Opinion
03-08-2024
The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Leonardo TAVAREZ, Defendant.
Jack Sorensen, Esq., The Legal Aid Society, for Defendant Jennifer Rentrope, Esq., Office of the Bronx County District Attorney for the People
Jack Sorensen, Esq., The Legal Aid Society, for Defendant
Jennifer Rentrope, Esq., Office of the Bronx County District Attorney for the People
Matthew V. Grieco, J.
Defendant Leonardo Tavarez is charged with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00[1]), a class A misdemeanor; criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01[2]), a class A misdemeanor; and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26[1]), a violation. Defendant moves pursuant to CPL 100.40 and 170.30 to dismiss count 2 of the information (criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree) as facially insufficient; or in the alternative to: suppress tangible, non-tangible, and testimonial evidence, or grant a Mapp/Dunaway hearing; suppress statements, or grant a Huntley/Dunaway hearing; suppress identification evidence, or grant a Wade/Dunaway hearing; grant a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing for any statements sought to be used only on cross-examination of defendant; grant a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing for any statements made to civilians; preclude the admission of evidence under CPL 710.30; grant a Sandoval hearing; allow defendant to reserve the right to make additional motions as necessary; and grant such other relief as this Court may deem proper. The People oppose.
DISCUSSION
[1, 2] "A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (People v. Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 99, 396 N.Y.S.2d 841, 365 N.E.2d 872 [1977]). A misdemeanor information must contain an accusatory part and a factual part, and be subscribed and verified by a complainant (CPL 100.15[1]). The accusatory section "must designate the offense or offenses charged" (CPL 100.15[2]). The factual section must allege "facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges" (CPL 100.15[3]), which, together with any supporting depositions, "provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part" (CPL 100.40[1][b]). The non-hearsay factual allegations must "establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and defendant’s commission thereof" (CPL 100.40[1][c]; see People v. Slade, 37 N.Y.3d 127, 136, 148 N.Y.S.3d 413, 170 N.E.3d 1189 [2021]; People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 [2000]).
[3, 4] The requirement that an information factually describe the elements of the crime and the particular acts of the defendant constituting its commission serves to give the accused fair notice to prepare and conduct a defense and to prevent double jeopardy, by specifically identifying the alleged crime so that the defendant cannot be charged again with the same crime, and is therefore non-waivable (see Slade, 37 N.Y.3d at 141-143, 148 N.Y.S.3d 413, 170 N.E.3d 1189; People v. Sedlock, 8 N.Y.3d 535, 538, 838 N.Y.S.2d 14, 869 N.E.2d 14 [2007]; Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 363, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233; see People v. Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d 100, 103, 905 N.Y.S.2d 542, 931 N.E.2d 526 [2010]), and should be accorded reasonable inferences (see People, v. Udeke, 34 N.Y.3d 1118, 1119, 118 N.Y.S.3d 63, 141 N.E.3d 131 [2019]; People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738, 747-748, 944 N.Y.S.2d 715, 967 N.E.2d 1160 [2012]).
The factual allegations of the complaint here read, in relevant part:
Deponent [P.O. Jacob Spring] states that he is informed by informant … that, [on or about June 1, 2023 at approximately 10:51 PM at the northwest corner of Seward Ave and Zerega Ave, County of the Bronx], defendant and informant engaged in a verbal dispute about a delivery, at which point defendant pushed the complainant with both hands. Deponent is further informed by
informant that defendant while holding a cellphone repeatedly struck the informant in the face, neck and arm multiple times with a closed fist using both hands interchangeably.
Deponent is further informed by informant that as a result of defendant’s aforementioned actions informant suffered substantial pain, a laceration to his neck and lip, a missing tooth, swelling to the face, a dislocated right shoulder, bleeding and bruising.
The People filed a supporting deposition by the complainant, attesting to the facts in the complaint and converting it to an information.
Defendant asserts that the People have not filed a facially sufficient information as to the count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, because the accusatory instrument alleges that defendant Struck the complaining witness "with a closed fist using both hands interchangeably," but fails to indicate that he "used or threatened to use his cell phone to inflict any injury, that the cell phone caused any injury, or that the cell phone came in contact with the Complaining Witness" (Def Aff at ¶ 9).
In response, the People assert that the cell phone was used unlawfully as a weapon and caused substantial injury to the complainant. The People argue that "the allegation is that [defendant] had the phone in his hand the whole time. It alleges that ‘while holding a cell phone’ he repeatedly struck the informant about the body. This statement shows that the phone was held during the entire assault, and being that the defendant was switching hands, it can be inferred that at some point it is likely that the phone made contact with the complainant’s body as well" (People’s Opp at p 9).
In reply, the defense asserts that "[t]he language in the complaint simply fails to allege how an incredibly ordinary object (cell phone) was used as a ‘dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon’ that [defendant] intended to use against any individual. In the absence of such language, the [second count] should be dismissed" (Reply at ¶ 2).
Penal Law § 265.01(2) provides that: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when [h]e or she possesses any dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, machete, razor, stiletto, imitation pistol, undetectable knife or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon with intent to use the same unlawfully against another."
[5, 6] Penal Law § 10.00(13) defines "[d]angerous instrument" as "any instrument, article or substance, including a "vehicle’ as that term is defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury." The "object itself need not be inherently dangerous"; "[i]t is the temporary use rather than the inherent vice of the object which brings it within the purview of the statute" (People v. Carter, 53 N.Y.2d 113, 116, 440 N.Y.S.2d 607, 423 N.E.2d 30 [1981]). Thus, under that "use-oriented approach," any instrument, article, or substance, "no matter how innocuous it may appear to be when used for its legitimate purpose, becomes a dangerous instrument when it is used in a manner which renders it readily capable of causing serious physical injury" (id. [emphasis in original] [rubber boots used to stomp on victim’s head]; see People v. Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d 561, 580, 647 N.Y.S.2d 697, 670 N.E.2d 1328 [1996] [paper towels wadded up with rubber bands to form ball used to gag victim]; People v. Galvin, 65 N.Y.2d 761, 492 N.Y.S.2d 25, 481 N.E.2d 565 [1985] [sidewalk against which victim’s head was pounded]; People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1070 [1979] [handkerchief used to gag victim]; People v. Nosea, 212 A.D.3d 511, 181 N.Y.S.3d 558 [1st Dept. 2023] [umbrella used to beat victim on the head], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1143, 188 N.Y.S.3d 448, 209 N.E.3d 1276 [2023]; People v. Tannen, 182 A.D.3d 482, 122 N.Y.S.3d 610 [1st Dept. 2020] [dashboard against which victim’s head was slammed], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1049, 127 N.Y.S.3d 845, 151 N.E.3d 526 [2020]; People v. Peralta, 172 A.D.3d 457, 97 N.Y.S.3d 850 [1st Dept. 2019] [hot liquid thrown by defendant]; Matter of Joy T., 106 A.D.3d 456, 964 N.Y.S.2d 511 [1st Dept. 2013] [unopened soda can thrown at victim’s face from 5 feet away]; People v. Medor, 39 A.D.3d 362, 833 N.Y.S.2d 100 [1st Dept. 2007] [backpack weighted with hard and heavy objects swung at victim’s head], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 867, 840 N.Y.S.2d 897, 872 N.E.2d 1203 [2007]; Matter of Marie K., 19 A.D.3d 149, 796 N.Y.S.2d 350 [1st Dept. 2005] [ceramic vase thrown at victim]; People v. Nelson, 10 A.D.3d 565, 782 N.Y.S.2d 75 [1st Dept. 2004] [nail file pointed against chest], lv denied 3 N.Y.3d 759, 788 N.Y.S.2d 675, 821 N.E.2d 980 [2004]; People v. Wade, 232 A.D.2d 290, 648 N.Y.S.2d 563 [1st Dept. 1996] [wire handle of flyswatter used to strike child on the back], lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 989, 656 N.Y.S.2d 748, 678 N.E.2d 1364 [1997]; People v. Scipio, 169 A.D.2d 596, 565 N.Y.S.2d 15 [1st Dept. 1991] [broom stick used to strike victim], lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 966, 570 N.Y.S.2d 500, 573 N.E.2d 588 [1991]; People v. Coe, 165 A.D.2d 721, 564 N.Y.S.2d 255 [1st Dept. 1990] [plate glass window through which victim was thrown], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 984, 563 N.Y.S.2d 773, 565 N.E.2d 522 [1990]; People v. Colon, 121 A.D.2d 181, 503 N.Y.S.2d 8 [1st Dept. 1986] [flashlight used to strike theater patron on head]; People v. Richards, 67 A.D.2d 893, 413 N.Y.S.2d 698 [1st Dept. 1979] [food tray used to strike victim in face]; People v. Krotoszynski, 43 A.D.3d 450, 840 N.Y.S.2d 627 [2d Dept. 2007] [television remote control used to strike on head], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 962, 848 N.Y.S.2d 31, 878 N.E.2d 615 [2007]; People v. Oglesby, 15 A.D.3d 419, 789 N.Y.S.2d 536 [2d Dept. 2005] [medallion on chain used to punch and cut]; People v. Gonzalez, 141 A.D.2d 665, 529 N.Y.S.2d 558 [2d Dept. 1988] [flower pot used to strike victim on head], lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 957, 534 N.Y.S.2d 670, 531 N.E.2d 302 [1988]; People v. Ryder, 146 A.D.3d 1022, 44 N.Y.S.3d 598 [3d Dept. 2017] [headphones used to beat victim], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1086, 64 N.Y.S.3d 176, 86 N.E.3d 263 [2017]; People v. Jones, 136 A.D.3d 1153, 26 N.Y.S.3d 363 [3d Dept. 2016] [mixed drink glass used to strike on side of face], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1000, 38 N.Y.S.3d 109, 59 N.E.3d 1221 [2016]; People v. Bouldin, 40 A.D.2d 1045, 338 N.Y.S.2d 686 [3d Dept. 1972] [spatula used to cut victim]; People v. Molnar, 234 A.D.2d 988, 652 N.Y.S.2d 186 [4th Dept. 1996] [pen and pencil used to stab], lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1038, 659 N.Y.S.2d 869, 681 N.E.2d 1316 [1997]).
" ‘Serious physical injury’ means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ" (Penal Law § 10.00[10]).
More particular to the instant case, cell phones have been found to qualify as a dangerous instrument (see People v. Delgado, 214 A.D.3d 542, 185 N.Y.S.3d 150 [1st Dept. 2023] [cell phone in hard plastic case used to strike victim on forehead and nose], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 928, 192 N.Y.S.3d 489, 213 N.E.3d 631 [2023]; Peo- ple v. Prior, 23 A.D.3d 1076, 804 N.Y.S.2d 877 [4th Dept. 2005] [cell phone or box cutter used to inflict permanent two-inch scar], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 817, 812 N.Y.S.2d 456, 845 N.E.2d 1287 [2006]), as have landline telephones (see People v. Williams, 40 A.D.3d 402, 836 N.Y.S.2d 137 [1st Dept. 2007] [telephone used to repeatedly strike victim on head and body], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 883, 842 N.Y.S.2d 795, 874 N.E.2d 762 [2007]; People v. Baber, 182 A.D.3d 794, 123 N.Y.S.3d 222 [3d Dept. 2020] [motel room telephone yanked out of wall and thrown at victim’s face, causing bleeding], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1064, 129 N.Y.S.3d 365, 152 N.E.3d 1167 [2020]; People v. Barnes, 158 A.D.3d 1072, 70 N.Y.S.3d 679 [4th Dept. 2018] [telephone receiver used to hit victim], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1011, 78 N.Y.S.3d 281, 102 N.E.3d 1062 [2018]; Matter of Brittanie G., 6 A.D.3d 1213, 775 N.Y.S.2d 702 [4th Dept. 2004] [telephone receiver used to strike victim on head]).
[7] Penal Law § 10.00(13)’s specification of an "instrument, article or substance," however, encompasses only devices or objects, not one’s body parts, such as hands or teeth (People v. Owusu, 93 N.Y.2d 398, 690 N.Y.S.2d 863, 712 N.E.2d 1228 [1999] [reviewing the "well-documented legislative history that a body part was never considered a dangerous weapon or instrument"]; see People v. Plunkett, 19 N.Y.3d 400, 948 N.Y.S.2d 233, 971 N.E.2d 363 [2012] [one’s own saliva, even if infected with the HIV virus, not an "instrument, article or substance"]).
The accusatory instrument alleges that: defendant while holding a cellphone repeatedly struck the informant in the face, neck and arm multiple times with a closed fist using both hands interchangeably [and] as a result of defendant’s aforementioned actions informant suffered substantial pain, a laceration to his neck and lip, a missing tooth, swelling to the face, a dislocated right shoulder, bleeding and bruising.
Defendant highlights that the information does not explicitly state that the cell phone made contact with the complainant. Upon a fair reading, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom (Udeke, 34 N.Y.3d at 1119, 118 N.Y.S.3d 63, 141 N.E.3d 131), it could be found that at least the laceration of the neck could not have been caused by bare fists but only by an object (see People v. Moreno, 187 A.D.3d 449, 133 N.Y.S.3d 8 [1st Dept. 2020] [forehead laceration could only have been caused by a dangerous instrument, not by a punch], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 974, 138 N.Y.S.3d 458, 162 N.E.3d 687 [2020]; People v. Dilly, 84 A.D.3d 1110, 923 N.Y.S.2d 211 [2d Dept. 2011] [physician testified that eyelid laceration could only have been caused by an object with an edge, not by a fist], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 858, 932 N.Y.S.2d 23, 956 N.E.2d 804 [2011]; People v. Davis, 96 A.D.2d 680, 466 N.Y.S.2d 540 [3d Dept. 1983] [physician testified that broken nose, right forearm, and rib, and laceration behind ear requiring 10 stitches, could not have been caused by a fist alone, and was caused by staking with an arm covered by a plaster cast]). Whether the cell phone here constituted a dangerous instrument as used is ultimately a question for the fact-finder at trial (see Vasquez, 88 N.Y.2d at 580, 647 N.Y.S.2d 697, 670 N.E.2d 1328; People v. Rivera, 213 A.D.3d 420, 421, 182 N.Y.S.3d 109 [1st Dept. 2023], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1113, 186 N.Y.S.3d 838, 208 N.E.3d 66 [2023]; Colon, 121 A.D.2d at 181, 503 N.Y.S.2d 8; People v. Davis, 65 A.D.2d 515, 409 N.Y.S.2d 135 [1st Dept. 1978] [error to instruct jury that auto jack was a dangerous instrument as a matter of law]), as is the issue of defendant’s intent (see People v. Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094 [1977]; People v. Johnson, 63 A.D.3d 470, 882 N.Y.S.2d 401 [1st Dept. 2009], lv denied 13 N.Y.3d 745, 886 N.Y.S.2d 99, 914 N.E.2d 1017 [2009]; see also People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E. 267 [1891] ["However clear the proof may be, or however incontrovertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to the jury"]; People v. Simmons, 66 A.D.3d 292, 884 N.Y.S.2d 9 [1st Dept. 2009], affd 15 N.Y.3d 728, 905 N.Y.S.2d 797, 931 N.E.2d 1053 [2010]).
[8–10] Even if defendant never hit the complainant with the cell phone itself, it could still qualify as a dangerous instrument. Giving the information a fair reading, including reasonable inferences (Udeke, 34 N.Y.3d at 1119, 118 N.Y.S.3d 63, 141 N.E.3d 131), the cell phone was in one of defendant’s fists that struck the complaining witness. In (People v. Seymore, 79 A.D.3d 477, 912 N.Y.S.2d 51 [1st Dept. 2010], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 801, 929 N.Y.S.2d 109, 952 N.E.2d 1104 [2011]), where the issue before the jury was whether the defendant had an unidentified dangerous instrument concealed in his fist, the First Department concluded: "the [trial] court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a witness with expertise in boxing to testify that if a person held a heavy object while striking a blow, the power of the blow would be enhanced." Similarly, in (People v. Goode, 179 A.D.2d 676, 578 N.Y.S.2d 611 [2d Dept. 1992], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1001, 584 N.Y.S.2d 456, 594 N.E.2d 950 [1992]), the Second Department held that "the jury could properly conclude that the printer’s guide, a solid cylindrical object measuring approximately two inches in length and weighing about one and one-half pounds, which was used to reinforce the impact of the fist blow, was ‘readily capable of causing serious physical injury’ and, thus, was a ‘dangerous instrument.’ " So too here, it could be found that the cell phone enhanced or reinforced the strength of the fist blow to such an extent that it was readily capable of causing serious physical injury and thus was a dangerous instrument. There is no statutory requirement that the object make contact with the victim, only that it "is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury" "under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used" (Penal Law § 10.00[13]). Again, whether the cell phone as used was in fact a dangerous instrument and whether defendant had the requisite intent are questions for the fact-finder.
Based on all the above, defendant’s motion to dismiss the count charging criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree as facially insufficient is denied.
[11] With respect to the remainder of defendant’s motion: a combined Mapp/Huntley/Wade/Dunaway/voluntariness hearing is granted; and the branches of the motion to preclude the admission of evidence under CPL 710.30 and all Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia issues are referred to the trial court. The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to supply all Brady and Rosario material, as well as their supplemental discovery obligations, to be served on the defense no later than 15 days prior to the first scheduled trial date.
The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.