Opinion
2011-03-25
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Alvis D. SPRAGUE, Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Richard A. Keenan, J.), rendered June 5, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of grand larceny in the third degree. Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Janet C. Somes Of Counsel), for defendant–appellant. Alvis D. Sprague, defendant–appellant pro se.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Richard A. Keenan, J.), rendered June 5, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of grand larceny in the third degree.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Janet C. Somes Of Counsel), for defendant–appellant. Alvis D. Sprague, defendant–appellant pro se.
Michael C. Green, District Attorney, Rochester (Stephen X. O'Brien of Counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law § 155.35[1] ), defendant contends in his pro se supplemental brief that County Court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence without affording him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. That contention is not preserved for our review because defendant did not object to the enhanced sentence, nor did he move to withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction ( see People v. Fortner, 23 A.D.3d 1058, 803 N.Y.S.2d 470;People v. Sundown, 305 A.D.2d 1075, 758 N.Y.S.2d 736). In any event, defendant's contention lacks merit. “When a defendant violates a condition of the plea agreement, the court is no longer bound by the agreement and is free to impose a greater sentence without offering [the] defendant an opportunity to withdraw his [or her] plea” ( People v. Santiago, 269 A.D.2d 770, 770, 705 N.Y.S.2d 141;see People v. Figgins, 87 N.Y.2d 840, 637 N.Y.S.2d 684, 661 N.E.2d 156;People v. Cato, 226 A.D.2d 1066, 642 N.Y.S.2d 105,lv. denied88 N.Y.2d 877, 645 N.Y.S.2d 451, 668 N.E.2d 422). The record establishes that defendant was clearly informed of the consequences of his failure to appear at sentencing and the date on which sentencing was scheduled, and he nevertheless failed to appear on that date. The remaining contentions of defendant in his pro se supplemental brief are without merit. Contrary to the contention of defendant in his main brief, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.