Opinion
14367 Ind. No. 2013/15 Case No. 2019-1028
10-14-2021
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jaleel SHAKOOR, Defendant–Appellant.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Alexandra L. Mitter of counsel), and Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, New York (Michaela E. Pickus of counsel), for appellant. Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Nicole Neckles of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Alexandra L. Mitter of counsel), and Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, New York (Michaela E. Pickus of counsel), for appellant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Nicole Neckles of counsel), for respondent.
Gische, J.P., Moulton, Gonza´lez, Kennedy, Scarpulla, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Martin Marcus, J.), rendered May 8, 2017, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and resisting arrest, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of five years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion in all respects. When police officers who were investigating a recent, nearby shooting saw defendant adjusting a large object that bulged from his waistband, suggesting the presence of a handgun rather than an innocuous object (see People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 271, 434 N.Y.S.2d 144, 414 N.E.2d 645 [1980] ), they had, at least, at least a common-law right to inquire. The record supports the conclusion that defendant fled upon being told to stop, rather than in response to a prior order by the police that defendant and his companions "disperse," which defendant ignored. Even if the police did not already have reasonable suspicion justifying pursuit, defendant's flight elevated the interaction to one of reasonable suspicion, justifying police pursuit, which led to the recovery of a handgun that defendant discarded (see People v. Sierra, 83 N.Y.2d 928, 929, 615 N.Y.S.2d 310, 638 N.E.2d 955 [1994] ).
The court also correctly determined that the People met their burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's statements to the police, made after receiving and waiving Miranda warnings, were voluntary under the totality of circumstances (see generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–288, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 [1991] ; People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 38–39, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318 [1977] ). There is no evidence that defendant was so sleep-deprived and ill that he could not make a voluntary statement (see e. g. People v. Ashline, 124 A.D.3d 1258, 1259, 3 N.Y.S.3d 469 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied, 27 N.Y.3d 1128, 39 N.Y.S.3d 109, 61 N.E.3d 508 [2016] ). None of the police interrogation tactics were fundamentally unfair (see People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188 [1980] ). In particular, the police did not expressly promise defendant leniency in exchange for his cooperation (see People v. Rodriguez, 270 A.D.2d 956, 957, 706 N.Y.S.2d 293 [4th Dept. 2000], lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 870, 715 N.Y.S.2d 225, 738 N.E.2d 373 [2000] ; People v. Martinez, 133 A.D.2d 572, 574, 520 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept. 1987], lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 957, 525 N.Y.S.2d 841, 520 N.E.2d 559 [1988] ). In any event, any error in admitting the statement was harmless under the circumstances of the case and defendant's trial strategy (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975] ). We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence, including the five-year period of postrelease supervision.