Opinion
No. 570012/12.
01-19-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert STUTLEY, Defendant–Appellant.
Judgment of conviction (Gerald Lebovits, J.), rendered February 25, 2011, affirmed.
Upon our review of the record as a whole and the circumstances of the plea in its totality (see People v. Sougou, ––– NY3d ––––, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 08617 [2015], we are satisfied that defendant “intelligently and understandingly waived [his] constitutional rights” (People v. Conceicao, ––– NY3d ––––, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 08615 [2015] ; see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [1969] ; People v. Tyrell, 22 NY3d 359, 366 [2013] ), and entered an otherwise knowing and voluntary guilty plea. In satisfaction of an accusatory instrument charging him with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and attempted tampering with physical evidence, defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of seventh degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, in return for a sentence of time served. In response to questioning from the court, defendant personally confirmed that he wanted to plead guilty and that he was, in fact, guilty, and that he understood that he was giving up his right to a trial. “Granted, the plea proceeding was succinct, but, unlike Tyrell, the record was not silent” (see People v. Sougou, supra ), and the substance of the plea colloquy “established defendant's understanding and waiver of his constitutional rights” (People v. Conceicao, supra [internal brackets and quotations omitted] ).
Similarly unavailing is defendant's challenge to the facial sufficiency of the underlying accusatory instrument. The factual portion of the accusatory instrument established reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant was guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03 ) by alleging, inter alia, that, at a specified time and location, the arresting officer observed defendant “holding one (1) pipe/stem containing crack/cocaine residue in defendant's hand” and that the officer believed that the substance was crack/cocaine based upon his “professional training as a police officer in the identification of drugs and [his] prior experience as a police officer in drug arrests” (see People v. Smalls, ––– NY3d –––, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 09188 [2015] ; People v. Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 231–232 [2009] ; People v. Pearson, 78 AD3d 445 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 799 [2011] ).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur.