Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR566555
Reardon, J.
After charges that he failed to register as a sex offender were dismissed, appellant Carmel Alfred Spiteri petitioned the trial court for a finding of factual innocence. (Pen. Code, § 851.8.) The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, Spiteri contends that both the facts and the law compel the granting of his petition for a finding of factual innocence. We affirm the trial court’s denial order.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. FACTS
In 1998, appellant Carmel Alfred Spiteri was convicted in Ventura County of sodomy and oral copulation with a person under age 16 when he himself was over age 21. (See §§ 286, subd. (b)(2), 288a, subd. (b)(2).) This conviction required him to register as a sex offender and he has registered at various California locations. (See § 290, subd. (c).) In October 2002, he registered with the Sonoma County sheriff, listing his correct Guerneville address on the registration form. In November 2008, Spiteri registered with authorities in Riverside County.
We take judicial notice of the fact that Palm Springs is located in Riverside County. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (f), 459, subd. (a)(1).)
On April 1, 2009, authorities in Riverside County were notified that Spiteri would travel to the East Coast later that month for two visits. On April 27, he returned from the East Coast to San Francisco. Two days later, on April 29, Spiteri registered with the Sonoma County sheriff, giving notice that he had moved back to the county. The typed part of his registration form cited his correct Guerneville address, but the typed house number was crossed out and an incorrect house number on the same street was handwritten in its place. The copy of the registration receipt listed the correct address. After this registration, apparently, the database listed the incorrect house number in Guerneville as his registered address.
All subsequent dates refer to the 2009 calendar year unless otherwise indicated.
In fact, there was no such address, as that house number did not exist.
Later, the official who issued the receipt advised Sonoma County authorities that the receipt had been mailed to the incorrect address.
Sonoma County officials discovered the incorrect address during an exchange with Riverside County authorities, who had a warrant for Spiteri’s arrest for a Riverside County registration violation. The official who conducted his April registration in Sonoma County told county authorities that she gave Spiteri a pretyped form listing his correct address, which Spiteri himself changed to an incorrect house number.
In July, Spiteri was charged by felony complaint in Sonoma County with failure to register as a sex offender. (§ 290, subd. (b).) On August 7, he appeared in court and pled not guilty to this charge. Outside of the courtroom, Spiteri told the prosecutor that because of a medical condition or his medication, he might have crossed out the correct house number. On August 25, Spiteri filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus disputing the charge.
Spiteri told the trial court that he has a brain tumor. The California Supreme Court has not determined whether forgetfulness resulting from circumstances such as an acute psychological condition or a chronic memory or intelligence deficiency might negate the statutory requirement of willfulness. (See People v. Barker (2004)34 Cal.4th 345, 358.)
In a telephone conversation, Spiteri told Sonoma County officials that he had been living at the correct Guerneville address for several years. He explained that because he used a post office box for his mailing address, he was often confused about his correct street address. He told the sheriff that he had crossed out the correct number and substituted an incorrect one, believing that the incorrect number was actually correct. His registration receipt listed the correct number and he verified that the number listed on it was correct.
Based on these facts, the sheriff concluded that while Spiteri violated the registration requirement by furnishing an incorrect address, he had a plausible defense to the charge. Spiteri returned to the sheriff’s office to supply the correct house number to them. On the People’s motion, the charges against Spiteri were dismissed on August 31.
In September, Spiteri sought clarification of the dismissal order, asking for a dismissal with prejudice. On September 23, without objection, the trial court ordered that the case be dismissed with prejudice.
Spiteri also moved for a finding of factual innocence, seeking sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct. (§ 851.8.) The People opposed the motion, arguing that reasonable cause existed to believe that Spiteri committed the charged offense, but had properly dismissed the case at his request. At a hearing on the motion in October, the prosecution argued that Spiteri had crossed out the correct address and included an incorrect one in its place. After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for a finding of factual innocence. In so doing, it specifically found that Spiteri had listed an incorrect address on his registration form, giving the prosecution reasonable grounds to file the failure to register charge.
II. CERTIFICATE OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE
If one is arrested and charged with a crime, but the case is later dismissed, the arrestee may petition for a finding that he or she is factually innocent of the charges. (§ 851.8, subd. (c).) A trial court may grant a certificate of factual innocence only if it finds that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the petitioner committed the charged offense. (§ 851.8, subd. (b); People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 (Adair).) This provision was enacted for the benefit of those who have not committed any crime. (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4that p. 905.) Consistent with that purpose, the record must exonerate the petitioner, not merely raise a substantial question about guilt. (Id. at p. 909; People v. Laiwala (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1069 (Laiwala).) It is not sufficient to establish a viable substantive defense to the charge. The petitioner must show that there was no reasonable cause to arrest him or her in the first place. (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905.) If any reasonable cause exists to believe that the petitioner committed the charged offense, the petition must be denied. (See id. at p. 909; Laiwala, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069.) If the trial court grants the petition, the arrest records must be sealed or destroyed. (§ 851.8, subd. (b).)
Reasonable cause is defined as the state of facts that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe and to conscientiously entertain an honest, strong suspicion that the petitioner was guilty of a crime. Trial and appellate courts apply an objective standard to make this determination. (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 897, 904-906; Laiwala, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069.)
At a hearing on the petition, the petitioner has the initial burden of proof to show that no reasonable cause exists to believe that he or she committed the offense for which the arrest was made. (§ 851.8, subd. (b); Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 902-903; Laiwala, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068.) If the petitioner establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state to show that a reasonable cause did exist. (§ 851.8, subd. (b); Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 903.) On appeal from a trial court’s legal determination that a petitioner did not establish a lack of reasonable cause to believe that he or she committed the charged offense, we conduct an independent, de novo review of the record on appeal. (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 897, 905; Laiwala, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069.)
III. FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER
A violation of section 290 requires actual knowledge of the duty to register, which a jury may supply by reasonable inference. (People v. Barker, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 351; People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752.) While willfulness is an element of failure to register, merely forgetting to register does not negate a finding of willfulness. (People v. Barker, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 348, 356-358; People v. Chan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 408, 417; People v. Cox (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377.) This rule extends to those who register but fail to recall a correct address. Even a digit error resulting in a partially incorrect address will satisfy the requirements of section 290. (People v. Chan, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.)
IV. DISCUSSION
Spiteri argues that he was entitled to a certificate of factual innocence. He argues that the facts allow only two explanations, both of which are consistent with his innocence. He asserts that either his registration form was changed by a third party or that, after he crossed out the correct number, he provided the correct number that was not changed back on the form. Regardless of whether these explanations are supported by the record, they would not be the only reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. That evidence could also support findings that Spiteri was confused about his precise address, and that he altered the form.
From this evidence, it would be reasonable to infer that Spiteri crossed off the correct address and substituted an incorrect one in order to evade the registration requirement. Listing an incorrect address on the registration form constitutes giving a false address for purposes of failing to register. (See, e.g., People v. Chan, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 417 [address did not exist].) As there is a reasonable interpretation of the evidence supporting a finding of reasonable cause to believe that Spiteri failed to register, he did not meet his burden of proof of a lack of reasonable cause necessary to obtain a finding of factual innocence. (See § 851.8, subd. (b).)
As we rely on other evidence to reach this conclusion, we need not determine Spiteri’s contention that we must not rely on a declaration in support of an arrest warrant.
The order is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J.Rivera, J.