Opinion
NO. 4-14-0996
08-22-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JARED J. SZARKA, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Adams County
No. 13CF544
Honorable Scott H. Walden, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Turner and Justice Appleton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed in part as modified, finding section 120(a) of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (720 ILCS 646/120(a) (West 2012)) did not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution or the equal protection and due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction under the Act. The appellate court vacated improper monetary assessments and reduced a surcharge.
¶ 2 Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Jared J. Szarka, was found guilty of unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursors in violation of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (Act) (720 ILCS 646/120(a) (West 2012)). On appeal, defendant argues (1) section 120(a) of the Act violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as well as the equal protection and due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions, (2) the State failed to prove defendant purchased a product he knew
contained a methamphetamine precursor, and (3) the trial court improperly levied a methamphetamine law enforcement fine and the "Lump Sum" surcharge must be reduced. We affirm in part as modified and vacate in part.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In August 2013, the State charged defendant with one count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursors. Id. Specifically, the State alleged defendant knowingly purchased or possessed products containing pseudoephedrine without a prescription and he previously pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of methamphetamine in December 2009.
¶ 5 On November 17, 2014, the trial court held a stipulated bench trial. According to the facts presented by the State and stipulated to by defendant, defendant purchased a product containing pseudoephedrine without a prescription at a Sam's Club in Quincy, Illinois. Video surveillance as well as the National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) verified defendant made the purchase on July 16, 2013. Further, the State explained that the NPLEx log revealed defendant made 46 purchases of pseudoephedrine between January 2011 and July 2013. The trial court also took judicial notice of defendant's prior guilty plea under the Act in Adams County case No. 09-CF-90.
¶ 6 Based on these facts, the trial court found defendant guilty, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
"I believe each of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt [based on] [t]he logs, the prior offense, the identification by virtue of the video, and the nature of what's required to buy pseudoephedrine. So,
the court does find [defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
¶ 7 Immediately following the bench trial, the trial court sentenced defendant to one year in prison and denied his posttrial motion.
¶ 8 This appeal followed.
¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Defendant argues on appeal that (1) section 120(a) of the Act violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as well as the equal protection and due process clauses of the of the Illinois and United States Constitutions, (2) the State failed to prove defendant purchased a product he knew contained a methamphetamine precursor, and (3) the trial court improperly levied a methamphetamine law enforcement fine and the "Lump Sum" surcharge must be reduced.
¶ 11 A. The Constitutionality of the Act
¶ 12 There is a strong presumption that statutes are constitutional, and reviewing courts "have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute whenever reasonably possible, resolving any doubts in favor of the statute's validity." People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23, 61 N.E.3d 92; see also Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 284 (1901). "To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish its invalidity." People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 22, 33 N.E.3d 137. The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. Id.
¶ 13 1. Proportionate Penalties
¶ 14 Defendant contends the Act violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because possessing pseudoephedrine is "a felony with mandatory
imprisonment [under the Act], but elsewhere *** the same conduct—or even far more culpable conduct—[is punishable] as a mere misdemeanor."
¶ 15 The proportionate penalties clause provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. After our supreme court's decision in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521, 839 N.E.2d 492, 517 (2005), "[a] defendant may no longer challenge a penalty under the proportionate penalties clause by comparing it with the penalty for an offense with different elements." A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause when: (1) "the penalty for a particular offense is too severe" under the "cruel or degrading" standard or (2) "a penalty *** [is] harsher than the penalty for a different offense that contains identical elements." Id. "If the legislature determines that the exact same elements merit two different penalties, then one of these penalties has not been set in accordance with the seriousness of the offense." Id. at 522, 839 N.E.2d at 517.
¶ 16 Defendant challenges the Act under the latter approach. Specifically, defendant claims the Act under which he was convicted (720 ILCS 646/120(a) (West 2012)) classifies his conduct as a Class 4 felony, punishable by at least one year in prison, yet the same conduct is punishable as a mere misdemeanor under the Methamphetamine Precursor Control Act (720 ILCS 648/40(a)(2) (West 2012)).
¶ 17 The Act under which defendant was convicted provides:
"Whenever any person pleads guilty to, is found guilty of, or is placed on supervision for an offense under this Act, in addition to any other penalty imposed by the court, no such person shall thereafter knowingly purchase, receive, own, or
otherwise possess any substance or product containing a methamphetamine precursor as defined in Section 10 of this Act, without the methamphetamine precursor first being prescribed for the use of that person in the manner provided for the prescription of Schedule II controlled substances under Article III of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act." (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 646/120(a) (West 2012).
¶ 18 By contrast, the Methamphetamine Precursor Control Act provides:
"Any person who knowingly purchases, receives, or otherwise acquires, within any 30-day period, products containing more than a total of 7,500 milligrams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, *** in violation of subsection (b) of Section 20 of this Act, and who has previously been convicted of any methamphetamine-related offense under any State or federal law, is subject to the following penalties: *** More than 7,500 milligrams but less than 15,000 milligrams [is a] Class A misdemeanor[.]" (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 648/40 (a)(2) (West 2012).
¶ 19 In a case with nearly identical facts, People v. Lewis, 2016 IL App (4th) 140852, ¶ 32, 78 N.E.3d 967, we rejected the defendant's claim that the Act violates the proportionate penalties clause. In Lewis, the defendant purchased a product containing pseudoephedrine, which is a methamphetamine precursor, after he had been convicted for a prior methamphetamine-related offense. Id. ¶ 4. At a bench trial for his second offense, the court found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor (720 ILCS 646/120(a) (West 2012)) and sentenced him to one year in prison. Lewis, 2016 IL App (4th), 140852, ¶¶4-5, 78
N.E.3d 967. On appeal, this court emphasized that the Act the defendant was convicted under requires a prescription to purchase or possess any amount of a methamphetamine precursor, whereas the Methamphetamine Precursor Control Act regulates the specific amount (over 7500 milligrams) of a precursor an individual may acquire and the period of time during which he may do so (30 days). Id. ¶ 32. As we explained in Lewis, these distinctions demonstrate that the elements for the respective offenses are not identical and do not punish identical conduct. Id. We adhere to our holding in Lewis and find there is no proportionate penalties violation in this case.
¶ 20 2. Equal Protection
¶ 21 Defendant next argues the Act violates his equal protection rights. Both the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution provide that no person shall be denied "equal protection of the laws." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection prohibits "unequal treatment to persons placed by a statute into different classes for reasons wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation." People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499, 605 N.E.2d 518, 523 (1992); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) ("The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike."). "A law that does not implicate either a suspect classification or a fundamental right is subject to rational basis review." Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d at 500, 605 N.E.2d at 524. Defendant concedes the rational basis test applies in this case because there is no classification that implicates a suspect class or affects a fundamental right. Under the rational basis test, "a statutory classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate State goal." Id. "[I]f any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the enactment, it must be upheld." Id. at 502, 605 N.E.2d at 525. We
perform the same analysis regardless of whether the claim arises under the state or federal constitution. Id. at 499, 605 N.E.2d at 523.
¶ 22 The stated purpose of the Act in this case is as follows:
"The purpose of this Act is to reduce the damage that the manufacture, distribution, and use of methamphetamine are inflicting on children, families, communities, businesses, the economy, and the environment in Illinois. The General Assembly recognizes that methamphetamine is fundamentally different from other drugs regulated by the Illinois Controlled Substances Act because the harms relating to methamphetamine stem not only from the distribution and use of the drug, but also from the manufacture of the drug in this State. Because methamphetamine is not only distributed and used but also manufactured here, and because the manufacture of methamphetamine is extremely and uniquely harmful, the General Assembly finds that a separate Act is needed to address the manufacture, distribution, and use of methamphetamine in Illinois." 720 ILCS 646/5 (West 2012).
¶ 23 The Act undoubtedly bears a rational relationship to the State's goal in reducing the "manufacture, distribution, and use of methamphetamine in Illinois" (id.) by punishing repeat offenders who lack a prescription for any substance containing a methamphetamine precursor. Defendant contends, however, there is no rational basis for classifying some defendants as felons under the Act at issue in this case, while the Methamphetamine Precursor Control Act classifies those who commit the same offense as misdemeanants.
¶ 24 Here again, we find that our decision in Lewis is dispositive. In Lewis, we
recognized that the two statutes involve different conduct with different punishments. Lewis, 2016 IL App (4th) 140852, ¶ 43, 78 N.E.3d 967. Specifically, we stated as follows: "the availability of different punishments under the two acts does not violate equal protection because the two provisions constitute different offenses proscribing different conduct." Id. The Act here requires prior offenders "to have a doctor's prescription to purchase or possess a methamphetamine precursor, whereas the [Methamphetamine Precursor Control Act] regulates the amount of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine anyone can purchase or otherwise acquire within a 30-day period." Id. ¶ 34. Accordingly, as we explained in Lewis, there is no equal protection violation because "there is no disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals." Id. ¶ 43.
¶ 25 3. Due Process
¶ 26 Defendant also argues that "[p]unishing less severe conduct as a Class 4 felony with mandatory prison, while punishing more severe conduct as a Class A misdemeanor, violates [his] right to due process." The Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution prohibit the State from depriving any person of "life, liberty or property without due process of law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Defendant acknowledges that the challenged statute need only survive rational basis review because it does not affect a fundamental constitutional right. Under the rational basis test for a due process challenge, the statute "will be upheld if there is any conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose, even if that purpose did not motivate the legislative action." People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 37, 971 N.E.2d 504; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-722 (1997) (holding that only "fundamental rights and liberties" that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" qualify for anything other than rational
basis review under the doctrine of substantive due process).
¶ 27 We have already concluded that the Act survives rational basis review because it is rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of reducing the "manufacture, distribution, and use of methamphetamine in Illinois." 720 ILCS 646/5 (West 2012); see also Lewis, 2016 IL App (4th) 140852, ¶ 40, 78 N.E.3d 967 (recognizing that it is within the legislature's purview to determine that it is less culpable conduct for prior offenders to "purchase between 7500 and 15,000 milligrams of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine within a 30-day period" with "a doctor's prescription" "than to purchase any precursor without a prescription").
¶ 28 Nonetheless, defendant further contends the Act violates his right to due process because it potentially criminalizes innocent conduct by failing to require a culpable mental state beyond mere knowledge. Defendant cites examples of allegedly innocent conduct criminalized by the Act, such as where a prior offender (1) obtains a single decongestant pill from a neighbor or coworker, (2) purchases a decongestant for a sick child, or (3) shares a home with someone who possesses decongestants. This court addressed these same hypotheticals in Lewis, 2016 IL App (4th) 140852, ¶ 26, 78 N.E.3d 967, explaining that the first two do not involve innocent conduct; rather, it is "the exact conduct the legislature intended to prohibit," namely where the individual is a prior offender and subsequently possesses a methamphetamine precursor without a prescription. As for the third example, we found the defendant's argument lacked merit because "mere knowledge that a product is present in one's home does not amount to possession of that product absent control over the product." Id.
¶ 29 The Act does not criminalize innocent conduct; instead, it prohibits prior offenders from knowingly purchasing or otherwise possessing any substance or product
containing a methamphetamine precursor without a prescription. 720 ILCS 646/120(a) (West 2012); see also People v. Laws, 2016 IL App (4th) 140995, ¶ 34, 66 N.E.3d 848 (explaining that "the statute here expressly requires knowledge, which is a mental state, as an element.").
¶ 30 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 31 Defendant also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because "the State failed to present evidence that [defendant] knew the product he purchased contained a 'methamphetamine precursor.' " We disagree.
¶ 32 Generally, when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant inquiry is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ngo, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1052, 904 N.E.2d 98, 102 (2008) (quoting People v. Singleton, 367 Ill. App. 3d 182, 187, 854 N.E.2d 326, 331 (2006)). "However, where defendant *** questions whether the uncontested facts were sufficient to prove the elements of the offense, our review is de novo." People v. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 757-58, 945 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (2011) (citing In re Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d 226, 231, 817 N.E.2d 495, 497-98 (2004)).
¶ 33 To convict defendant under section 120(a) of the Act, the State was required to show (1) defendant previously pleaded guilty to, was found guilty of, or was placed on supervision for an offense under this Act and (2) defendant knowingly purchased or otherwise possessed any substance containing a methamphetamine precursor (3) without a prescription. 720 ILCS 646/120(a) (West 2012).
¶ 34 Defendant does not argue that the State failed to prove he purchased a product
containing a methamphetamine precursor. Instead, he claims it failed to also prove he knew the product contained a methamphetamine precursor. This same argument was rejected in Lewis. In Lewis, the defendant argued, "to obtain a conviction under section 120(a), the State must show he knowingly purchased or possessed a product that he knew contained a methamphetamine precursor." Lewis, 2016 IL App (4th)140852, ¶ 14, 78 N.E.3d 967. The court in Lewis found "[t]he State need not show the defendant actually knew the illegal nature of the substance possessed." Id.; see also Laws, 2016 IL App (4th) 140995 ¶ 22, 66 N.E.3d 848 ("Requiring the State to prove the defendant knew the illegal nature or character of his or her act is simply requiring the defendant to know the law, which is knowledge we impute to all defendants regardless of the crime in question."). In Laws, we rejected an identical argument and found that "[a]n individual who purchases medication containing a methamphetamine precursor is on notice the medication contains the precursor because the ingredients are listed on the box or bottle containing the ingredient." Id. ¶ 23. We see no reason to depart from our holdings in Lewis and Laws, and we hold the State did not have to prove that defendant knew the product he purchased contained a methamphetamine precursor.
¶ 35 Here, there is no dispute that video surveillance and the NPLEx log established defendant purchased a product containing pseudoephedrine without a prescription on July 16, 2013. In addition, defendant made 46 other purchases of pseudoephedrine between January 2011 and July 2013. The trial court also took judicial notice of defendant's prior guilty plea under the Act. We find the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant under the Act.
¶ 36 C. Monetary Assessments
¶ 37 Defendant argues that the trial court improperly imposed two monetary
assessments.
¶ 38 First, defendant argues he was not eligible for the $100 methamphetamine law enforcement fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1-5(a), (b) (West 2012)) because "the trial court never made a finding that [defendant] had intent to manufacture methamphetamine or an analog." Section 5-9-1.1-5 provides as follows:
"(a) When a person has been adjudged guilty of a methamphetamine related offense involving possession or delivery of methamphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of methamphetamine or possession of a methamphetamine manufacturing material as set forth in Section 10 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act with the intent to manufacture a substance containing methamphetamine or salt of an optical isomer of methamphetamine, in addition to any other penalty imposed, a fine shall be levied by the court at not less than the full street value of the methamphetamine or salt of an optical isomer of methamphetamine or methamphetamine manufacturing materials seized.
***
(b) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fine of $100 shall be levied by the court[.]" (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1-5(a), (b) (West 2012).
¶ 39 The State contends that the $100 methamphetamine law enforcement fine applies because section 5-9-1.1-5 does not require the trial court to make a finding of intent to manufacture. Id. In Lewis, 2016 IL 140852, ¶ 18, 78 N.E.3d 967, the State conceded on appeal that the $100 methamphetamine law enforcement fine should be vacated because the
"defendant's offense based on possession of pseudoephedrine without a prescription lacked an element of intent to manufacture methamphetamine." In that case, we accepted the State's concession and vacated the fine because we agreed that "the trial court did not find defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine." Id. We reach the same conclusion here.
¶ 40 Here, defendant was not convicted of possessing pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1-5(a), (b) (West 2012). Instead, defendant was charged with, and convicted of, "purchas[ing] or possesses[ing] products containing pseudoephedrine" without a prescription. Accordingly, we vacate the $100 methamphetamine law enforcement fine.
¶ 41 Second, defendant argues that the "Lump Sum" surcharge must be reduced if this court vacates the $100 methamphetamine law enforcement fine. With respect to the surcharge, the trial court is required to impose "[t]he additional penalty of $10 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed." 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2012). Because we have vacated $100 in fines, we reduce the "Lump Sum" surcharge by $25.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part as modified and vacate in part. We vacate the $100 methamphetamine law enforcement fine and reduce the "Lump Sum" surcharge by $25. We otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002 (West 2016).
¶ 44 Affirmed in part as modified and vacated in part.