Opinion
Index No. 76222-2022
06-06-2023
The People of the State of New York, v. S.S., Defendant.
For the People: Assistant District Attorney Douglas Steinberg and Christopher Colt Rainwater, Kings County District Attorney's Office For the Defendant: Marshal Guiboa and Guy Raimondi, Brooklyn Defender Services.
Unpublished Opinion
For the People: Assistant District Attorney Douglas Steinberg and Christopher Colt Rainwater, Kings County District Attorney's Office
For the Defendant: Marshal Guiboa and Guy Raimondi, Brooklyn Defender Services.
Jane C. Tully, J.
The defendant is charged with aggravated cruelty to animals, and overdriving, torturing, and injuring animals. A combined Payton/Dunaway/Mapp/Huntley hearing was held before this Court on May 15, 2023. The People called Police Officer John Cioffi as their sole witness. The defense did not present any evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court heard oral arguments, and the parties submitted case law.
Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and the applicable law, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Officer John Cioffi has been with the NYPD for 5 ½ years and was previously assigned to the 88th precinct. On September 28, 2022, at approximately 9:30 am, Officer Cioffi and his partner Officer Vasquez received a radio run, based on a 911 call of animal cruelty, at the defendant's apartment. When the officers arrived at the building, a NYCHA worker informed Officer Cioffi that she observed an individual on the 6th floor with a dog, "yelling at it, screaming at it and possibly kicking it." The officers proceeded to the defendant's apartment on the 6th floor. Officer Cioffi testified that when he exited the elevator, it was clear to him that the floor had just been cleaned. Officer Cioffi did not hear any barking, howling, or whimpering when he approached the defendant's apartment door.
Officer Cioffi's body-worn camera footage was introduced into evidence as People's Exhibit 1. Officer Vasquez knocked on the apartment door. Officer Cioffi announced "police" and inquired whether the occupants had a dog. The occupants answered yes, and Officer Cioffi asked whether the occupants could come to the door. The defendant opened the door, and a female stood next to the defendant. Officer Vasquez explained that the officers received calls about a dog being beaten, and as a precaution, the officers wanted to see the dog to make sure that the dog was not harmed. The defendant denied that there had been any animal abuse, became irate, and asked the officers who made the call. Officer Cioffi testified that he observed an empty dog kennel and what appeared to be dog feces and urine on the apartment floor, but Officer Cioffi did not see or hear a dog. Officer Cioffi immediately became concerned about the safety of the dog, given the 911 call and the witness's observations about an individual kicking a dog. The female standing next to the defendant told the officers that the dog was fine and closed the apartment door. The officers remained in front of the apartment and listened to the noise coming from inside the apartment, but Officer Cioffi did not hear a dog. Officer Cioffi testified that he did not leave because he was investigating a call about animal cruelty, and he wanted to see the condition of the dog. After a minute or so, Officer Cioffi inquired: "Are you coming to the door or not" and "Are you bringing the dog to the door or not," and knocked on the apartment door. The female stated that they already spoke with the officers, and they were not opening the door. Officer Cioffi responded that he had a job to do, and if the occupants did not open the door, he was going to call "ESU" in "60 seconds" and call "ESU to take the door." Officer Vasquez informed the occupants that the officers just wanted to see that the dog was "okay." The defendant opened the door a second time and began arguing with the officers. Officer Vasquez explained once more that the officers wanted to make sure that the dog was "okay." The female came to the door and began arguing with the officers about her neighbors making false calls. Officer Vasquez informed the female that the officers wanted to make sure that the dog was fine and played the radio run of the report for the female. Officer Cioffi instructed the female to bring the dog to the door and stated that the officers "would be on our way" once they saw the dog. Officer Cioffi further explained that the officers would have left by now if they had seen the dog. Officer Cioffi told the female that she did not need to bring the dog to the door; she could just bring the dog to the hallway of the apartment. In response, the female stated that the report was false, and closed the apartment door.
The defendant opened the apartment door for a third time and told the officers that the dog was under the bed. Officer Cioffi asked the defendant for the dog's name and told the defendant to call out to the dog. The defendant called out to the dog, but the dog did not appear. The defendant insisted that the dog would not come to the door and told the officers that the dog only responds when fed. Officer Cioffi then told the defendant that the officers "were going to come in and check the dog" because it "looks way too suspicious," given that the call about a dog being beaten. Officer Cioffi also told the defendant that the officers just needed to see the dog. The defendant held the apartment door open, told the officers that the dog was under the bed, and led the officers to a bedroom. Officer Cioffi began calling out for the dog by name. The defendant kept insisting that the dog was laying down under the bed. The officers did not threaten the defendant. The officers' guns were not drawn, and they made no promises to the defendant. The officers continued to call out for a dog when the defendant stated that the dog was dead, that he wanted to be honest, and admitted in sum, and substance that he "popped the dog." Officer Cioffi and the defendant exited the apartment into the hallway, while Officer Vasquez remained in the apartment. Officer Cioffi asked the defendant what happened, and the defendant explained how the dog came to be deceased. The defendant walked back into the apartment and continued to explain his interactions with the dog. Officer Vasquez asked the defendant to step back into the hallway because the officers were trying to ascertain what happened. The defendant and the officers exited the apartment, and the defendant admitted to hitting and kicking the dog.
The body-worn camera footage, time-stamped: 9:25:42, depicts additional police officers arriving at the location, while the defendant was standing outside of the apartment. Multiple police officers surrounded the defendant. The defendant was placed in handcuffs and escorted away from the apartment. At some point, Officer Cioffi exited the apartment building, and approached the defendant, while the defendant was seated inside the police car. The police car door was open, and the defendant was surrounded by three police officers. Officer Cioffi asked the defendant to explain what happened and questioned the defendant about the dog. The defendant answered Officer Cioffi's questions and admitted that he hit the dog.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Entry into the Apartment
The People have the initial burden at a suppression hearing of providing evidence of the legality of police conduct (see People v Baldwin, 25 N.Y.2d 66, 71[1969]; People v Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 91 [1965]). Once the People have met this burden, it is the defendant that bears the burden of proving the illegality of police conduct (see People v Diaz, 146 A.D.3d 803 [2d Dept 2017]). Warrantless entries and searches of a home are presumptively unreasonable (see Payton v New York, 445 U.S. 573, 580 [1980]). Nevertheless, "the Fourth Amendment is not violated every time police enter a private premises without a warrant" (People v Gavin, 30 N.Y.3d 174, 180 [2017], quoting People v Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d 328, 331 [2002]). Under the emergency doctrine, warrantless entry into a home is justified when the police (1) have "reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property," (2) are "not... primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence," and (3) have a "reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched" (People v Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-178 [1976]). A warrantless entry is "'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action'" (Brigham City v Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 [2006], quoting Scott v United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 [1978]). The emergency doctrine applies to the protection of animals (see People v Grant, 189 A.D.3d 1458, 1460 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Hunter, 74 Misc.3d 131 [A] [App Term, 2d Dept, 11th &13th Jud Dists 2022]). Therefore, the police may enter a premises without a warrant to aid an animal in distress to render emergency assistance (see e.g. People v Rogers, 184 Misc.2d 419 [App Term, 2d Dept 2000]; People v Munoz, 65 Misc.3d 1208 [A] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2019]).
The People met their burden of demonstrating the legality of the officers' entry into the apartment. The evidence established that the officers had "reasonable ground to believe that there was an emergency at hand and that there was an immediate need for their assistance for the protection" of the dog (Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 177). The officers responded to the apartment based on a radio run of a 911 call reporting animal cruelty. The officers were informed by a witness that an individual on the 6th floor was hitting and kicking a dog. Officer Cioffi observed that the 6th floor had been cleaned. The fact that Officer Cioffi did not hear a dog barking, howling, or whimpering provides even more cause to believe that the dog was in danger. When the officers inquired about the whereabouts of the dog and told the defendant about the reports of a dog being beaten, the defendant became irate and argumentative. Officer Vasquez explained that the officers had received a call about animal cruelty, and as a precaution, the officers wanted to ensure that the dog was not harmed. Officer Cioffi did not see or hear a dog, despite observing an empty dog kennel, and feces on the floor, and Officer Cioffi became concerned about the safety of the dog. Although the officers explained multiple times that once they saw the dog they would leave, the defendant was uncooperative. Officer Vasquez even played the radio run of the report in an attempt to persuade the occupants to bring the dog to the door. The defendant and the female continued to argue with the officers and refused to bring the dog to the door. When the defendant opened the door a third time, he informed the officers that the dog was under the bed. Officer Cioffi asked the defendant to call out to the dog by name and the defendant complied, but a dog did not appear. There was no indication that a dog was present in the apartment, despite the defendant's claims that the dog was under the bed, and that the dog was not harmed. Officer Cioffi became even more suspicious, given the 911 call, the observation by the witness, and the lack of response from the dog. Therefore, viewed objectively, the officers had valid reasons to believe that the dog was injured or in distress, justifying the officers' entry into the apartment (see People v Rossi, 99 A.D.3d 947, 952 [2d Dept 2012]; People v Stanislaus-Blache, 93 A.D.3d 740, 742 [2d Dept 2012]).
The evidence further established that the officers' entry into the apartment was motivated by concerns for the safety of the dog, and not an intent to arrest and seize evidence. In fact, the officers' entry into the apartment was unintended. The officers proceeded with restraint and tried unsuccessfully to convince the defendant to bring the dog to the door. Although the police "'may not compel a suspect to open a door by threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment by, 'for example,... announcing that they would break down the door if the occupants did not open the door voluntarily'" (Garvin, 30 N.Y.3d at 182, quoting Kentucky v King, 563 U.S. 452, 471 [2011]), Officer Cioffi's statements that he was going to call "ESU to take down the door" were made after the emergency was already at hand, since at that point he had well-founded concerns about the safety of the dog. Despite the defendant's admission that there was a dog in the apartment, Officer Cioffi did not see a dog. Officer Cioffi listened to the noise coming from inside the apartment, but Officer Cioffi did not hear a dog. The purpose of Officer Cioffi's statements was not to force the defendant to consent to entry into the apartment. Officer Cioffi inquired whether the defendant was "bringing the dog to the door or not" before stating that he was going to call ESU. Moreover, the officers' made clear that calling ESU was an alternative to verifying that the dog was safe. The officers did not call ESU but instead continued their attempts to see the dog, without entering the apartment. Officer Vasquez even played the radio run, which described that a dog was being beaten, and stated that the officers only wanted to ensure that the dog was safe. Officer Cioffi explained that the officers would have left the location had they seen a dog and stated that the dog only needed to come out into the hallway of the apartment. However, the defendant continued to argue with the officers, and made excuses for why the dog could not come to the door, which prompted the officers to enter the apartment to ensure that the dog was not harmed. Moreover, the evidence clearly established that was a reasonable basis to believe that a dog was injured, and the officers had a "reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency" with the defendant's apartment (see People v Desmarat, 38 A.D.3d 913, 916 [2d Dept 2007]; People v Leggett, 75 A.D.3d 609 [2d Dept 2010]). Accordingly, the officers' entry into the defendant's apartment was lawful under the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement.
The defendant admitted to causing the dog's death. As such, there was probable cause for the defendant's arrest. The recovery of the deceased dog as evidence was proper. The police may seize evidence that is in plain view upon entry into an apartment under the emergency doctrine (see People v George, 7 A.D.3d 810, 811 [2d Dept 2005]; People v Dixon, 281 A.D.2d 430, 431 [2d Dept 2001]). Therefore, the motion to suppress evidence as fruits of any unlawful police conduct is DENIED.
Statements to the Police
The People carry the burden of going forward, in the first instance, to establish the legality of police conduct in obtaining a statement from a defendant (see People v Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 78 [1965]; People v Holland, 48 N.Y.2d 861, 862 [1979]). Under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966), a defendant who is in custody may not be interrogated by law enforcement without being advised of his constitutional rights. "Both the elements of police 'custody' and police 'interrogation' must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda" (People v Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29, 33 [1976]). On the other hand, a defendant's volunteered and spontaneous statements made to the police are admissible, in the absence of Miranda warnings (see People v Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-303 [1978]; People v Tavares-Nunez, 87 A.D.3d 1171, 1172 [2d Dept 2011]). The People have the burden of proving the voluntariness of any statements allegedly made beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Valeruis, 31 N.Y.2d 51, 55 [1972]).
The defendant's statements at the apartment door at the outset of the officers' investigation did not require Miranda warnings. The officers were responding to a report of animal cruelty and were trying to ascertain that the dog was not harmed (see People v Doll, 21 N.Y.3d 665, 671 [2013]). The defendant's statements in the apartment were spontaneous. The officers were calling out for the dog when the defendant admitted that the dog was dead. Moreover, the defendant was not in custody. No guns were drawn, and no threats or promises had been made to the defendant. The defendant was not in custody when he initially spoke with Officers Cioffi and Vasquez outside of the apartment. The questions were investigatory, as the officers were trying to ascertain what had occurred (see People v Santjer, 190 A.D.3d 983 [2d Dept 2021]; People v McKenzie, 183 A.D.2d 631, 632-633 [1st Dept 2001]). The defendant appeared eager to explain the circumstances under which the dog had died. The defendant was not retrained in any way and the defendant walked in and out of the apartment as he continued to explain his interactions with the dog. Therefore, the motion to suppress those statements is DENIED.
The body-worn camera footage time-stamped: 9:25:42, depicts additional police officers arriving at the location. The police officers surrounded the defendant as he stood outside the apartment. The defendant's freedom was restricted to the hallway, and the police activity conveyed the impression the police had decided to arrest the defendant. Therefore, the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, and any statements elicited from the defendant at that point forward required Miranda warnings (see People v Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 129 [2005]). The People concede that the defendant's statements made while the defendant was seated in the police car were the product of custodial interrogation. The defendant was in handcuffs and surrounded by multiple police officers. There was no longer any emergency. The officers observed and recovered the deceased dog, and the defendant had already narrated what had occurred before he was escorted to the police car. Any further questioning by Officer Cioffi should have been preceded by Miranda warnings (see People v Reyes, 77 A.D.3d 509, 510 [1st Dept 2010]). As such, the motion to suppress all statements made by the defendant after 9:25:42 is GRANTED.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.