposes a restriction on his freedom of speech that is not narrowly tailored to the circumstances of his crimes or his future criminal activity. While we recognize T.L. stole another boy's cell phone (a portable communication device), barring him from possessing one would impose a greater burden on his speech than is necessary for the state's legitimate interest in his rehabilitation, especially in light of the probation officers' ability to search any phone in his possession to ensure it is not stolen. Accordingly, we modify the condition to prohibit him from possessing portable communication devices for any unlawful purpose.
In light of this modification, there is no need to require T.L. to secure "express permission" to carry such a device from his probation officer. We strike that portion of the condition. Probation officers retain the authority to ensure T.L.'s compliance with this probation condition. "Probation officers are charged with supervising probationers' compliance with the specific terms of their probation to ensure the safety of the public and the rehabilitation of probationers." (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Should T.L. carry a cell phone, the probation officer maintains the authority to search it to ensure it is not stolen, as discussed above, and it is not being used for unlawful purposes.
The People point out that Victor L., discussed above, did not agree "that a cell phone ban for a juvenile delinquent unconstitutionally burdens his First Amendment rights." (182 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.) The Victor L. court noted that, unlike the adults subject to an injunction in Englebrecht, "a minor does not ordinarily have a professional need for a cell phone or pager." (Ibid.) Further distinguishing Englebrecht, which it found "of limited utility," Victor L. also observed that the probationer before the court was "a juvenile offender who was found in possession of an illegal weapon," unlike the adults subject to the injunction in Englebrecht who had not been convicted of any crime. (Id. at pp. 920-921.) In addition, as the People do here, Victor L. observed that the restriction was not an absolute ban on the possession or use of mobile communications devices because it contained an exception for use or possession authorized by the probation officer. (Id. at p. 922.) Victor L. rejected the same proposed modification T.L. promotes here, and the People encourage us to do the same.
The People make many fair points based on Victor L., but these arguments do not compel a different result. T.L. is not an admitted gang member whose rehabilitation requires minimizing contact and communications with other gang members. The condition in this context was not narrowly tailored so as to not run afoul of the First Amendment, and the juvenile court did not attempt to narrow the condition to enjoin only the use of these devices to abet criminal activities.
Accordingly, we modify the condition to preclude T.L.'s possession of portable communication equipment for any unlawful purpose.
Curfew Condition
T.L.'s last challenge is to a curfew condition. The condition provides: "When authorized to leave [Camp Glenwood], the Minor is required to be at his legal residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., or earlier, as directed by the probation officer."
T.L. argues this condition is unconstitutionally overbroad because it does not include an exception allowing him to travel outside his home with a parent during curfew hours and it grants too much discretion to his probation officer. He asks that we strike the curfew condition, or that we modify it to include an exception for outings with his parents and to eliminate the authority granted to his probation officer.
The People do not object to carving out a curfew exception for when T.L. is out with a parent. Both sides recognize a parent-accompaniment exception accords with Welfare and Institutions Code section 729.2, subdivision (c) that provides when a ward is released to the custody of his parents, the court, as a condition of probation, shall: "Require the minor to be at his or her legal residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless the minor is accompanied by his or her parent or parents, legal guardian or other adult person having the legal care or custody of the minor." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 729.2, subd. (c).) This guidance has been described as "a floor, not a ceiling, for juvenile probation conditions." (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99.) We agree the exception should be added.
However, the People do not concede that the condition gives the probation officer too much discretion, noting the "grant of authority to the probation officer to set the curfew earlier is well within the court's discretion." The People are correct that the condition does not grant unfettered discretion to the probation officer in adjusting T.L.'s curfew, as probation officers have an inherent obligation to act reasonably in supervision of probationers and in applying all associated conditions. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380-382.) As a result, this part of the curfew condition was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Our modification allowing for parent-accompanied outings during curfew hours also constrains the probation officer's discretion to limit T.L.'s ability to travel.
Accordingly, the curfew condition is modified to provide that "[w]hen authorized to leave the facility, the Minor is required to be at his legal residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., or earlier, as directed by the probation officer, unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian."
DISPOSITION
The probation conditions imposed on T.L. in the December 2016 dispositional order are modified as follows:
The condition that "[t]he Minor shall not access or participate in any Social Networking Site, including but not limited to Facebook.com" is stricken.
The electronic search condition is modified to state: "Any electronic data storage and/or communication device under the Minor's control and/or which the Minor has shared, partial or limited access, is subject to a full and complete search, by any probation officer, in any manner required to guarantee full disclosure by any probation officer, during the day or night, with or without his consent, with or without a search warrant, and without regard to probable and reasonable cause. Such a search shall occur only after the devices have been disabled from any internet or cellular connection and without utilizing specialized equipment designed to retrieve deleted information that is not readily accessible to users of the device. The Minor shall provide encryption keys or passwords to the probation officer for any computer or electronic data storage devices, in his possession, custody or control and to which he has sole, shared, partial, or limited access."
The condition that "[t]he Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device" is stricken.
The portable communication equipment condition is modified to state "[t]he Minor shall not be in possession of any paging devices or any other portable communication equipment, including but not limited to scanners, for any unlawful purpose."
The curfew condition is modified to state: "When authorized to leave the facility, the Minor is required to be at his legal residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., or earlier, as directed by the probation officer, unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian."
With these modifications, the dispositional order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Siggins, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Pollak, J. /s/_________
Jenkins, J.