Opinion
368554
09-19-2024
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAEQUIN RASHADE SCOTT, Defendant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Saginaw Circuit Court LC No. 22-049792-FH
Before: RICK, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution appeals by delayed leave granted an order granting defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of jury confusion or impermissible compromise. Defendant was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. A jury convicted defendant of felony-firearm despite being unable to reach a verdict on the felonious assault count. We affirm.
People v Scott, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 27, 2024 (Docket No. 368554).
The order also denied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Neither party challenges this portion of the order on appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the execution of a no-knock search warrant at a house in Saginaw that followed a narcotics investigation. After breaking through the door and setting off a "flashbang grenade," the police allegedly found defendant lying on the ground with his legs curled. According to a police witness, defendant then pointed a gun at the officer, and the officer shot defendant multiple times. Despite being injured, defendant survived. Defendant was arrested, and charged as described above.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury as follows with respect to the felony-firearm charge:
In Count II, the defendant is also charged with the separate crime of possessing a firearm at the time he committed the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon. This crime is often referred to as felony firearm for short. It is not necessary, however, that the defendant be convicted of that crime.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court regarding the felony-firearm instruction, stating that "[t]he first element seems self-contradictory" and requesting clarification on "the situation where the defendant is found not guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon, but is found guilty of felony firearm[.]" The court answered the question by acknowledging that the first element of felony-firearm is "somewhat contradictory" but added that "courts allow it." The court then reread the felony-firearm instruction to the jury. The court concluded by saying,
Does that seem contradictory? Yeah, it does. But our courts have determined that you can find somebody not guilty of felonious assault, and still find them guilty of felony firearm. Yeah, it doesn't make a lot of sense, but I didn't write it, I'm just reading it. So it's something you can do. And I can't tell you how they thought when they came up with that, but that is the law, okay?
Later, the jury sent another note requesting information about the law governing selfdefense. The court declined to offer this instruction because it found that a rational view of the evidence did not support a self-defense instruction and because the prosecution did not have an opportunity to present evidence or arguments on the matter. It answered the jury's question by stating, "I've got your note, the first part saying-talking about [sic] self-defense statute. We discussed that, that there will be no explanation given for that in this case[,] okay?"
The jury then sent another note to the court indicating that it reached a verdict on one count but not on the other. The court considered giving the jury a deadlock instruction and asked the foreperson whether the jury would be able to reach a verdict on the deadlocked count with further deliberation. The foreperson responded that the jury was deadlocked and further deliberation would not assist the jury in reaching a verdict, so the court asked the jury to deliver its verdict. The jury found defendant guilty of felony-firearm but was unable to reach a verdict as to the felonious assault charge.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts resulting from jury confusion or impermissible compromise, as evidenced by the jury's questions regarding the felony-firearm instruction and self-defense. With a different judge presiding, the court heard oral arguments on the motion. The court found that the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the felonious assault count rendered its verdicts inconsistent. The court further found that the jury's questions and the prior judge's responses suggested that the inconsistent verdicts resulted from jury confusion or impermissible compromise. The court thereafter entered an order granting defendant's motion for a new trial. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court palpably erred by finding that the jury's questions demonstrated jury confusion or impermissible compromise because the record did not support such a finding. The motion was denied, and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
The prosecution first argues that, to the extent the verdicts were inconsistent, the court abused its discretion by granting defendant's motion for a new trial because there was no evidence demonstrating that the inconsistent verdicts resulted from jury confusion or impermissible compromise. Because the record supports the court's conclusion that the jury was confused, we affirm.
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial. People v Johnson, 502 Mich. 541, 564; 918 N.W.2d 676 (2018). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes or when it makes an error of law. People v Owens, 338 Mich.App. 101, 113; 979 N.W.2d 345 (2021). This Court's review of a trial court's decision to grant a new trial "examines the reasons given by the trial court for granting a new trial. This Court will find an abuse of discretion if the reasons given by the trial court do not provide a legally recognized basis for relief." People v Loew, 340 Mich.App. 100, 108; 985 N.W.2d 255 (2022) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). "This Court reviews de novo questions regarding inconsistent verdicts, which are constitutional issues." People v Russell, 297 Mich.App. 707, 722; 825 N.W.2d 623 (2012). A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Johnson, 502 Mich. at 565. "Clear error occurs if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
MCR 6.431(B), which provides permissible grounds for granting a motion for a new trial, provides in relevant part:
On the defendant's motion, the court may order a new trial on any ground that would support appellate reversal of the conviction or because it believes that the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The court must state its reason for granting or denying a new trial orally on the record or in a written ruling made a part of the record.
Defendant was granted a new trial because the court found that the jury's inconsistent verdicts resulted from jury confusion or impermissible compromise. Accordingly, we must determine whether the inconsistent verdicts provided a legally recognized basis for relief.
As a threshold matter, the prosecution expressed doubt regarding whether there were inconsistent verdicts because the felonious assault charged resulted in a hung jury rather than an acquittal. "Verdicts are considered 'inconsistent' when the verdicts cannot rationally be reconciled." People v Montague, 338 Mich.App. 29, 51; 979 N.W.2d 406 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finding defendant guilty of felony-firearm means that the jury was unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was likewise guilty of felonious assault. Failing to reach a verdict on the felonious assault charge means that the jury was not unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of felonious assault. While the term "inconsistent verdicts" is a bit of a misnomer given that only one charge resulted in a verdict, these two outcomes cannot be rationally reconciled. Therefore, inconsistent-verdict jurisprudence is applicable.
"A jury may reach inconsistent verdicts as a result of mistake, compromise, or leniency. People v Goss, 446 Mich. 587, 597-598; 521 N.W.2d 312 (1994). Our Supreme Court has explained:
Juries are not held to any rules of logic nor are they required to explain their decisions. The ability to convict or acquit another individual of a crime is a grave responsibility and an awesome power. An element of this power is the jury's capacity for leniency. Since we are unable to know just how the jury reached their conclusion, whether the result of compassion or compromise, it is unrealistic to believe that a jury would intend that an acquittal on one count and conviction on another would serve as the reason for defendant's release.... [W]e feel that the mercy-dispensing power of the jury may serve to release a defendant from some of the consequences of his act without absolving him of all responsibility. [People v Vaughn, 409 Mich. 463, 466; 295 N.W.2d 354 (1980) (footnotes omitted).]
Accordingly, "[i]nconsistent verdicts within a single jury trial are permissible, and do not require reversal absent a showing of confusion by the jury, a misunderstanding of the instructions, or impermissible compromises." Montague, 338 Mich.App. at 51. Defendant bears the burden to establish an impermissible basis for an inconsistent verdict and cannot rely on the inconsistency alone. Id.
In People v Lewis, 415 Mich. 443, 446; 330 N.W.2d 16 (1982), our Supreme Court specifically concluded that a felony-firearm conviction does not require a conviction of the underlying felony. The Court stated that "[a]lthough the Legislature no doubt contemplated that a person convicted of felony-firearm would also have been convicted of an underlying felony, it made commission or the attempt to commit a felony and not conviction of a felony an element of felony-firearm." Id. at 453. Therefore, "it is both within the letter of the statute and the spirit of the legislative purpose to construe the statute as providing for the imposition of sentence in a case where the jury convicts of felony-firearm but acquits of the underlying felony." Id. at 453-454 (footnote omitted).
The record supports the court's conclusion that the jury was confused. First, while not the only explanation, the fact that the jury rendered verdicts that cannot be logically reconciled does suggest confusion. However, the clearest evidence of confusion in this case is the fact that the jury explicitly told the court that it was confused. The jury described the felony-firearm instruction as "self-contradictory" and asked for guidance on how a person could be not guilty of felonious assault but guilty of felony-firearm. The court's response did nothing to quell this confusion; instead of answering the question, the court simply reread the instruction that the jury found confusing and acknowledged that it "doesn't make a lot of sense." If anything, the court added to the confusion. The jury then asked for clarification about the law of self-defense, and the court simply told the jury that it would not answer the question. Thus, the jury twice expressed confusion and twice was not given any answers. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that a new trial was warranted because the verdict was a product of confusion rather than leniency.
Because the court did not err by finding that the inconsistent verdicts were the result of confusion, we need not review its finding that they were also the result of compromise.
That the jury asked about self-defense even though defendant asserted he did not point a gun at the police and did not assert a self-defense claim further demonstrates the jury's confusion.
The prosecution raises two issues in its statement of the questions presented that we decline to review because they were abandoned in the analysis section. First, defendant argued that the new judge who granted defendant's motion abused its discretion by allegedly deciding this motion without reviewing the trial transcripts. Second, defendant argues that the court erroneously relied on dicta when citing caselaw in support of its decision. Aside from a brief reference to the first issue in the brief's "introduction" section, there is no mention of either of these issues in the rest of the brief. Therefore, we deem review of the arguments waived. See People v Matuszak, 263 Mich.App. 42, 59; 687 N.W.2d 342 (2004) ("An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authority.").
Affirmed.
MURRAY, J. (dissenting).
The majority holds that the jury reached inconsistent verdicts when it convicted defendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, but could not reach a verdict on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82, because the inconsistency was the result of jury confusion. Because the record belies the conclusion that jury confusion led to the verdict, and therefore the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion, I respectfully dissent.
In reviewing this issue, it is critical to place the questions in context of what had already occurred. First, there is no dispute that the jury was properly instructed, and that when the jurors asked the four questions during deliberations, the court provided (after consultation with counsel) answers to the jury's questions. Second, there is no argument that the answers provided were not accurate. Third, the jury was instructed not to compromise their views and to render a unanimous verdict, and was polled after the verdict and all agreed with the verdict rendered.
The record also reflects that the jury was faced with the odd, but perfectly legal, situation where it could convict defendant of felony-firearm without convicting him of felonious assault, the underlying felony. See People v Lewis, 415 Mich. 443, 453-454; 330 N.W.2d 16 (1982) (stating "it is both within the letter of the statute and the spirit of the legislative purpose to construe the statute as providing for the imposition of sentence in a case where the jury convicts of felonyfirearm but acquits of the underlying felony"). This inconsistency in the verdict, which again was permitted by Supreme Court precedent, alone cannot carry defendant's burden of showing the verdict was the result of confusion. People v Montague, 338 Mich.App. 29, 51; 979 N.W.2d 406 (2021).
Jurors are, of course, free to ask the court questions during deliberations, and doing so "is not necessarily indicative of jury compromise" or confusion. People v Moorer, 246 Mich.App. 680, 683 n 1; 635 N.W.2d 47 (2001), citing People v Clark, 172 Mich.App. 1, 5; 432 N.W.2d 173 (1988). Here, the record reflects that the jury sent a note to the court regarding the seemingly contradictory nature of the felony-firearm instruction which, again, was consistent with controlling law. The court acknowledged the "somewhat contradictory" nature of the instruction, but informed the jury that it was permitted by law. The court then reread the felony-firearm instruction to the jury.
The only other relevant note sent by the jury requested information about self-defense, but nothing was provided since defendant had never requested that defense instruction, a rational view of the evidence did not support a self-defense instruction, and the prosecution did not have an opportunity to present evidence or arguments on the matter.
This is the sum total of questions posed by the jury, and all they reflect are questions about the apparent internal inconsistency (but legal inconsistency), in the felony-firearm instruction, and whether self-defense was at issue. Those questions do not present clear evidence of confusion, but instead show that the jury "kn[e]w what it was doing," Lewis, 415 Mich. at 450 n 9, as it carefully listened to and read the instruction, and saw the inconsistency. But once the court instructed the jury that it was a lawful, permissible inconsistency to reach, no other questions on the subject were asked. And, the verdict reached was consistent with that outcome, i.e., it convicted defendant of felony-firearm without convicting him of felonious assault. The same holds true with the jury asking about the availability of self-defense-it carefully reviewed the evidence, and apparently thought that defendant may have acted in that manner. But, having been denied information about that defense, it was left to the instructions provided, which presumably it followed. To conclude that the verdict was a product of confusion, on this record, is based upon improper speculation.
Importantly, it is reasonable to conclude that the jury was already leaning this way, as why else would it ask whether it could, under the given (and correct) instruction, convict defendant of felony-firearm without a conviction of felonious assault?
There is no doubt, as ably argued by defendant, that the trial court's decision is afforded deference by this Court, because the governing standard of review is abuse of discretion. But an abuse of discretion occurs where a trial court grants a new trial when neither the law nor facts support a new trial under the court rules. See People v Owens, 338 Mich.App. 101, 113; 979 N.W.2d 345 (2021).
There is also no doubt that the judge deciding the motion was not the judge who presided over the trial.
I would reverse the trial court's order.