Opinion
G062709
02-28-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES PAUL SNIDER, Defendant and Appellant.
Laura P. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 05HF0548 Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura P. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
O'LEARY, P. J.
James Paul Snider, who was convicted of murder in 2006, appeals from the trial court's summary denial of his resentencing petition based on Penal Code section 1170.91 and his prior military service. His appointed counsel filed a brief citing People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, advising she found no arguable appellate issue to assert (People v. Johnson (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109 [requirements of merit and materiality]), and requesting this court to independently review the record. Counsel identified two issues she considered, to assist this court: (1) "Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Snider's petition to recall his sentence and vacate his conviction under . . . section 1170.91 due to the diagnosed [posttraumatic stress disorder] he suffered as a result of being sexually assaulted while a member of the United States [m]ilitary?"; and (2) "Whether the trial court erred in failing to reduce Mr. Snider's second degree murder conviction to the lesser included offense of manslaughter?"
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Following his counsel's brief, Snider filed a supplemental brief asserting other issues for consideration. We address his claims anon and discern no arguable issue in this appeal, for the reasons discussed below. We have independently reviewed the record (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231-232) and affirm the order denying the postconviction petition for resentencing relief.
FACTS
The context for the limited nature of this appeal is taken from two prior nonpublished opinions, People v. Snider (Feb. 29, 2008, G037131) (Snider I) and People v. Snider (Nov. 24, 2020, G058947) (Snider II). As relevant to this appeal, "In December 1983, the victim was found dead in his hotel room due to blunt force trauma.... In June 2004, after DNA recovered from the scene was found to match Snider's DNA, California detectives interviewed Snider in Michigan. Snider admitted killing the victim. Snider claimed he hit the victim over the head with [a] toilet tank lid because the victim had sexually molested him. [¶] An information charged Snider with murder[, and a] jury convicted [him] of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Snider to an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life." (Snider II, supra, G058947.) We affirmed the judgment in 2008. (Snider I, supra, G058947 .)
In 2023, Snider filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.91. The trial court summarily denied the petition, stating that Snider "stands convicted of second degree murder and is therefore statutorily ineligible for relief. ([Id., subd.] (c).)" Snider timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A former or current military service member who has been convicted of a felony may petition for resentencing alleging they suffer from a mental health condition related to their service that "was not considered as a factor in mitigation at the time of sentencing." (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(1).) Certain categories of convictions, however, disqualify the defendant from resentencing. Relevant here, section 1170.91 explicitly "does not apply to a person convicted of" certain enumerated offenses (id., subd. (c)) including "[a]ny homicide offense" (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV)). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded Snider is ineligible for section 1170.91 resentencing.
None of Snider's supplemental briefing points bear on the issue of this appeal, which is whether the trial court erred by finding him ineligible for section 1170.91 resentencing. His arguments in large part concern errors that purportedly occurred during his 2006 trial, attempting to litigate issues that, even if meritorious, existed at the time this court decided his direct appeal in 2008. "[W]here a criminal defendant could have raised an issue in a prior appeal, the appellate court need not entertain the issue in a subsequent appeal absent a showing of justification for the delay." (People v. Senior (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.) Snider also argues the trial court's adjudication of his petition did not comply with section 1170.91, overlooking the fact he is explicitly disqualified from the statute's coverage, as the trial court ruled. (§§ 1170.91, subd. (c), 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV); Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
For example, Snider asserts: "At no time during the two years that I was awaiting trial, nor during my trial, nor afterwards, did [trial counsel] attempt to address my mental health, my drug or alcohol use, or any mitigating factors that might have helped me at my trial or sentencing other than what was presented in the police/pre-sentenc[ing] report. [Counsel] never inquired into my military service, nor into my mental health issue(s) with [posttraumatic stress disorder], even though I informed him that [the victim] was one of the men I fought with in my sleep."
For example, Snider asserts: "The trial court err[ed] when [it] summarily dismiss[ed] my petition to recall my sentence and vacate my conviction . . . without first assigning me an attorney and holding a public hearing as required by [section] 1170.91."
In sum, given that the specific legislative relief at issue does not apply to Snider's conviction, we discern no arguable issue presented by this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOTOIKE, J. DELANEY, J.