Opinion
B332661
09-30-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COURTNEY STOUT, Defendant and Appellant.
Justin Andrew Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Melanie Dorian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. YA107425 Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
Justin Andrew Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Melanie Dorian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
INTRODUCTION
On February 18, 2023, police arrested Courtney Stout in Rancho Palos Verdes for the burglary of Barbra Zuliani's property. Stout entered a detached pool house in Zuliani's backyard and took clothing. At trial, Stout maintained she had permission to stay at Zuliani's property from a man she met 20 years beforehand, and that the items she took from the pool house were her own belongings she had left there many years ago. She also testified she entered the pool house to find a place to sleep. The case was tried to the court, which convicted Stout of burglary. Her only argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence of her intent to steal when she entered the pool house, a required element for burglary. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Information
The information filed against Stout charged her with one felony count of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459 ). Stout entered a plea of not guilty. After a court-ordered competency evaluation, Stout was found competent to stand trial. She agreed to a bench trial.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
B. The Trial Evidence
The court held a one-day bench trial where the following evidence was presented.
1. The People's Evidence
Zuliani testified she had lived at the home on Colt Road for more than 35 years. Her property included a main house, a pool, and a pool house. Zuliani used the pool house for storage, including her adult children's belongings. The pool house also served as a guesthouse, and had a twin bed and a bathroom. Zuliani usually left the pool house door unlocked, and she kept food in a refrigerator by the pool.
Around 10:00 a.m. on February 18, 2023, Zuliani was at home when she noticed the pool house curtains were closed. She testified this was unusual, so she went to investigate. She entered the pool house and saw Stout "coming out of the bathroom brushing her teeth and [Zuliani] asked her, 'What are you doing here?'" Stout responded, "'I live here,'" and "'This is all my stuff.'" Zuliani asked Stout if she knew her children or another homeowner on the road, and Stout mentioned "Zeke Bender," a name familiar to Zuliani. Zuliani asked for Stout's identification, and Stout willingly provided a passport, but when Zuliani walked toward the main house to get her reading glasses, Stout's "tone sort of changed" and she demanded her passport back. Frightened, Zuliani went into the main house and called 911.
From a window, Zuliani saw Stout return to the pool house, then leave wearing a backpack, a green jacket with fur, and a sweatsuit featuring the logo of the Port of Los Angeles. Zuliani thought the sweatsuit might belong to her daughter, who worked at the port, and she was "positive" the green jacket belonged to her daughter.
Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies apprehended Stout outside Zuliani's home. Zuliani reviewed the contents of Stout's backpack and recognized crackers, cheese, and other food from her poolside refrigerator. Inside the pool house, Zuliani could tell the toilet and shower had been used and saw Stout's clothing on the floor. The bathroom "was a mess"; the shower had been used, and the toilet and the sink were clogged. There was a "partially eaten" cake in the pool house, which Zuliani had kept in the refrigerator by the pool. Zuliani testified she did not give Stout permission to stay at the pool house, take any items, or eat the food. Zuliani later found, in the twin bed, a map of Colt Road with a "mark" near her house.
Deputy Jessie Romero testified she spoke with Stout while Stout was detained in front of Zuliani's home. The People introduced video footage from Deputy Romero's body-worn camera of this interview. Stout told Deputy Romero she had lived on Zuliani's property "over 20 years" ago. She stated that "a long time ago," she knew "a gentleman in the main house that had rented [the pool house] to me" and she visited the pool house to "try[] to speak" to him and to get her "stuff" that was still there. Stout explained she usually stayed in Malibu but came to Colt Road to "find my memory" and "follow[] a pipeline fantasy."
The court also admitted a transcript of this video.
When Deputy Romero asked Stout "whose jacket" she was wearing, Stout responded, "I'm assuming it was mine since it was with my stuff. She [Zuliani] just tried to say it was her daughter's." Deputy Romero then stated he was placing Stout under arrest for burglary. Stout said, "For burglary? Nothing I took is from there.... Except for what I'm wearing minus the shoes . . . I would have taken some expensive [sic]."
Deputy Romero transported Stout to a nearby police station and the two continued to talk. This conversation was also captured on Deputy Romero's body-worn camera, and the People introduced footage and a transcript at trial. Stout asked Deputy Romero, "But what did I burglarize? What did I take out of there, some food for a [unintelligible] that I put in my belly? . . . It's under $50." Deputy Romero stated, "That's technically burglary." Stout pressed, "Isn't there like a minimum of property[?]" and Deputy Romero replied that there was not. Stout stated: "Oh, so it could just be [unintelligible]. I bought food a long time ago, and I put it in my belly-I bought cake. . . . You can eve[n] ask her, nothing was missing. Not one item was missing. Zero."
2. Stout's Testimony
Stout testified that in December 2022 she was staying in San Pedro. She testified she was being "stalked," her car had been set on fire, she had been "hit over the head," and she "didn't know who to trust." She remembered a former employer named Bender who lived on Colt Road. Stout testified that Zeke Bender was an architect who "supposedly . . . was in Architectural Digest." The two had previously dated. She was aware Bender died of COVID the year before, but she hoped someone at his house would help her. She printed a map of Colt Road and searched for Bender's house, believing she was still being "followed" and "stalked."
On the way to Bender's house, Stout remembered she also knew a "gentleman" who owned Zuliani's house. Stout testified she used to go to "pool parties" at Zuliani's house and this man told her, "'The door is always open for you if you ever need a place to stay, you know, [if] anything ever happens.'" Stout believed this man could be Zuliani's husband but did not remember his name, only his description. Stout stated she did not believe she had the right to enter Zuliani's property, because "[n]obody has a right to go on anybody's property," but she was "tired of looking for Zeke."
On cross-examination, Stout testified: "At that point I was so exhausted I did not care if I was even, even if I was breaking and entering at that point. I was desperate. I had gone to the police, the police weren't helping me.... So it comes a point where you have to take the risk and I did." She stated that she took a risk that the man she remembered still lived there.
Stout admitted to entering the pool house around 8:00 p.m., after the sun had set. At that time, the main house was dark and the blinds were closed; Stout did not attempt to contact anyone in the main house. Stout testified her "intention" when she entered the pool house was "to lie down. I was exhausted." She stated she did not intend to commit some kind of crime inside, but "[j]ust use the restroom and get some shut eye. More like shelter and fear-based [sic]." Defense counsel asked Stout, "At some point you said a person had given you permission and the door would always be open to you . . . is that why you felt you could go in there?" Stout answered, "Well, I didn't know. The door was unlocked....I said it was the last resort type thing for shelter from the rain I guess you would say metaphorically speaking."
Stout testified she stayed in the pool house for "two or three days." She admitted to taking food from the poolside refrigerator. When asked if she took clothing that was not hers, Stout said, "No. That is debatable." Stout maintained she "still ha[d] property" in the pool house, including "roller skates," "work boots," and "[a] lot of winter coats." On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked:
Q. [W]hen the officer said you're being arrested for burglary, you said, "'For burglary? Nothing I took from there except for what I'm wearing minus the shoes.'" So you knew it wasn't your clothing?
A. Yeah. Maybe my memory has come back, though .... Again, I couldn't tell you and I can't admit to it because I believe that I really did buy that jacket a long time ago with the same hat from Old Navy.
C. Conviction and Sentence
The trial court found Stout guilty of second degree burglary. The court found Stout's testimony was not credible because "it's clear from the statement that she made at the time [of her arrest], and even during the course of her testimony, [she] vacillate[s] from one defense to another, or one explanation to another, none of them really consistent with each other[,] other than to keep throwing out what she believed might negate her responsibility for her actions on that day." The court also stated:
"[T]here's a real question about [Stout's] credibility; and . . . she even ends up admitting [that] at some point that she committed a theft. I believe the reasonable or rational explanation as to what happened is that for some reason or another she felt that what she was doing was not a big deal and that she could go into this place. She needed to go to a place to stay, she picked this place to stay. She didn't think it was a big deal taking food or clothing. She even went so far as to say it's under $50.
"It could even be a penny that she takes from there, it would still be a burglary, and I do believe that the specific intent has been shown in this case."
Stout was sentenced to 16 months in county jail. Stout timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Stout's sole argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence of her intent to steal when she entered the pool house.
Stout also argues the trial court "made no findings about [her] intent at the time of entry." Because the trial court expressly found "specific intent has been shown in this case," we reject Stout's argument. (See People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 793 ["the specific intent necessary to commit burglary is simply the felonious design with which the accused enters the building, i.e., 'with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony' therein"], superseded on other grounds by Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, as stated in People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 213.)
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Burglary requires "not only that a defendant enter a structure, but that he or she do so with a particular objective in mind: larceny (or any other felony)." (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 939; accord, People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 170 (Tafoya); see § 459 ["Every person who enters any house . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary."].) "Because intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof," a burglary defendant's intent "may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence." (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1245 (Kwok); accord, People v. Rehmeyer (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1765 (Rehmeyer).) Whether the defendant entered the premises with intent to commit a theft or a felony is a question of fact reserved for the factfinder. (See Kwok, at p. 1245.)
"'"In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citations.] All conflicts in the evidence . . . are resolved in favor of the verdict, drawing every reasonable inference the [factfinder] could draw from the evidence.'" (People v. Lara (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 296, 314 (Lara); accord, People v. Saez (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1189.) "In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we cannot reweigh the evidence, as the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact." (People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837, 842 (Misa).)
"Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom." (People v. Ugalino (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1064.) "'"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."'" (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1054 (Kraft).) "Unless it is clearly shown that 'on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict,' the conviction will not be reversed." (Misa, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 842; accord, Lara, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 314.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Finding that Stout Had the Intent to Commit Theft When She Entered the Pool House
Stout argues "the facts and circumstances surrounding [her] conduct did not establish that she had the requisite intent for burglary at the time of entry," because she "genuinely believed that she had permission to be in the pool house and that she had property there." Stout contends "her intention upon entry was to use the restroom and get some rest." Stout also submits that her "significant mental health difficulties" and her "inconsistent and incoherent" story demonstrate her lack of intent to commit any crime.
In her opening brief, Stout argued that the "questions regarding her competency . . . support the argument that she lacked the requisite intent for burglary." At trial, Stout did not argue or introduce expert evidence that she lacked the requisite intent due to a mental disease or defect. (See § 28, subd. (a) ["Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible . . . on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific intent"]; People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 824 [expert testimony required to establish mental disease within the meaning of § 28].) On reply, Stout clarified she was "not asserting that she had a specific diagnosed medical condition that precluded a finding of specific intent." (See Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 513, 530, fn. 11 [argument raised in opening brief but disclaimed on reply is considered abandoned]; accord, Schwartz v. Fay (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 446, 448.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Stout entered the pool house with the intent to commit larceny. Stout testified that she entered the pool house for the purpose of using the bathroom, and Zuliani confirmed that Stout took a shower and used the bathroom. (See People v. Martinez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 581, 585 [entering home with "inten[t] to use the soap, shampoo and water constituted an intent to commit larceny," supporting burglary conviction].) Stout left the pool house with a coat belonging to Zuliani's daughter; indeed, Stout admitted to Deputy Romero that she took "what I'm wearing" from the pool house. (See In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541 [theft of a camcorder "create[d] a reasonable inference that appellant entered [the] apartment with intent to steal"].)
Additionally, Stout entered the property at night, without announcing herself, and concealed herself for several days by closing the pool house curtains. (See People v. Frye (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 941, 947-948 [intent for burglary present where defendant "tried to conceal his presence" at a "late hour" despite his testimony he was looking for a place to sleep]; People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41-42 [same, where defendant "entered [victim's] apartment surreptitiously, [and] hid in her bathroom with the lights out"]; People v. Corral (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 300, 304 ["intruder's intent to commit theft within the houses was amply shown by the secret and noiseless entry in an unusual manner at an odd hour of the night into the homes where he was not an invited guest, [and] the thefts of property"].) Stout fled the property after Zuliani confronted her and called the police. (See Frye, at p. 947 ["late hour" of entry and "flight upon discovery" supported intent to steal]; People v. Martin (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 334, 339 ["a person's flight from the scene of a burglary, without reasonable explanation" is evidence of intent].) And while Stout initially admitted taking clothes, she changed her story when she learned there was "no [dollar] minimum of property" for burglary, asserting the clothes were hers and "nothing was missing" from the pool house. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine it supports a reasonable inference Stout intended to steal when she entered the pool house. (See People v. Jones (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 71-72 ["[T]here is no better proof that a burglar entered with intent to commit theft than a showing that he did commit it."]; accord, In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 741; People v. Manson (1974) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 208.)
Stout argues these facts are also consistent with her testimony that she intended to sleep and, because of mental health challenges, she believed that the belongings stored in the pool house were hers. In People v. Myles (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 711 (Myles), a burglary defendant similarly testified that, due to his mental illness, "he believed the house and its contents were his," he "went in because he was homeless and cold," and he "did not intend to steal when he entered." (Id. at p. 721.) The court held there was substantial evidence of the defendant's intent to steal because the defendant concealed his entry. (Id. at p. 739.)
As in Myles, although some of the evidence at Stout's trial "was also consistent with an innocent state of mind, for purposes of substantial evidence review, we are not permitted to draw inferences contrary to the verdict." (Myles, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 740; accord, Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1054.) The trial court here found Stout was not credible, and we may not reassess this determination on appeal. (See Myles, at p. 740; accord, People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.) Because substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Stout had the intent to commit larceny, we are "compelled to reject [her] sufficiency of the evidence challenge." (Myles, at p. 740; Tafoya, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 170 [that "'"the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding" does not render the evidence insubstantial'"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SEGAL, J. STONE, J.