Opinion
November 21, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Chetta, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was charged with burglary after he entered the bedroom of a cotenant and removed some of her belongings. The defendant contends that the judgment of conviction must be reversed because all of the elements of burglary in the second degree were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. He asserts that the bedroom of the cotenant was not a "building", as required by Penal Law § 140.25, and further claims that since he was privileged to be in the main area of the house he could not have "entered unlawfully". We find no merit to the defendant's contentions. The tenant's room was independent of the rest of the house, and should be considered a separate "dwelling" within a "building", as well as part of the main building (People v Pringle, 96 A.D.2d 873). The fact that the defendant was properly in the common areas of the house did not give him a license to enter the locked room of another tenant (People v. Bell, 131 A.D.2d 859, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 749; People v. Borazzo, 137 A.D.2d 96, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 916; People v. Bull, 136 A.D.2d 929, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 966).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit (see, People v. Christmas, 110 A.D.2d 707; People v. Velasquez, 107 A.D.2d 726; People v. Thompson, 105 A.D.2d 762). Mollen, P.J., Mangano, Brown and Eiber, JJ., concur.