Opinion
G061767
01-19-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHNNY SEGARRA, Defendant and Appellant.
Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 21NF1650 Lance P. Jensen, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, J.
Johnny Segarra appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of receiving a stolen vehicle. Segarra argues the trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted unrelated crimes evidence regarding stolen mail. Segarra also contends that, if he forfeited his appellate challenges to the stolen mail evidence, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
We affirm. We hold Segarra forfeited his right to object to the other crimes evidence and Segarra has not established ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if we were to consider Segarra's arguments on their merits, we would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence or, if it did so, any error was harmless.
FACTS
The relevant facts are undisputed. On August 24, 2020, an HVAC technician responded to a service call regarding a malfunctioning air conditioner at a bank. At approximately 2:30 p.m., he drove his work van, which displayed his employer's name on both sides, to the bank and parked it in a nearby alley. Once at the bank, the technician left his work photo identification (ID) badge in the van's cab and his employer-branded duffel bag in the back of the van. The technician kept a spare van key inside the van.
At approximately 4:00 p.m., the technician returned to his van, but it was missing. He called his manager and asked him to locate the van with the van's GPS system. He also called 9-1-1 to report his van stolen. The GPS system located the van at a parking structure by an apartment complex. At 5:15 p.m., a police officer took the technician to the van. No one was in or around the van. The police instructed the technician to wait inside the van as the police removed it from the stolen vehicle system.
While the technician waited inside the van, Segarra approached and opened the rear passenger door. Segarra was wearing the technician's ID badge and carrying the technician's duffel bag. The technician asked Segarra what he was doing. Segarra replied he thought the van was his.
The police later determined Segarra's vehicle had no resemblance to the van and was parked near the bank. The bank was approximately three miles away from the apartment complex.
After his conversation with the technician, Segarra walked away. The technician followed Segarra and called 9-1-1 to report the incident. As he walked away, Segarra placed the ID badge and duffel bag near a bush.
The police then arrived and arrested Segarra near the parking structure. The police found and searched the duffle bag. It contained, among other items, mail addressed to residents living in the apartment complex where the police apprehended Segarra. The police did not find any van keys in the duffle bag or elsewhere.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The prosecution filed an information, alleging Segarra committed one felony count of unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and one felony count of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). The prosecution also alleged Segarra had suffered a prior serious felony conviction, which qualified as a "strike" under the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1) & 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1).)
I.
PRETRIAL HEARING
Before trial, Segarra filed motions in limine, with only one, a general motion to exclude all of Segarra's "prior convictions, arrests or conduct," being relevant to this appeal. During the hearing on this motion, the trial court indicated it had already ruled on the admissibility of Segarra's prior felony conviction for impeachment. As to any "prior . . . arrests or conduct," the trial court commented that, because the prosecution had made no indication of using evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), the motion in respect to other arrests or conduct was "kind of moot at this point." The trial court also advised the prosecution to let the court and Segarra know if this intention changed.
Prior to considering the defense's in limine motions, the trial court ruled on the prosecution's motions, which included the admissibility of Segarra's prior felony conviction for purposes of impeachment if Segarra testified.
II.
TRIAL
A. The Prosecution's Opening Statement
At trial, during its opening statement, the prosecution introduced the facts of the case as "three connected thefts: [Segarra] stole [the technician's] van; he stole his [ID]; and then he stole their mail." The prosecution later elaborated, "[I]n addition to what was normally in the duffel bag, . . . the police find that it is full of stolen mail from the apartment complex where the defendant had driven the van. So he took [the van] from [the bank], drove it down to this apartment complex, took the [ID] badge and work bag and went around stealing mail while dressed as an air condition repairman in case anyone asked him. He used the van, [ID] badge, and bag to steal mail." The prosecution continued, "So starting to see the big picture, the defendant drives, parks near the van, steals the van, drives it to the apartment complex so he can steal mail without his own car being spotted there, without him being at risk of getting caught because he is dressed like an air conditioner repairman and not have his car there."
The prosecution then gave a preview of its witnesses, including the anticipated testimony of Officer Brayden Blyleven: "[T]hen you will hear from . . . Blyleven. He went through the duffel bag and found the stolen mail, which is helpful to help you understand why the defendant stole the van." At this point, Segarra objected to this statement as argumentative, which the trial court overruled.
The prosecution continued, "[T]his theft only really makes sense when you see it as part of the big picture. He stole [the technician's] van. He stole his [ID] badge and bag so he could steal mail and have cover. [¶] Now, you heard a lot of possible crimes. We are only charging him with the vehicle theft, so I do want to be clear."
Segarra's trial counsel objected to these statements as argumentative and requested a sidebar. At sidebar, his counsel indicated the prosecution was "getting close to arguing the facts of the case and also the law." Segarra's counsel then objected to the prosecution's "repeated stuff about stolen mail," arguing: "While we did litigate in [the Evidence Code section 402 hearing (402 hearing)] the video without sound of the duffel bag, there was never a motion to introduce foundation or information in regards to stolen mail. There [are] just other documents, essentially, in the bag that they remove, and then I assume that the alleged victim would say those items were not his." Segarra's counsel continued, "[W]e are getting into other crime[s] evidence that's not being charged in this case, and that should have been litigated in" the 402 hearing.
During the 402 hearing, Segarra raised no objection to the "audioless clip from the body-worn camera footage" the prosecution indicated it wanted to play during trial.
The prosecution's trial brief did identify the following items as being found in the technician's work bag: "work tools, as well as mail that had been stolen from the apartment complex where [Segarra] had just been arrested."
The trial court overruled the objection. But the trial court admonished the jury that attorneys' opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence. The prosecution then stated, "[T]he mail theft goes to motive. So if there is an objection to relevance later, my answer is going to be the mail theft is motive for the crime."
The record is not clear and we are troubled as to why the prosecutor did not bring the stolen mail evidence to the attention of the court or Segarra earlier, despite the prosecutor identifying the stolen mail in the statement of anticipated facts within his trial brief and the trial court advising the prosecutor to address any possible other crimes evidence during the 402 motions.
In response, the trial court told Segarra's counsel, "[I]f you feel as a result of that being evidence that he wishes to introduce for purposes of motive and if you want to challenge that or further discuss that or have a particular jury instruction on top of or in addition to, I think it is CALCRIM 370 that deals with motive, the court is more than happy to hear from you at that time." The trial court then reiterated its prior admonishment to the jury that "nothing the attorneys say is evidence," including any remarks made by the attorneys during opening statements.
The prosecution then continued, "[D]uring this trial, you are going to hear evidence about other possible criminal behavior like mail theft, and that's important to understanding motive in this case, but to be clear, the crime charged is vehicle theft. So when you are listening to the evidence in this case, listen for evidence of vehicle theft. The mail theft situation is there to help you understand [Segarra's] motivation and because it is corroborating evidence. So I just want you to listen during the trial to evidence focusing on vehicle theft."
B. Prosecution Witnesses
The prosecution called three witnesses: the technician, Officer Kalid Abuhadwan, and Blyleven. The technician recounted his version of events, which is recited ante. He testified he did not give anyone permission to take his van while he was responding to a service call at the bank. The technician left his spare key inside the van after parking and, when he and the police recovered the van, the police informed him the spare key was missing. The technician could not recall whether he also left his regular key inside the van after parking or whether he took the key with him inside the bank. The technician identified Segarra in court as the person who wore his duffel bag and ID badge and who opened the van door while the technician waited in the van. He typically kept safety equipment in his bag, never mail or shoes.
Abuhadwan testified he encountered the technician and Segarra when he arrived at the apartment complex, verified who they were, and separated them. Abuhadwan questioned Segarra, asking why Segarra was in Anaheim and how he arrived there. Segarra replied he was looking for a friend, drove his vehicle to the area, and parked across from a library at a restaurant; the restaurant was approximately 0.02 to 0.03 miles from where the van was taken. The police located Segarra's car, but not where he said he parked it; rather, the police found his car even closer to the location of the van theft.
Blyleven testified he found and searched the duffel bag, and his body-worn camera (BWC) footage of the search was played for the jury. After the video played, Blyleven stated he found "a lot of mail" in the duffel bag, addressed to approximately 15 different apartments in the same complex where the police found Segarra. He did not find any van keys in the duffel bag. At no point did Segarra object to the BWC footage or Blyleven's testimony.
C. Defense Witness
The defense called one witness, an investigator with the Orange County Public Defender's Office. Days before trial and a couple of years after the relevant events, the investigator took photographs of the crime scene. He testified the bank had several surveillance cameras facing the alley where the technician parked his van and there was a surveillance camera at the apartment complex's parking structure where the van was recovered. After viewing screenshots from the BWC footage, he testified the surveillance cameras at the bank and parking structure were in place at the time of the relevant events. He did not obtain or view any of the surveillance cameras' footage.
D. Admission of Exhibits
After the prosecution and defense rested, the trial court heard arguments regarding each party's exhibits. When the prosecution moved to admit Blyleven's BWC footage, Segarra objected to it as other crimes evidence. Segarra explained, "I believe I have to make [the objection] contemporaneously, but I believe I objected to it in the 402" hearing and a sidebar. It is unclear on this record whether the trial court overruled the objection. But it ultimately admitted the exhibit into evidence, implicitly overruling the objection.
E. The Prosecution's Closing Argument and Rebuttal
In its closing argument, the prosecution began by summarizing the case: "[T]his is a case about three thefts. He steals the van. He steals the [ID] badge and bag so he can steal mail and now you understand what I meant when I said that earlier. So here are the two legal charges. They are very, very similar. One is called a taking of a vehicle, so taking the van. The other is receiving or withholding a stolen vehicle from its owner."
The prosecution proceeded to discuss counts 1 and 2. While explaining the second element of the unlawful taking of a vehicle offense, the prosecution stated, "[W]e just have to show that he intended to use the van for any period of time at all. So he took the van to go conduct his mail theft scheme, that's what the evidence shows." Segarra objected to this statement as facts not in evidence, and the court sustained the objection.
After discussing counts 1 and 2, the prosecution noted, "Now there may be other questions that you have about the case, other things we want to know, like what is going on with the mail thing? . . . It doesn't matter. That would be speculation. What matters are those elements we just went through."
Then, while addressing the jury instruction on motive, the prosecution argued: "What about motive? . . . Firstly, we don't have to prove motive. That's not an element. Once again, there is an instruction that says we don't have to prove motive, but we did, because his motive is so he could have an [ID] badge and a work bag and a work van to go to an apartment to take mail so nobody would recognize him or they would think he was just a repairman." Segarra objected to this statement as speculation and as facts not in evidence. The court overruled the objection and admonished the jury, "Again, ladies and gentlemen, [Segarra] is charged with the two counts that [have] been read to you and . . . argued to you and that will be given to you as part of the law. [Segarra] is not charged with any other crimes other than that and, therefore, you should not consider such."
The prosecution then continued, "Again, the mail theft thing is not a crime for you to consider. It is just going to his motive to take the van and take the bag and take the badge. We know that's his motive because when the police find the bag, it is full of stolen mail from that same apartment complex where the defendant was. We know [the technician] couldn't have been the one stealing the mail because he rode with the police to the van. So we know [the technician] hadn't been to that apartment complex yet because he was going there with the cops. The only person at the apartment complex was the defendant. So his motive of having cover so he could take mail fits with why he took the badge, the bag, and the van. So, again, regardless of what his motive is, he's still guilty because the elements are he drove the van without permission and it was worth more than $950. So regardless of this motive thing, this is just to help you understand the case."
The prosecution concluded, "[W]e proved he stole the van, [we] proved he stole the [ID] and it is a very clear inference he was doing it to steal mail."
In its rebuttal to Segarra's closing argument, the prosecution continued to emphasize the mail, stating, "We know where he drove down to[:] the apartment complex. We know where he went to while he was there. He was gathering the mail that the police found in his bag. And we know where he went to deposit the mail once he filled up the duffel bag. He was head[ing] back to the van."
The prosecution later asserted, "The only conclusion in this case that you can draw from the evidence is he stole the van, stole the [ID and] bag and went around stealing mail ...." Segarra objected to this statement as facts not in evidence, and the court sustained the objection as to stealing the mail. The prosecution rephrased his statement, "The evidence is clear that he stole the van, the [ID and] bag, and we saw him with a bag that has mail in it from the apartment." Segarra objected to this statement as facts not in evidence, but the court overruled the objection. The prosecution resumed, clarifying, "He is not on trial for stealing mail. But, again, it is helpful to see that to understand that he was in the van, that he had access to the van, that he stole from the van."
III.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCING
The jury found Segarra not guilty of unlawfully taking a vehicle as charged in count 1 (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) but guilty of receiving a stolen vehicle as charged in count 2 (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). After a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true the prior serious felony conviction allegation.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court exercised its discretion and struck the prior conviction finding for purposes of sentencing. Segarra was sentenced to the low term of 16 months in prison. Segarra timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Segarra argues the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of the stolen mail because it was unrelated to the two charged offenses. Segarra contends the court's error violated his federal and state due process rights and was prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) or, in the alternative, People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). In addition, Segarra argues, if we determine he forfeited his appellate challenge by not objecting to Blyleven's testimony concerning the stolen mail evidence, his attorney provided ineffective assistance and his attorney's deficient performance prejudiced him under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (Strickland). We disagree.
I.
FORFEITURE
"'[F]orfeiture results from the failure to invoke a right.'" (Lynch v. California Coastal Commission (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 476.) "The forfeiture doctrine is a 'well-established procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been-but were not-raised in the trial court.'" (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 (Stowell).)
Reversal of a judgment based on erroneously admitted evidence is prohibited unless a timely and specific objection was made. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) "[T]he objection [must] fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling." (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 (Partida).) "'It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.'" (Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114.) "A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct." (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435.)
Here, Segarra never objected to Blyleven's testimony regarding the mail. Because no objection was made, Segarra forfeited his appellate challenge to the admission of this evidence by failing to preserve the issue for appeal.
As for Blyleven's BWC footage showing the stolen mail, Segarra did object to it. Contrary to Segarra's assertions, nothing in the record shows he objected to the BWC footage during the 402 hearing or at the time it was introduced to the jury. Segarra made the objection after both parties rested their respective cases when the trial court considered which exhibits to admit. This was well after the prosecution played the footage to the jury. By not making a contemporaneous objection, Segarra deprived the court of the opportunity to correct any error. Segarra's objection after the parties rested was untimely and did not preserve the issue for appeal. (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856 ["a defendant generally must preserve claims of trial error by contemporaneous objection as a prerequisite to raising them on appeal"].)
II.
ADMISSION OF STOLEN MAIL EVIDENCE
Even assuming Segarra preserved his evidentiary challenges to the stolen mail evidence, the trial court did not err in admitting that evidence. While character evidence "is inadmissible when offered to prove . . . conduct on a specified occasion" (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), evidence of uncharged offenses is admissible "when relevant to prove some fact," like motive (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)). "In other words, [Evidence Code section 1101] allows the admission of evidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense '"'"when such evidence is relevant to establish some fact other than the person's character or disposition."'"'" (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358 (Thomas).)
"'When reviewing the admission of evidence of other offenses, a court must consider: (1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative value of the other crime evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence is relevant. [Citation.] Because this type of evidence can be so damaging, "[i]f the connection between the uncharged offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear, the evidence should be excluded."'" (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 667.) "Courts subject other crimes evidence to '"extremely careful analysis."'" (People v. Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 216, 238 (Hendrix).)
"[A] trial court's decision to admit evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352" is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5that p. 358.) "We do not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or made in a '"patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice."'" (Ibid.)
A. Materiality
"The first factor in determining the admissibility of uncharged act evidence is the materiality of the facts sought to be proved." (People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 957 (Clark).) "[T]he fact sought to be proved or disproved must be either an ultimate fact or an intermediate fact from which such ultimate fact may be inferred. [Citation.] Elements of the offense and defenses are ultimate facts." (Hendrix, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 239.) "[M]otive is an intermediate fact, from which the existence of an ultimate fact may be inferred. [Citations.] And for intermediate facts, 'the materiality requirement is satisfied only if the intermediate fact tends logically and reasonably to prove an ultimate fact.'" (Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 960.)
"Other crimes evidence is admissible to establish two different types or categories of motive evidence. In the first category, 'the uncharged act supplies the motive for the charged crime; the uncharged act is cause, and the charged crime is effect.' [Citation.] 'In the second category, the uncharged act evidences the existence of a motive, but the act does not supply the motive.... [T]he motive is the cause, and both the charged and uncharged acts are effects. Both crimes are explainable as a result of the same motive.'" (People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1381, italics omitted.)
Here, the prosecution offered evidence of the uncharged act of Segarra stealing mail for the noncharacter purpose of establishing Segarra's motive for stealing the van, the charged act. Specifically, the prosecution's theory was Segarra stole the van and the items inside the van-the ID badge and duffel bag-to use as "cover" to steal mail in the apartment complex. As Segarra already had a car and parked it near the bank, the prosecution used motive to explain why Segarra would steal an HVAC business's van. Thus, the materiality factor weighs in favor of admission of the uncharged act evidence.
B. Probative Value
"The second factor in determining the admissibility of uncharged act evidence under Evidence Code section 1101[, subdivision ](b) is probative value-the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove or disprove the material fact." (Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 962.) "Probative value goes to the weight of the evidence of other offenses. The evidence is probative if it is material, relevant, and necessary. '[How] much "probative value" proffered evidence has depends upon the extent to which it tends to prove an issue by logic and reasonable inference (degree of relevancy), the importance of the issue to the case (degree of materiality), and the necessity of proving the issue by means of this particular piece of evidence (degree of necessity).'" (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318, fn. 20 (Thompson).) "[T]he probativeness of other-crimes evidence on the issue of motive does not necessarily depend on similarities between the charged and uncharged crimes, so long as the offenses have a direct logical nexus." (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15.)
The stolen mail evidence had probative value. According to the prosecution's motive theory, Segarra's "cover"-the HVAC van, ID badge, and duffel bag-facilitated his access to the apartment complex to steal mail, creating a logical nexus between the charged and uncharged acts. Therefore, the probative value factor also weighs in favor of the evidence's admission.
C. Evidence Code Section 352
"The third factor to consider in determining the admissibility of uncharged act evidence is the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence, i.e., prejudicial effect or other Evidence Code section 352 concerns." (Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 966.) Evidence Code section 352 states, "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." "A trial court should not exclude highly probative evidence unless the undue prejudice is unusually great." (People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 806 (Walker).)
"Evidence is prejudicial . . . if it '"uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual"' [citation] or if it would cause the jury to '"'prejudg[e]' a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors."'" (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 475.) "'Regardless of its probative value, evidence of other crimes always involves the risk of serious prejudice ....'" (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 318.) "The primary factors affecting the prejudicial effect of uncharged acts are whether the uncharged acts resulted in criminal convictions . . . and whether the evidence of uncharged acts is stronger or more inflammatory than the evidence of the charged offenses." (Walker, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) "[A]dmission of this evidence produces an 'over-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts.' [Citation.] It breeds a 'tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from other offences ....'" [Citation.] Moreover, 'the jury might be unable to identify with a defendant of offensive character, and hence tend to disbelieve the evidence in his favor.'" (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 317, fn. omitted.)
Segarra argues the stolen mail evidence evoked a strong emotional bias against him, because the jurors were likely to relate to someone stealing their mail as opposed to taking a commercial vehicle from them. Because the stolen mail evidence was relevant to motive, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such for this limited purpose. "Evidence of uncharged crimes is inherently prejudicial but may still be admitted if it has substantial probative effect. [Citation.] The matter lies within the discretion of the trial court." (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 380.) Segarra "has not established error under the highly deferential standard applicable here." (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 364.)
III.
HARMLESS ERROR
Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion, we find the error harmless. We review allegations of evidentiary error using the harmless error standard in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226227.) The Watson standard requires reversal only if "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) "'[P]robability' in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility." (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195.)
Here, the admission of the stolen mail evidence was harmless. Overwhelming circumstantial evidence supported the jury's finding as to the receiving a stolen vehicle charge. The technician testified that, while he was waiting inside the van in the parking structure, Segarra, who was wearing the technician's ID badge and duffel bag, opened the van's rear passenger door. When the technician asked what Segarra was doing, Segarra replied he thought the van was his. Additionally, Segarra's vehicle was parked near the area where the van was taken, the van was found a mere three miles from where the technician had last parked it, and only three hours had passed between the theft and the recovery of the vehicle.
The evidence also established Segarra knew the van had been stolen. Segarra did not work for an HVAC company. Despite having his own vehicle parked a few miles away, Segarra approached and opened the door of the van, which featured the business's name on both sides of the van. Segarra's actions following the confrontation with the technician also implied a consciousness of guilt: Segarra walked away from the van and dropped the ID badge and duffel bag. (CALCRIM No. 372.)
Moreover, the primary purpose of the stolen mail evidence was to show motive for the van theft, a crime of which the jury acquitted Segarra. Throughout its opening statement and closing argument, the prosecution tied the stolen mail to the van theft and stressed repeatedly the limited purpose of the stolen mail evidence was to show motive for the van theft. "Any inference of prejudice resulting from the [stolen mail] evidence is [largely] dispelled by the fact the jury" acquitted Segarra of vehicle theft. (People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1131.)
Segarra argues some courts find prejudicial error even if other admissible evidence establishes a defendant's guilt, citing People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 385 (Diaz). That is true. But the instant case is distinguishable from Diaz, which involved highly inflammatory videos, inadequate curative instructions by the trial court, the prosecution's disregard of the trial court's instructions to avoid referring to statements in the video, the jury asking questions related to the videos, a previous trial resulting in a hung jury, and a close case for the jury. (Id. at pp. 383-385.) Here, while one of the trial court's admonishments on the stolen mail evidence was inexact, the prosecution clarified the limited purpose of the stolen mail evidence several times and, importantly, the stolen mail evidence was hardly as inflammatory as the other evidence presented. This argument is therefore unavailing.
We reject Segarra's claim that the admission of the stolen mail evidence violated his federal and state due process rights and thereby warrants application of the harmless error standard in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24. Segarra's claim "falls within the general rule that 'violations of state evidentiary rules do not rise to the level of federal constitutional error.'" (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 120.)
The confluence of overwhelming circumstantial evidence linked Segarra to receiving the stolen van. Therefore, even if the trial court erred in admitting the stolen mail evidence, any such error would be harmless.
IV.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Segarra argues that, if he forfeited the evidentiary issue, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. "It is defendant's burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial counsel." (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436.) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 688, 694.)
Even if Segarra successfully objected to the stolen mail evidence, it is not reasonably probable the result would have been different, for the same reasons discussed ante. (People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407, fn. 4 [Watson prejudicial analysis "is substantially the same as the" prejudicial analysis in Strickland].) Segarra therefore has not established ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: GOETHALS, ACTING P. J. DELANEY, J.