Opinion
December 3, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Sherman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly permitted the eight-year-old complainant to be sworn as a witness. Absent an improvident exercise of discretion, the court's determination with respect to a witness's competency will not be disturbed (see, People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560, 566; see also, People v. Fernandez, 138 A.D.2d 733, 734; People v. Boyd, 122 A.D.2d 273, 275). The court found, after a preliminary examination, that the complainant knew and appreciated the difference between truth and falsity, and knew the consequences of telling a lie. It was therefore reasonable to conclude that he understood the gravity of the oath.
Upon a review of the record, we are satisfied that the People's expression of readiness for trial on February 3, 1989, indicated present readiness to proceed, and not merely an expectation of future readiness (see, People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337; People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932). Consequently, the defendant was not denied his statutory right to a speedy trial, and the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss on this ground.
We reject the defendant's claim that the admission at trial of allegations of acts not charged in the indictment violated standards of fair notice (see, People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 416; People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 293; People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 594).
Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that it was legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of the crimes charged (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). Bracken, J.P., Brown, Kunzeman and Harwood, JJ., concur.