Opinion
G058921
08-04-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGELA MAY SHAVER, Defendant and Appellant.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SWF015780) OPINION Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed. William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In 2012, after a jury found appellant Angela May Shaver guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to the Penal Code), the trial court sentenced her to 26 years to life in state prison. In an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the murder conviction. (People v. Shaver (May 8, 2015, G049824) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, Shaver filed a petition to vacate her murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, alleging she was convicted "pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine." At the hearing on the section 1170.95 petition, the district attorney argued Shaver was not eligible for resentencing relief because the jury was not instructed on felony murder or natural and probable consequences. The trial court summarily denied the petition.
Shaver appealed, and her appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. Shaver did not file a supplemental brief. Because our review of the record discloses no arguable issues, we affirm the postjudgment order denying Shaver's section 1170.95 petition.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying facts were recounted in our opinion affirming Shaver's conviction for first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation or lying in wait. (People v. Shaver (May 28, 2015, G049824) [nonpub. opn.].)
A jury convicted Shaver of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and it found true a penalty enhancement for personal use of a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). (People v. Shaver (May 28, 2015, G049824).) The trial court sentenced Shaver to 25 years to life on the murder conviction, plus one year for the weapon enhancement.
After Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective, Shaver filed a petition to vacate her conviction under section 1170.95. After appointing counsel for Shaver and hearing argument, the trial court summarily denied Shaver's petition. After Shaver appealed, her appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issue, but asking this court to independently review the record on appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Sen. Bill 1437), which became effective January 1, 2019, was enacted to "'amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez), quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It added section 1170.95, which allows those "convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . ." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
"An offender may file a petition under section 1170.95 where all three of the following conditions are met: '(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder[;] [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.' (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)" (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.)
Shaver is not entitled to relief under Sen Bill 1437 because she was not convicted of felony murder or murder a natural and probable consequences theory. (See People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 333 & fn. 11 [trial court properly denied defendant's section 1170.95 petition where there is no possibility the jury found defendant guilty of murder under a natural and probable consequences theory].) The trial court properly denied Shaver's section 1170.95 petition.
Our review of the entire record, including the matters identified by counsel, does not show the existence of an arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 442-443.) Consequently, we affirm. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)
III
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
ARONSON, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. THOMPSON, J.