Opinion
E066075
03-28-2017
In re S.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.V., Defendant and Appellant.
Paul Stubb, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1401241) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Reversed and remanded with directions. Paul Stubb, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant S.V. (minor) appeals from the juvenile court's order denying his motion to seal his records held by Riverside City College (RCC) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. On appeal, minor argues that because Riverside City College Police Department (RCCPD) responded to the scene and RCCPD is a law enforcement agency within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (a), because RCC is a public agency within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (e)(2), and sealing the college's record of the dismissed petition would benefit minor, this court should remand the matter and instruct the juvenile court to order minor's records with RCCPD and RCC sealed. The People agree that a remand is appropriate. We also agree, and reverse and remand the matter with directions to the juvenile court to grant minor's request to seal his juvenile records held by RCCPD and to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretionary authority as to minor's request to seal his records held by RCC relating to the current proceedings.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from the probation officer's report.
On July 28, 2014, at approximately 4:16 a.m., minor was identified driving an RCC golf cart with a bicycle in the back of the cart. Minor was contacted by law enforcement and stated that he had found the golf cart in the river bottom while riding bikes with his friends. RCCPD was contacted and reported that the golf cart had been stolen between July 27 and 28, 2014. An officer from RCCPD responded to the scene and confirmed that the golf cart driven by minor was the college's property. Another RCC golf cart was discovered in a ditch in the river bottom. The second golf cart was identified and recovered by RCCPD.
On November 26, 2014, a petition pursuant to section 602 was filed against minor, alleging that minor unlawfully took and drove a golf cart (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and that he received a stolen golf cart (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)).
On January 16, 2015, the juvenile court found unusual or exceptional circumstances existed within the meaning of section 654.3 and granted minor informal probation pursuant to section 654.2.
On August 25, 2015, the juvenile court found minor successfully completed probation and dismissed the petition.
On May 20, 2016, minor's counsel moved to seal the records of the proceedings in the custody of applicable agencies or officials. The juvenile court granted minor's request to seal the records of the proceedings as to all agencies pursuant to section 786, except for those records held by RCC. Minor filed a notice of appeal the same day.
II
DISCUSSION
Minor argues that although none of the parties considered that RCCPD arrived at the scene and may have in their custody records of their dispatch and investigation, any such records should have been sealed because RCCPD is a "law enforcement agency" within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (a). Minor also contends that the records held by RCC should have been ordered sealed because the college is a " 'public agency' " within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (e)(2), and sealing the records would promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of minor.
The People partially agree. They aptly concede that the matter should be remanded and that the juvenile court should be directed to grant minor's request to seal his juvenile records in the custody of RCCPD. The People also correctly concede the juvenile court erred in denying minor's request as to sealing his records held by RCC because the court incorrectly found section 786 did not apply to school records, but request the matter be remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion whether to order the school records sealed rather than ordering the juvenile court to grant minor's request to seal juvenile records in the custody of RCC.
Section 786, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that if a minor successfully completes informal probation, the juvenile court "shall order the petition dismissed. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice. . . ." (Italics added.)
"A court shall not seal a record or dismiss a petition pursuant to this section if the petition was sustained based on the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 that was committed when the individual was 14 years of age or older . . . ." (§ 786, subd. (d); italics added.) Minor's offenses are not one listed in section 707, subdivision (b). --------
"The court shall send a copy of the order to each agency and official named in the order, direct the agency or official to seal its records, and specify a date by which the sealed records shall be destroyed. Each agency and official named in the order shall seal the records in its custody as directed by the order, shall advise the court of its compliance, and, after advising the court, shall seal the copy of the court's order that was received." (§ 786, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
The statute further provides that the sealing of records held by an entity is not limited to the court or law enforcement public agencies. Section 786, subdivision (e)(2), provides: "An individual who has a record that is eligible to be sealed under this section may ask the court to order the sealing of a record pertaining to the case that is in the custody of a public agency other than a law enforcement agency, the probation department, or the Department of Justice, and the court may grant the request and order that the public agency record be sealed if the court determines that sealing the additional record will promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of the individual." (Italics added.)
Effective January 1, 2016, subdivision (e)(1) of section 786 provides: "The court may, in making its order to seal the record and dismiss the instant petition pursuant to this section, include an order to seal a record relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition or petitions that have been filed or sustained against the individual and that appear to the satisfaction of the court to meet the sealing and dismissal criteria otherwise described in this section." (Stats. 2015, ch. 368, § 1.)
Interpretation of section 786 presents a question of law subject to independent review on appeal. (See In re Clarissa H. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 120, 125.) " ' "As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose." ' " (People v. Moreno (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934, 939; see People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974.) "We examine the statutory language, and give it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the statutory language is unambiguous, then the plain meaning controls." (People v. Moreno, supra, at p. 939; see People v. Cole, supra, at p. 975.) In other words, if there is "no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said," and it is not necessary to "resort to legislative history to determine the statute's true meaning." (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401; accord, People v. Toney (2004) 32 Cal.4th 228, 232.)
A. Records Held by RCCPD
Here, an RCCPD officer responded to the scene and confirmed that the golf cart driven by minor was the college's property. A second golf cart was also identified and recovered by RCCPD. At the time of the juvenile court's sealing order, section 786 required the court to seal all records in the custody of law enforcement agencies. There is no dispute that RCCPD is a "law enforcement agency" within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (a). As noted by minor, RCCPD's "law enforcement authority on or about the campus is identical to that of municipal and county law enforcement officers." (Riverside City College, Campus Police, About Us <http://www.rcc.edu/businesservices/campuspolice/Pages/RCCD%20Police%20Department%20About%20Us.aspx> [as of Mar. 24, 2017].) Under the plain language of section 786, the records held by RCCPD must be sealed. (See In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523, 526-527 [the unambiguous language of section 786 required the juvenile court to seal records pertaining to a dismissed petition based upon first finding satisfactorily completed probation].) Accordingly, because section 786, subdivision (a), requires that the juvenile court seal records in the custody of law enforcement agencies and RCCPD is a law enforcement agency, we remand the matter and direct the juvenile court to grant minor's request to seal his juvenile records in the custody of RCCPD.
B. Records Held by RCC
We agree with the parties that by its express language, the statute allows judicial discretion as to whether records held by a public agency and related to a dismissed petition should be sealed. We also agree that by the statute's plain language, RCC, a public college, is a "public agency" within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (e)(2). (See Gov. Code, § 53050 ["The term 'public agency,' as used in this article, means a district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state, but does not include the state or a county, city and county, or city."]; California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 820 [a public college is an agency within the meaning of the Government Code]; Marin Community College Dist. v Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 719 [a community college district is a "local agency" for purposes of the venue statute requiring transfer of actions by local agencies to a neutral county]); Hovd v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 470, 472 [vocational skills center was not "public agency" within meaning of Government Code section 53051 requiring public agencies to file certain information with Secretary of State and county clerk, since it was a subdivision of a district].)
However, minor is mistaken that this court should instruct the juvenile court to seal his records held by RCC because sealing the records will promote minor's successful reentry and rehabilitation into society. As previously noted, subdivision (e)(2) of section 786 provides that a juvenile court "may grant the request and order" the public agency record be sealed "if the court determines that sealing the additional record will promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of the individual." (Italics added.) "This is the traditional language of discretionary power [citations], and courts throughout the country have treated the scope of public access as committed to a trial court's discretion. [Citations.]" (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 299; see People v. Mgebrov (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 579, 587.) As such, we apply the abuse of discretion standard to the issue of whether the juvenile court erred in denying minor's request to seal his records held by RCC pursuant to subdivision (e)(2) of section 786. (In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663, 668 [appellate court reviewed the trial court's denial of a petition under section 781 to seal juvenile records for abuse of discretion]; V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1469 [appellate court reviews the trial court's decision to grant or deny a section 782 motion to dismiss a juvenile petition under the abuse of discretion standard], disapproved on another point in In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 415.)
"[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) If the record shows that a trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, then we must remand for an informed exercise of the power. (Cf. People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 [discretion to strike recidivist finding].)
" '[T]he purpose of the juvenile justice system is "(1) to serve the 'best interests' of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and 'enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and community,' and (2) to 'provide for the protection and safety of the public . . . .' " ' " (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 417; § 202, subd. (b) [public safety is a consideration coequal to rehabilitation].) The purpose of sealing is to protect minors from future prejudice resulting from their juvenile records. (In re Jeffrey T. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1020.) Further, the juvenile delinquency system is not concerned merely with punishing juvenile offenders; rather, it is concerned with rehabilitating them. (In re J.W., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 667.)
Here, based on a thorough analysis of the record, it appears the juvenile court misunderstood its discretion in determining section 786 did not apply to school records. It appears the juvenile court abused its discretion because the juvenile court's decision appears to be based on errors. (See Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393 ["[A] reasoned decision based on the reasonable view of the scope of discretion is still an abuse of judicial discretion when it starts from a mistaken premise . . . ."]; see also People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 997 [finding an abuse of discretion where "substantial evidence does not support the critical inference the court relied on in denying [a] motion to strike"].) The juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion in determining whether sealing the school records will promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of minor. (See In re J.W., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 667-668.)
Based on the foregoing, we will remand the matter to allow the juvenile court to make a factual determination in the first instance as to whether sealing minor's records held by RCC will promote minor's reentry and rehabilitation.
III
DISPOSITION
The order denying minor's request to seal his records relating to his juvenile court proceedings held by RCCPD and RCC is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The juvenile court is directed to grant minor's request to seal his juvenile records relating to these proceedings in the custody of RCCPD, and to hold a hearing to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion as to minor's request to seal his juvenile records in the custody of RCC.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: McKINSTER
J. MILLER
J.