Opinion
Docket No. 23020046
08-12-2024
The People of the State of New York v. Robert M. Spaulding, Defendant.
Anthony Parisi, Esq., Dutchess County District Attorney (by Joseph Petito, Senior Asst. Dist. Atty.) for the People James Caffrey, Esq., attorney for Defendant
Anthony Parisi, Esq., Dutchess County District Attorney (by Joseph Petito, Senior Asst. Dist. Atty.) for the People
James Caffrey, Esq., attorney for Defendant
DARREN H. FAIRLIE, J.
Background
On February 3, 2023, the Defendant was arrested for driving with ability impaired by drugs (VTL § 1192[4]) and additionally charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the 7th degree (PL § 220.03) following a traffic stop for a violation of VTL § 1128(a) (moving from a lane).
On May 23, 2024, the Court held a probable cause hearing concerning the propriety of the traffic stop and the Defendant's subsequent arrest. The only evidence offered at the hearing was the testimony of Trooper Ewald, who made the traffic stop and the arrest, and his bodycam footage of the same. Trooper Ewald testified in a credible fashion. The Defendant did not testify. No other documents or records were offered by the defense or prosecution or otherwise entered into evidence by the court.
Trooper Ewald testified that, while driving toward the Defendant in the opposite lane of traffic, he observed the Defendant cross the fog line once and then aggressively readjust his steering, then crossing over the center double yellow line. As a result, Trooper Ewald turned around and pursued the Defendant. Upon stopping the Defendant, Trooper Ewald informed the Defendant that he had stopped him because the Defendant was "all over the road." (See Bodycam, 00:01:20). Trooper Ewald saw an open alcohol container in the Defendant's vehicle while speaking to the Defendant and informed him of the same. The Defendant stated that he drank "one beer" about three hours ago. (See Bodycam, 00:05:54-00:06:03). At that point, Trooper Ewald had the Defendant exit his vehicle, after which Trooper Ewald administered a series of roadside sobriety tests, which, according to Trooper Ewald, the Defendant failed. Following the roadside sobriety tests, Trooper Ewald noticed a substance hanging out of the Defendant's nose. The Defendant then stated that he had snorted some crushed Adderall pills approximately an hour and a half before driving. (See Bodycam 00:17:02-00:17:34). The Defendant also stated that he was prescribed Xanax, but further stated that he did not use it. The Defendant later produced a prescription bottle of Xanax from the passenger compartment of his vehicle. As it turned out, it appeared that the prescription bottle was not written in the Defendant's name. Ultimately, Trooper Ewald placed the Defendant under arrest for driving while ability impaired, expressly referring to the Defendant's admitted snorting of Adderall and driving thereafter, in violation of VTL § 1192(4). (See Bodycam, 00:34:50).
On cross examination, the defense questioned Trooper Ewald as to whether the defendant had crossed the center, yellow line in addition to the fog line, arguing that the initial arrest report did not mention crossing the yellow line. The arrest report was not offered or entered into evidence.
Analysis
A traffic stop or vehicle stop is a seizure implicating constitutional limitations under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. People v. Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d 427, 430 (2020). In order to effectuate a valid traffic stop that does not violate the driver's constitutional rights, a police officer must have probable cause to believe that the driver of the vehicle has committed a traffic violation. People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349 (2001).
A finding of probable cause does not require a demonstration of proof sufficient to sustain a conviction or even to establish a prima facie case; instead, the circumstances need only demonstrate that it is "more probable than not" that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is the perpetrator. People v. Hill, 146 A.D.2d 823, 824 (3d Dept. 1989); see also People v. Attebery, 223 A.D.2d 714,715 (2d Dept. 1996).
Where a defendant challenges the legality of a stop/seizure in a Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearing for the purposes of suppressing the statements or other evidence obtained as a result of the stop, the People have the burden of going forward, in the first instance, to establish the legality of the police conduct, i.e., the probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle. People v. Abrucci-Kohan, 52 Misc.3d 919, 921 (Just. Ct. 2016). Once the People have met that burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish the illegality of the police conduct by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Abrucci-Kohan, 52 Misc.3d at 921.
"Considerable confusion has developed among courts as to whether a brief contact with the solid white 'fog' line on a roadway violates [Vehicle and Traffic Law] section 1128 and therefore justifies a stop." NY Veh. & Traf. Law § 1128 (McKinney, Practice Commentary, 2019). This confusion has likely developed because the statute contains several unequivocal "shall" and "shall not" commandments pertaining to driving within a lane or obeying lane markings. See generally VTL § 1128. At the same time, however, several cases state that, "The crossing of a solid white line [i.e., the fog line] is discouraged, but not prohibited." See, e.g., People v. Shulman, 14 Misc.3d 129 (A) (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dist., 2006).
Consequently, probable cause cases involving the touching or crossing of the fog line have varied in their holdings, both within and between judicial departments. See, e.g., People v. Kern, 38 Misc.3d 1217(A) (Just. Ct. 2013) (collecting cases); People v. Chesley, 27 Misc.3d 1227 (A) (Just. Ct. 2010) (collecting cases); see also People v. Wohlers, 138 A.D.2d 957 (4d Dept. 1988); People v. Eron, 119 A.D.3d 1358 (4d Dept. 2014); People v. Davis, 58 A.D.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2009). In such cases, courts have often focused their attention on (1) the frequency of which the fog line was touched or crossed, (2) the degree to which the fog line was crossed (e.g., how much of the vehicle crossed the line), (3) the duration or distance that the defendant was observed touching or crossing the fog line and/or (4) whether or not the center, yellow line was additionally touched or crossed. Courts then add-up the above-described "line violations" and decide whether or not the grand total or combination of "line violations" is sufficient to create probable cause; however, focusing on the lines, alone, can obscure the much larger and more relevant picture of probable cause.
When the probable cause to initiate a traffic stop is based upon a perceived violation of VTL § 1128(a) relating to crossing the "fog line" or other lines, the court's focus should be on the safety of the movement from the lane, not merely the movement from the lane itself. Significantly, VTL § 1128(a) states that, "A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." See VTL § 1128(a) (emphasis added).Notwithstanding the case law's tendency to focus on counting "line violations," there are some cases that more closely examine the safety of lane movements when a violation of VTL § 1128(a) is alleged. For example, in People v. Kern, the Justice Court found insufficient probable cause to justify a traffic stop in the absence of facts suggesting that the defendant moved unsafely from her lane of travel when crossing the fog line. See People v. Kern, 38 Misc.3d 1217(A) (Just. Ct. 2013) (examining whether the defendant's driving was hazardous to herself or others on the road and, for example, questioning whether there were objects, pedestrians or other vehicles that the defendant was in danger of hitting when crossing the fog line). By comparison, in Schoonmaker v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, the Second Department found that a police officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred when he observed the defendant's vehicle "making an 'erratic movement' by crossing over the white fog line off the right shoulder, and then moving left back into the lane in which he had been driving while the right signal light was engaged." Schoonmaker v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles 165 A.D.3d 677, 678 (2d Dept. 2018 ), aff'd, 33 N.Y.3d 926 (2019) The dissent in Schoonmaker was noteworthy, in that the dissenters more closely questioned whether the facts sufficiently demonstrated "unsafe" actions by the driver, beyond merely crossing the fog line, to support a finding of probable cause for violation of VTL § 1128(a). See Schoonmaker v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 165 A.D.3d 677, 678 (2d Dept. 2018 ), aff'd, 33 N.Y.3d 926 (2019). In both Kern and Schoonmaker, the courts focused on the safety of the lane movement. Ultimately, it is the safety of the lane movement, not the lane movement, itself, upon which the probable cause analysis for a VTL § 1128(a) violation turns.
Here, Trooper Ewald testified that the Defendant crossed the fog line and then aggressively readjusted his steering, crossing over the center, double yellow line. The defense disputed whether the yellow line was additionally crossed. Even assuming that the yellow line was not crossed, Trooper Ewald's uncontroverted observation that, while driving towards each other, the Defendant crossed the fog line and then aggressively readjusted his steering toward the middle of the road, buttressed by his roadside explanation of the traffic stop to the Defendant ("You were all over the road" [ see Bodycam, 00:01:20]), sufficiently called into question the safety or lack of safety of the Defendant's erratic lane movement and, thus, constituted probable cause to initiate the subject traffic stop for violation of VTL § 1128(a). See Schoonmaker, supra.
Further, Trooper Ewald's observation of Adderall residue on the Defendant's nose, which the Defendant admitted to snorting prior to driving, constituted probable cause to arrest the Defendant for violation of VTL § 1192(4). See, e.g., People v. Boler, 106 A.D.3d 1119 (3d Dept. 2013) (finding that white powder under the defendant's nostrils in combination with drug paraphernalia constituted probable cause); see also People v. Parris, 26 A.D.3d 393 (2d Dept. 2006) (finding probable cause where a state trooper saw what appeared to be marijuana on the floor of the vehicle and the defendant admitted that he had smoked marijuana earlier).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to suppress Defendant's statements and/or evidence obtained from the subject traffic stop on February 3, 2023, is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.