Opinion
05-29-2024
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Steven A. STRUB, appellant.
Steven A. Feldman, Manhasset, NY, for appellant. Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Grazia DiVincenzo and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.
Steven A. Feldman, Manhasset, NY, for appellant.
Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Grazia DiVincenzo and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., LINDA CHRISTOPHER, LARA J. GENOVESI, LOURDES M. VENTURA, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (John B. Collins, J.), rendered December 12, 2018, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree in connection with the death of his wife based upon, among other things, statements he made to the police while in custody, DNA evidence, and cell site data.
[1] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
[2, 3] Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials based on the defendant’s symptoms of withdrawal. A confession will only be rendered inadmissible due to withdrawal where the symptoms have "risen to the degree of mania" (People v. Adams, 26 N.Y.2d 129, 137, 309 N.Y.S.2d 145, 257 N.E.2d 610) or "resulted in the sudden loss of [the defendant’s] capacity to understand either the nature of his legal rights or the consequences that would follow from their waiver" (People v. Husbands, 171 A.D.2d 756, 756, 567 N.Y.S.2d 309; see People v. Smith, 223 A.D.3d 500, 201 N.Y.S.3d 400; People v. Frejomil, 184 A.D.2d 524, 527, 584 N.Y.S.2d 181). At the suppression hearing, the People demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statements were voluntary and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making the statements (see Miranda, v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct, 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; People v. McManus, 219 A.D.3d 636, 636, 195 N.Y.S.3d 51). A review of the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant’s statements were voluntarily made, and the record is devoid of evidence establishing that the defendant was experiencing withdrawal symptoms that rose to the degree of mania or impaired his capacity to understand his legal rights (see People v. Lewis, 165 A.D.3d 979, 979, 84 N.Y.S.3d 585; People v. Frejomil, 184 A.D.2d at 524, 584 N.Y.S.2d 181).
[4] The County Court also properly denied that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Independent of any outstanding out-of-state warrants the defendant may have had, the People established that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for the instant crime (see People v. Lawrence, 211 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 179 N.Y.S.3d 599; People v. Rhames, 196 A.D.3d 510, 512, 149 N.Y.S.3d 550).
[5, 6] The defendant’s contention that the interrogating officer’s denial of the defendant’s request to call his mother violated his right to counsel is only partially preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Noble, 211 A.D.3d 970, 971, 180 N.Y.S.3d 262). In any event, the defendant’s contention is without merit. A defendant’s "request to speak with his mother is not the legal equivalent of a request to exercise the constitutionally protected right to an attorney’s advice and counsel" (People v. Fuschino, 59 N.Y.2d 91, 100, 463 N.Y.S.2d 394, 450 N.E.2d 200). Here, the record contains no indication that the defendant intended to call his mother for the purpose of retaining counsel. To the extent that the interrogating officer violated CPL 140.20(7), a statutory violation does not implicate the exclusionary rule, and therefore does not require the statement’s suppression (see People v. Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711, 714, 579 N.Y.S.2d 617, 587 N.E.2d 255; People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208, 216, 422 N.Y.S.2d 43, 397 N.E.2d 733).
[7] The defendant’s challenge to the County Court’s jury instructions regarding witness credibility and inconsistent statements is only partially preserved for appellate review (see People v. Santiago, 52 N.Y.2d 865, 866, 437 N.Y.S.2d 75, 418 N.E.2d 668; People v. Cruz, 137 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 27 N.Y.S.3d 643). In any event, the defendant’s contention is without merit because the " ‘court’s charge, taken as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct standard’ " (People v. Medina, 18 N.Y.3d 98, 104, 936 N.Y.S.2d 608, 960 N.E.2d 377, quoting People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28, 32, 817 N.Y.S.2d 583, 850 N.E.2d 630 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Whitney, 117 A.D.3d 762, 984 N.Y.S.2d 608).
[8, 9] Contrary to the defendant’s contention, his presumption of innocence was not impaired by a witness’s testimony regarding the defendant’s incarceration status. "Evidence indicating that a defendant was incarcerated pending trial may impair a defendant’s presumption of innocence" (People v. Zelaya, 170 A.D.3d 1206, 1207, 96 N.Y.S.3d 683). However, the subject witness’s testimony here was "temporary and brief’ and "served a legitimate State interest" (People v. Jenkins, 88 N.Y.2d 948, 951, 647 N.Y.S.2d 157, 670 N.E.2d 441). The witness testified only as to one telephone call the defendant made while in custody the day after his arrest, which did not imply that the defendant was otherwise incarcerated pending trial (see People v. Fabregas, 130 A.D.3d 939, 940, 15 N.Y.S.3d 794). Under these circumstances, the County Court was not required, sua sponte, to issue a curative instruction (see People v. Zelaya, 170 A.D.3d at 1207, 96 N.Y.S.3d 683).
[10] The defendant’s challenge to the interrogating officer’s use of writings between the defendant and his wife, and his related challenge to the introduction of the recorded interrogation to the jury, is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Noble, 211 A.D.3d at 971, 180 N.Y.S.3d 262). In any event, the defendant’s contentions are without merit because he left the subject writing "in plain view" (People v. Thomas, 288 A.D.2d 405, 406, 733 N.Y.S.2d 231) and because the marital privilege was "never designed to forbid inquiry into the personal wrongs committed by one spouse against the other" (Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 315, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99, 144 N.E.2d 72).
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit.
BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, GENOVESI and VENTURA, JJ., concur.