Opinion
2012-09-28
The PEOPLE of The State of New York, Respondent, v. Jack Z. SWEET, Defendant–Appellant.
Kathleen E. Casey, Barker, for Defendant–Appellant. Jack Z. Sweet, Defendant–Appellant pro se.
Kathleen E. Casey, Barker, for Defendant–Appellant. Jack Z. Sweet, Defendant–Appellant pro se.
Michael J. Violante, District Attorney, Lockport (Thomas H. Brandt of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, FAHEY, AND PERADOTTO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
We previously held this case, reserved decision and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing on defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to determine whether the People established “ ‘sufficient excludable time’ ” based upon our conclusion that defendant made a prima facie showing that the People failed to comply with CPL 30.30(1)(a)( People v. Sweet, 79 A.D.3d 1772, 1772, 917 N.Y.S.2d 768). The evidence adduced at the hearing on remittal establishes that the criminal action was commenced on April 9, 2002 by the filing of the indictment in Niagara County Court, and that the People declared their readiness for trial on June 17, 2002, well within the six-month limit provided in CPL 30.30(1)(a). We therefore reject defendant's contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based upon defense counsel's failure to seek dismissal of the indictment on the ground that defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial ( see generally People v. Manning, 52 A.D.3d 1295, 1295–1296, 861 N.Y.S.2d 873,lv. denied14 N.Y.3d 803, 899 N.Y.S.2d 137, 925 N.E.2d 941).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions in his main and pro se supplemental briefs and conclude that none requires modification or reversal of the order denying defendant's motion.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.