Opinion
January 29, 1988
Appeal from the Monroe County Court, Connell, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Green, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02), defendant contends that the trial court's admission of evidence of uncharged crimes constitutes reversible error. The trial court, over objection, admitted evidence that complainant's reason for seeking out defendant was to straighten out a debt for cocaine he received from defendant. Immediately after the introduction of this evidence and again during its charge, the court specifically advised the jury that the evidence was admitted solely to complete complainant's description of the entire incident and was not to be considered as direct evidence in this case.
Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible unless it helps establish some element of the crimes charged or is relevant because of some recognized exception to this rule (People v Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233; People v Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264). Testimony concerning this uncharged crime was admissible to complete the complainant's narrative of the episode (People v Gines, 36 N.Y.2d 932, 933; People v Brockington, 126 A.D.2d 655, 656; People v Watts, 118 A.D.2d 671, 672). It was also relevant in establishing defendant's motive for his possession of a weapon and a controlled substance. Further, the probative value of this evidence outweighs any prejudicial effect (see, People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359). Additionally, any prejudicial effect was minimized by the court's repeated limiting instructions (People v Ricchiuti, 93 A.D.2d 842, 845). Given these circumstances, the trial court properly admitted this evidence of an uncharged crime.
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit.