Opinion
Argued June 12, 1981
Decided July 6, 1981
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, JOSEPH S. MATTINA, J.
Charles D. Halvorsen, Rose H. Sconiers and Joseph B. Mistrett for appellant.
Edward C. Cosgrove, District Attorney (John De Franks and Joseph A. Matteliano of counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Defendant's plea of guilty operated as a waiver of his claim that he was entitled to have the indictment dismissed on the ground that the People were not ready for trial within the time prescribed by CPL 30.30 (People v Friscia, 51 N.Y.2d 845). Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider the merits of this statutory "speedy trial" claim in the instant appeal. As to defendant's claim that his conviction should be reversed because he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, although this claim was not waived by his plea, we note only that defendant has not demonstrated a factual or legal basis for the claim (see People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442) and that, consequently, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks.
Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and MEYER concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.